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Tenancy Tribunal case 4860131 — Tenancy dispute at 1940 Cardrona Valley Road, Cardrona, RD 2, Wanaka 9382

Decided 24 February 2026 · Published 24 February 2026 · Application 4860131

Landlord favoured

Property damage

View official order on MoJ →Explore similar cases

At a glance

Key facts from the published tribunal order.

Outcome

Landlord favoured

From published order

Location

Wanaka

Tribunal region

Adjudicator

M Brennan

Claims & awards

What this tenancy cost at tribunal — claim, category, amount, and party awarded, with reconciled net total.

No individual claim amounts were reconciled for this order. View the official Ministry of Justice PDF for full detail.

Order

The application for a rehearing is dismissed.

Reasons

Both parties attended the hearing to consider the landlord application for a rehearing.
These applications have been the subject of a number of prior hearings and orders. These are briefly recounted here.
On 26 August 2024 the Tribunal made a monetary order in favour of the tenants. The final amount reflected a number of successful claims from both parties. The final sum due the tenants was $1,221.67. This sum reflected, amongst other awards in favour of the landlord, $1,000.00 for a loss of amenity after the tenants were found to have cut a number of trees, causing significant damage.
The landlord sought a rehearing of that determination, claiming a number of errors. The adjudicator heard that application for a rehearing and dismissed all claims bar the award for the tree damage by order on 27 September 2024. He accepted that further, fresh evidence regarding the trees established grounds for the single claim regarding the tree damage and compensation to be reheard by another adjudicator. That adjudicator was to become me.
The landlord was unhappy with the order of 27 September 2024 and lodged an appeal to the District Court. There continued some discussions between the parties that are discussed later. The result was the landlord withdrawing the appeal. There was some confusion regarding what appears the interchangeable use of “dismissed” and “withdrawn” in correspondence. Regardless, the appeal was not heard after email advice to the Registry from the landlord on 30 April 2025, saw the appeal withdrawn. No determination of the appeal was required or made. The Tribunal system file notes on 25 July 2025, “Queenstown Court have advised that the appeal was withdrawn so can now proceed to rehearing granted as to the trees only.”
The appeal withdrawal meant the rehearing of the pending rehearing of the claim regarding tree damage and any compensation could now be scheduled by the Tribunal.
A late adjournment request by the tenants meant the next hearing scheduled for 22 September 2025 had to be adjourned. This was not the first adjournment.
The matter was then set down for 11 November 2025. A Direction was issued by me on 12 November 2025.
It required:
The final order was released on 14 November 2025. That order incorporated the previous order of 26 August 2024 and awarded compensation to the landlord for the tenant damage to the trees. The net result was neither party owed the other.
On 14 November 2025, the landlord applied for a rehearing on the grounds that the setoff of the compensation awarded against the monetary order in favour of the tenants from before should not have occurred. The second grounds for requesting a rehearing was the landlord view that the compensation awarded was insufficient and she had further evidence to support that.
Section 105(1) Residential Tenancies Act 1986 provides that the Tribunal has the power to order a rehearing where “a substantial wrong or miscarriage of justice has or may have occurred or is likely to occur”.
Usually the party applying for the rehearing must show that something went wrong with the Tribunal’s procedure, for example, that they did not receive notice of the hearing or they were not able to properly present their case. A rehearing may also be granted where there is new evidence that was not reasonably available at the first hearing, if it could have affected the outcome.
The District Court has held that if the Tribunal was simply wrong in its findings of fact, or its application of the law, this is not sufficient to establish a miscarriage of justice: a rehearing is not an alternative to an appeal. Furthermore, a rehearing will not be granted just because a party is unhappy with the decision, or to give them a second opportunity to present their case.

Has a substantial wrong or miscarriage of justice occurred?

