What was the outcome of Tenancy Tribunal case 4720410?

The tribunal order states: Joel Stanawski and Elena Fabbro must pay Lindsay Woods and Ailsa Woods

How much money was awarded in case 4720410?

Verified claim lines are listed on this page.

What type of tenancy dispute was case 4720410?

The dispute type was not classified.

Where can I read the official tribunal order for case 4720410?

The official Ministry of Justice published order is available at https://forms.justice.govt.nz/search/Documents/TTV2/PDF/10255812-Tribunal_Order.pdf.

What was the outcome of Tenancy Tribunal case 4720410?

The tribunal order states: Joel Stanawski and Elena Fabbro must pay Lindsay Woods and Ailsa Woods

How much money was awarded in case 4720410?

Verified claim lines are listed on this page.

What type of tenancy dispute was case 4720410?

The dispute type was not classified.

Where can I read the official tribunal order for case 4720410?

The official Ministry of Justice published order is available at https://forms.justice.govt.nz/search/Documents/TTV2/PDF/10255812-Tribunal_Order.pdf.

Unit/Flat 3, 21 Rannoch Drive, Jacks Point, Queenstown Tenancy Tribunal Case 4720410 — Tenancy dispute

Order

Joel Stanawski and Elena Fabbro must pay Lindsay Woods and Ailsa Woods $147.00 immediately, being the balance of the landlord letting fee.
The tenant is to retain the balance of the bond.
All other applications are dismissed.

Reasons

Both parties attended this rehearing on 19 April 2024.
The relevant law is found in the Residential Tenancies Act 1986 (“RTA”).
As with any claim before the Tenancy Tribunal, the Tribunal applies the usual civil law standards and expectations. That means that it is for the party bringing the application to establish their claims “on the balance of probabilities.” That means that in this case the tenant must establish that what they are claiming is more likely than not.
The balance of probabilities means more likely than unlikely, or in mathematical terms, has a fractionally more than 50% likelihood. The Tribunal does not need to be certain or very sure about any claim, only that what is claimed is likely. I do not need to be completely certain, but I need to be more certain than uncertain. In deciding any claim, I must consider all the evidence presented (including oral evidence during the hearing). I must weigh this evidence to decide what is more likely.
This is referred to as the “burden of proof.” Independent witnesses, corroborating documents and photographs may be an important part of discharging this burden. Ultimately however, it is for the party making the application to decide what evidence to put before the Tribunal.
As noted in Kaipo v Clarke & McCarthy (DC) TT233/02, in practical terms this means that: “ like anyone who brings an application before a Tribunal or Court, it is incumbent upon the applicant to provide the evidence necessary to prove the case. If the applicant fails to do that, then their application will be dismissed whether it has merit or not because it is up to the applicant to provide the necessary evidence. It is not up to the other parties, and it is certainly not up to the Tribunal to extract evidence.” (the emphasis is mine).
The Tribunal is not governed by the usual laws of evidence. The Tribunal may accept and consider any evidence. What is of importance, is the weight attached to that evidence by the Tribunal. As an example, the Tribunal is likely to attach more weight to evidence from a witness who is present at the hearing and who is available to be cross-examined, as distinct from evidence provided by way of a written statement from a witness who is not present at the hearing.
In this case, both parties have submitted documentary evidence. For the sake of brevity, I have not referred to all the evidence presented, however, the parties can be assured that it has all been carefully considered.
Prior to reviewing the evidence of the parties in relation to these claims, I wish to record that I found the parties to this hearing to be diligent and honest people. I have absolutely no doubt that all parties came to the hearing with a genuine desire to provide their evidence in a truthful manner.
The tenancy at Unit 3, 21 Rannoch Drive, Jacks Point Queenstown (“the premises”) commenced on 6 July 2023.
The tenants seek an order from the Tribunal for the return of their bond. Somewhat unusually, the bond has already been paid to the tenants, so that the parties seek an order as to what is not to happen to those funds.
The landlord seeks compensation for some of the money returned to the tenants. I explained to the parties that this would normally require the landlord to file a cross application with the Tribunal (see s.22B(2) Residential Tenancies Act 1986 (“RTA”)).