I consider the two grounds cited for a rehearing. First ground claimed – the incorporation of the prior 26 August 2024 monetary order into the final order.
As noted above, the intention to incorporate the previous order was signalled prior to the final order by my minute of 12 November 2025.
With the withdrawal of the appeal to the District Court, the two applications were returned to me. While the single claim to be determined was the tree damage and quantum of any compensation, the order of 26 August 2024 remained “live”, albeit the $1,000.00 awarded to the landlord was effectively removed with that, to be determined in the fresh hearing with me.
In Wellington City Council v McMillan [2003] DCR 50, the District Court held that if the Tribunal was simply wrong in its findings of fact, or its application of the law, this is not sufficient to establish a miscarriage of justice: [19] In my view, however, the words do not cover a complaint that the Tribunal was merely mistaken or wrong in its findings of fact or in its application of the law. There are two reasons for this. First the strength of the language in s 105 is such that something more than a mere wrong decision must be shown. The section does not speak of a decision being wrong, but of a substantial wrong or miscarriage of justice occurring. This implies obvious injustice, not merely an erroneous decision. [20] Secondly, if a mere erroneous decision is enough, whether the error is factual or legal or both, it would enable parties to in effect appeal any decision twice: once to the very Tribunal which made it by way of an application for rehearing, and then again to the District Court against the grant or refusal of the application for rehearing. Not only does that offend the general hierarchical nature of the appeal system, it would also make the time limit for filing notice of appeal against an original decision nugatory.
The incorporation of the previous order provided a final order for clarity and any subsequent enforcement purposes. This is usual practise and has merit for a number of practical reasons.
I do not consider the incorporation of the 26 August 2024 order into the final order, with an adjustment for the $1,000 compensation awarded at that time that was to be reheard, was a substantial wrong or injustice.
No concluded course of action via any determination of the previous District Court appeal occurred. While the landlord submitted the withdrawal was due to mutual agreement between the parties of the two disputed Tribunal awards (electricity and internet) only, the tenants stated they believed the “drop and walk away” approach proposed applied to all claims and both applications. I do not find that any clear acceptance by the tenants of such terms as claimed by the landlord are established. The email to the Registry dated 30 April 2025 is copied below (the tenants were cc’d to that email):
I consider the withdrawal communication was ambiguous or at best inconclusive as to the intent and any firm mutual agreement between the parties. The decision to withdraw an appeal such as here is one open to the applicant. Such a unilateral step is not unusual during an appeal process for a number of possible reasons. The other party have no sway on this and the actioning of such a request to withdraw is a procedural process completed by the Registry when so received.
In the absence of any subsequent District Court determination on any appeal regarding the orders made 1 , I do not consider the Tribunal process of incorporating a prior, active, order into the final order was wrong. Second ground claimed – the quantum of compensation and fresh evidence
The landlord sought “full compensation” for the damage to the trees via a rehearing. The quantum awarded was considered too low and she believed could “obtain evidence from the listing agent that the tree damage affected the price achieved for the sale of the property”.
I deal firstly with the desire of the landlord to adduce further evidence. This was not the first time in this dispute where the production of fresh evidence was later cited as grounds for a rehearing. That was successfully argued at the first rehearing where a partial rehearing on the trees only was ordered.
A rehearing may be granted where there is new evidence that was not reasonably available at the first hearing, if it could have affected the outcome. In Jemma Trust v Rutherford (DC North Shore, CIV-2009-044-2056, 11 December 1999), the District Court quoted an extract from the Court of Appeal outlining the relevant considerations: The principles upon which further evidence is admitted are designed to balance the interests of the person seeking to adduce such evidence on the 1 On the hearing of an appeal under section 117 RTA, a District Court Judge may— (a) quash the order of the Tribunal and order a rehearing of the claim by the Tribunal on such terms as the Judge thinks fit; or (b) quash the order, and substitute for it any other order or orders that the Tribunal could have made in respect of the original proceedings; or (c) dismiss the appeal one hand with the interests of the opposite party is on the other. They are also designed to reflect the public interest in ensuring, so far as is possible, that parties put up their best case at trial. Any other approach would be very wasteful of public resources. The conventional requirements are that the further evidence must be fresh, it must be credible and it must be cogent. Evidence is not regarded as fresh if it could with reasonable diligence have been produced at the trial....While the absence of freshness is not an absolute disqualification, the criteria for admission in such circumstances must be very strict. In our view, when the evidence is not fresh it should not be admitted unless the circumstances are exceptional and the grounds compelling.
The sale of the property and the impact on any possible reinstatement of the trees, being the basis for establishing the loss to the landlord was not raised by the landlord. The discussion was instigated by the tenants. It was an important factor to be considered.
No condition in the sale and purchase agreement addressed the trees. If they were considered in establishing the asking price, that is not obvious and, even if so, would be one of many factors considered by the vendor in establishing such a price.
The landlord tabled an email from the listing agent that she requested from him after the final hearing. Even if considered fresh, I consider that email of limited value to clearly link the historic quote of some $11,000 for the reinstatement with the sale price later agreed.
It was not lost on me that the tenant actions were wrong but with a enhanced rather than diminished result being their motivation. They were living there and sought to introduce more direct sunlight into the home, restricted due to extended tree shadow caused by the trees. It is perfectly conceivable the new owner might concur and not remedy as the landlord costed. I did not consider any transferable loss to the landlord was established by the sale and purchase process. This was reflected in the final order and remains my view. I appreciate the landlord has a different perspective on this.
Regardless, I do not consider the subsequent desire to introduce further evidence from the listing agent can be considered fresh. It was reasonably available before the hearing. The prior experience through the journey to date of these applications should have alerted the landlord to the need for timely evidence to support claims of any loss. I note that even if wrong, the statement by the agent lacks strong compulsion to conclude a direct causation between the damaged trees and diminished sale price.
I conclude by copying below one section from the 14 November 2025 order.
For the reasons above, I do not consider the cited grounds to justify a rehearing in this Tribunal establishes a substantial wrong or miscarriage of justice has occurred.
The application for a rehearing must be dismissed.

Topics & place

Topics are dispute themes across the order (not the same as claim-type money lines).

Property damage Wanaka

Residential Tenancies Act sections

s105, s105(1), s117

Property management

Management Shore Limited as trustee of the Kalander Trust (respondent)

Frequently asked questions

Common questions about this Tenancy Tribunal case.

What was the outcome of Tenancy Tribunal case 4860131?

The tribunal order states: The application for a rehearing is dismissed.

How much money was awarded in case 4860131?

Verified claim lines are listed on this page.

What type of tenancy dispute was case 4860131?

The dispute type was not classified.

Where can I read the official tribunal order for case 4860131?

The official Ministry of Justice published order is available at https://forms.justice.govt.nz/search/Documents/TTV2/PDF/13160287-Tribunal_Order.pdf.

Reasons

Both parties attended the hearing to consider the landlord application for a rehearing.

These applications have been the subject of a number of prior hearings and orders. These are briefly recounted here.

On 26 August 2024 the Tribunal made a monetary order in favour of the tenants. The final amount reflected a number of successful claims from both parties. The final sum due the tenants was $1,221.67. This sum reflected, amongst other awards in favour of the landlord, $1,000.00 for a loss of amenity after the tenants were found to have cut a number of trees, causing significant damage.

The landlord sought a rehearing of that determination, claiming a number of errors. The adjudicator heard that application for a rehearing and dismissed all claims bar the award for the tree damage by order on 27 September 2024. He accepted that further, fresh evidence regarding the trees established grounds for the single claim regarding the tree damage and compensation to be reheard by another adjudicator. That adjudicator was to become me.

The landlord was unhappy with the order of 27 September 2024 and lodged an appeal to the District Court. There continued some discussions between the parties that are discussed later. The result was the landlord withdrawing the appeal. There was some confusion regarding what appears the interchangeable use of “dismissed” and “withdrawn” in correspondence. Regardless, the appeal was not heard after email advice to the Registry from the landlord on 30 April 2025, saw the appeal withdrawn. No determination of the appeal was required or made. The Tribunal system file notes on 25 July 2025, “Queenstown Court have advised that the appeal was withdrawn so can now proceed to rehearing granted as to the trees only.”

The appeal withdrawal meant the rehearing of the pending rehearing of the claim regarding tree damage and any compensation could now be scheduled by the Tribunal.

A late adjournment request by the tenants meant the next hearing scheduled for 22 September 2025 had to be adjourned. This was not the first adjournment.