The tenants consented to the landlord counterclaim being heard at the same time without an application being filed and I proceeded to hear the matter on that basis.
This was a fixed term tenancy due to end on 21 February 2024.
There is no dispute between the parties over the background details. The tenants wanted to leave the tenancy early. The tenants moved out of the premises and paid rent through until 6 November 2023. The landlord advertised for replacement tenants and was successful in finding new tenants. The new tenants moved into the premises on 4 November 2023.
The landlord seeks reimbursement for $368.00 for his advertising costs and for his work in finding replacement tenants. The landlord also seeks to be credited with the 2 days rent that the tenants had overpaid ($147.00). The total costs claimed for finding replacement tenants is $515.00.
The landlord seeks a further $360.00, as he was only able to obtain new tenants at a lower weekly rent rate. The difference between the rent paid by the tenants and the replacement tenants was $15.00 per week. The term which the landlord says the tenants are liable for is from 4 November 2023 to what would have been the end of the fixed term tenancy on 21 February 2024. That is a period of 24 weeks. The landlord claims $15.00 per week being a total of $360.00.
The tenancy agreement entered into by the parties provides that if the tenant needs to negotiate an early end to the tenancy, a fee of one weeks rent will apply and rent will be payable until a mutually agreeable new tenancy termination date.
The RTA allows a landlord to charge a fee for ending a fixed term tenancy, but the fees should only be their actual and reasonable costs, for example the cost to advertise for new tenants. A fixed cost, as proposed in the tenancy agreement, is not valid.
In this case, the landlord accepts that there were no actual advertising costs incurred. The only “expense” was the landlord’s own time spent in arranging advertising online through Market Place, vetting potential tenants and carrying out open homes. The landlord time cost is something that has been incurred solely as a result of the early end to the fixed term tenancy. Taking into account the evidence provided by the landlord, I consider that a reasonable charge would be $300.00 and the tenant is ordered to pay $153.00 being the sum ordered, less the credit of $147.00 rent credit retained by the landlord.
The landlord said in evidence that he never agreed with the tenants that the fixed term tenancy could end early. I do not accept that this is the reality. If there had never been such an agreement, one has to question why the landlord was working to find replacement tenants. As mentioned to the landlord at the hearing, he can’t have it both ways.
I consider that the parties did agree to the fixed term tenancy ending and that it would end upon the commencement of the tenancy with new tenants. The landlord alone agreed with the new tenants that they could pay a lower weekly rent. There was never a discussion with the existing tenants or an acceptance by them that they would be liable in the event that new tenants could only be found at a reduced weekly rent. In those circumstances, I dismiss the landlord’s application.
Both parties have applied for name suppression.
Under Section 95A(1) RTA suppression order must be granted if on the application of a party that has wholly or substantially succeeded in proceedings.
In the present case, neither party has been wholly or substantially successful. I have considered if I should grant a name suppression order to the parties having regard to the interests of the parties and public interest under Section 95A(4) RTA.
I am mindful that open justice is a fundamental principle in our legal system. The issue here I need to consider is whether suppressing the parties’ names and identifying details outweighs the interest of the open justice reporting principle.
In my view, the application for name suppression and identifying details ought to be declined for the following reasons: a. It is common for parties appearing before the Tribunal to seek suppression orders. But that is not of itself a sufficient reason to make the order. b. The disputes before me are not unusual or other than the ordinary business of the Tribunal. c. The open justice principle requires the outcome of adjudication to be available to the public; and d. Weighing up the interests of the landlord, tenant and the public interest, the public interest outweighs the parties’ interests.
Accordingly, no order is made for suppression of the parties names and identifying details.

Order

Joel Stanawski and Elena Fabbro must pay Lindsay Woods and Ailsa Woods $147.00 immediately, being the balance of the landlord letting fee.
The tenant is to retain the balance of the bond.
All other applications are dismissed.

Reasons

Both parties attended this rehearing on 19 April 2024.
The relevant law is found in the Residential Tenancies Act 1986 (“RTA”).
As with any claim before the Tenancy Tribunal, the Tribunal applies the usual civil law standards and expectations. That means that it is for the party bringing the application to establish their claims “on the balance of probabilities.” That means that in this case the tenant must establish that what they are claiming is more likely than not.
The balance of probabilities means more likely than unlikely, or in mathematical terms, has a fractionally more than 50% likelihood. The Tribunal does not need to be certain or very sure about any claim, only that what is claimed is likely. I do not need to be completely certain, but I need to be more certain than uncertain. In deciding any claim, I must consider all the evidence presented (including oral evidence during the hearing). I must weigh this evidence to decide what is more likely.
This is referred to as the “burden of proof.” Independent witnesses, corroborating documents and photographs may be an important part of discharging this burden. Ultimately however, it is for the party making the application to decide what evidence to put before the Tribunal.
As noted in Kaipo v Clarke & McCarthy (DC) TT233/02, in practical terms this means that: “ like anyone who brings an application before a Tribunal or Court, it is incumbent upon the applicant to provide the evidence necessary to prove the case. If the applicant fails to do that, then their application will be dismissed whether it has merit or not because it is up to the applicant to provide the necessary evidence. It is not up to the other parties, and it is certainly not up to the Tribunal to extract evidence.” (the emphasis is mine).
The Tribunal is not governed by the usual laws of evidence. The Tribunal may accept and consider any evidence. What is of importance, is the weight attached to that evidence by the Tribunal. As an example, the Tribunal is likely to attach more weight to evidence from a witness who is present at the hearing and who is available to be cross-examined, as distinct from evidence provided by way of a written statement from a witness who is not present at the hearing.
In this case, both parties have submitted documentary evidence. For the sake of brevity, I have not referred to all the evidence presented, however, the parties can be assured that it has all been carefully considered.
Prior to reviewing the evidence of the parties in relation to these claims, I wish to record that I found the parties to this hearing to be diligent and honest people. I have absolutely no doubt that all parties came to the hearing with a genuine desire to provide their evidence in a truthful manner.
The tenancy at Unit 3, 21 Rannoch Drive, Jacks Point Queenstown (“the premises”) commenced on 6 July 2023.
The tenants seek an order from the Tribunal for the return of their bond. Somewhat unusually, the bond has already been paid to the tenants, so that the parties seek an order as to what is not to happen to those funds.
The landlord seeks compensation for some of the money returned to the tenants. I explained to the parties that this would normally require the landlord to file a cross application with the Tribunal (see s.22B(2) Residential Tenancies Act 1986 (“RTA”)).
The tenants consented to the landlord counterclaim being heard at the same time without an application being filed and I proceeded to hear the matter on that basis.
This was a fixed term tenancy due to end on 21 February 2024.
There is no dispute between the parties over the background details. The tenants wanted to leave the tenancy early. The tenants moved out of the premises and paid rent through until 6 November 2023. The landlord advertised for replacement tenants and was successful in finding new tenants. The new tenants moved into the premises on 4 November 2023.
The landlord seeks reimbursement for $368.00 for his advertising costs and for his work in finding replacement tenants. The landlord also seeks to be credited with the 2 days rent that the tenants had overpaid ($147.00). The total costs claimed for finding replacement tenants is $515.00.
The landlord seeks a further $360.00, as he was only able to obtain new tenants at a lower weekly rent rate. The difference between the rent paid by the tenants and the replacement tenants was $15.00 per week. The term which the landlord says the tenants are liable for is from 4 November 2023 to what would have been the end of the fixed term tenancy on 21 February 2024. That is a period of 24 weeks. The landlord claims $15.00 per week being a total of $360.00.
The tenancy agreement entered into by the parties provides that if the tenant needs to negotiate an early end to the tenancy, a fee of one weeks rent will apply and rent will be payable until a mutually agreeable new tenancy termination date.
The RTA allows a landlord to charge a fee for ending a fixed term tenancy, but the fees should only be their actual and reasonable costs, for example the cost to advertise for new tenants. A fixed cost, as proposed in the tenancy agreement, is not valid.
In this case, the landlord accepts that there were no actual advertising costs incurred. The only “expense” was the landlord’s own time spent in arranging advertising online through Market Place, vetting potential tenants and carrying out open homes. The landlord time cost is something that has been incurred solely as a result of the early end to the fixed term tenancy. Taking into account the evidence provided by the landlord, I consider that a reasonable charge would be $300.00 and the tenant is ordered to pay $153.00 being the sum ordered, less the credit of $147.00 rent credit retained by the landlord.
The landlord said in evidence that he never agreed with the tenants that the fixed term tenancy could end early. I do not accept that this is the reality. If there had never been such an agreement, one has to question why the landlord was working to find replacement tenants. As mentioned to the landlord at the hearing, he can’t have it both ways.
I consider that the parties did agree to the fixed term tenancy ending and that it would end upon the commencement of the tenancy with new tenants. The landlord alone agreed with the new tenants that they could pay a lower weekly rent. There was never a discussion with the existing tenants or an acceptance by them that they would be liable in the event that new tenants could only be found at a reduced weekly rent. In those circumstances, I dismiss the landlord’s application.
Both parties have applied for name suppression.
Under Section 95A(1) RTA suppression order must be granted if on the application of a party that has wholly or substantially succeeded in proceedings.
In the present case, neither party has been wholly or substantially successful. I have considered if I should grant a name suppression order to the parties having regard to the interests of the parties and public interest under Section 95A(4) RTA.
I am mindful that open justice is a fundamental principle in our legal system. The issue here I need to consider is whether suppressing the parties’ names and identifying details outweighs the interest of the open justice reporting principle.
In my view, the application for name suppression and identifying details ought to be declined for the following reasons: a. It is common for parties appearing before the Tribunal to seek suppression orders. But that is not of itself a sufficient reason to make the order. b. The disputes before me are not unusual or other than the ordinary business of the Tribunal. c. The open justice principle requires the outcome of adjudication to be available to the public; and d. Weighing up the interests of the landlord, tenant and the public interest, the public interest outweighs the parties’ interests.
Accordingly, no order is made for suppression of the parties names and identifying details.

Tenancy Tribunal case 4720410 — Tenancy dispute at Unit/Flat 3, 21 Rannoch Drive, Jacks Point, Queenstown

At a glance

Claims & awards

Tenancy Tribunal case 4720410 — Tenancy dispute at Unit/Flat 3, 21 Rannoch Drive, Jacks Point, Queenstown

At a glance

Claims & awards

Order

Reasons

Topics & place

Residential Tenancies Act sections

Frequently asked questions

Order

Reasons

Topics & place

Residential Tenancies Act sections

Frequently asked questions