The matter was then set down for 11 November 2025. A Direction was issued by me on 12 November 2025.

It required:

The final order was released on 14 November 2025. That order incorporated the previous order of 26 August 2024 and awarded compensation to the landlord for the tenant damage to the trees. The net result was neither party owed the other.

On 14 November 2025, the landlord applied for a rehearing on the grounds that the setoff of the compensation awarded against the monetary order in favour of the tenants from before should not have occurred. The second grounds for requesting a rehearing was the landlord view that the compensation awarded was insufficient and she had further evidence to support that.

Section 105(1) Residential Tenancies Act 1986 provides that the Tribunal has the power to order a rehearing where “a substantial wrong or miscarriage of justice has or may have occurred or is likely to occur”.

Usually the party applying for the rehearing must show that something went wrong with the Tribunal’s procedure, for example, that they did not receive notice of the hearing or they were not able to properly present their case. A rehearing may also be granted where there is new evidence that was not reasonably available at the first hearing, if it could have affected the outcome.

The District Court has held that if the Tribunal was simply wrong in its findings of fact, or its application of the law, this is not sufficient to establish a miscarriage of justice: a rehearing is not an alternative to an appeal. Furthermore, a rehearing will not be granted just because a party is unhappy with the decision, or to give them a second opportunity to present their case.

Has a substantial wrong or miscarriage of justice occurred?

I consider the two grounds cited for a rehearing. First ground claimed – the incorporation of the prior 26 August 2024 monetary order into the final order.

As noted above, the intention to incorporate the previous order was signalled prior to the final order by my minute of 12 November 2025.

With the withdrawal of the appeal to the District Court, the two applications were returned to me. While the single claim to be determined was the tree damage and quantum of any compensation, the order of 26 August 2024 remained “live”, albeit the $1,000.00 awarded to the landlord was effectively removed with that, to be determined in the fresh hearing with me.

In Wellington City Council v McMillan [2003] DCR 50, the District Court held that if the Tribunal was simply wrong in its findings of fact, or its application of the law, this is not sufficient to establish a miscarriage of justice: [19] In my view, however, the words do not cover a complaint that the Tribunal was merely mistaken or wrong in its findings of fact or in its application of the law. There are two reasons for this. First the strength of the language in s 105 is such that something more than a mere wrong decision must be shown. The section does not speak of a decision being wrong, but of a substantial wrong or miscarriage of justice occurring. This implies obvious injustice, not merely an erroneous decision. [20] Secondly, if a mere erroneous decision is enough, whether the error is factual or legal or both, it would enable parties to in effect appeal any decision twice: once to the very Tribunal which made it by way of an application for rehearing, and then again to the District Court against the grant or refusal of the application for rehearing. Not only does that offend the general hierarchical nature of the appeal system, it would also make the time limit for filing notice of appeal against an original decision nugatory.

The incorporation of the previous order provided a final order for clarity and any subsequent enforcement purposes. This is usual practise and has merit for a number of practical reasons.

I do not consider the incorporation of the 26 August 2024 order into the final order, with an adjustment for the $1,000 compensation awarded at that time that was to be reheard, was a substantial wrong or injustice.

No concluded course of action via any determination of the previous District Court appeal occurred. While the landlord submitted the withdrawal was due to mutual agreement between the parties of the two disputed Tribunal awards (electricity and internet) only, the tenants stated they believed the “drop and walk away” approach proposed applied to all claims and both applications. I do not find that any clear acceptance by the tenants of such terms as claimed by the landlord are established. The email to the Registry dated 30 April 2025 is copied below (the tenants were cc’d to that email):

I consider the withdrawal communication was ambiguous or at best inconclusive as to the intent and any firm mutual agreement between the parties. The decision to withdraw an appeal such as here is one open to the applicant. Such a unilateral step is not unusual during an appeal process for a number of possible reasons. The other party have no sway on this and the actioning of such a request to withdraw is a procedural process completed by the Registry when so received.

In the absence of any subsequent District Court determination on any appeal regarding the orders made 1 , I do not consider the Tribunal process of incorporating a prior, active, order into the final order was wrong. Second ground claimed – the quantum of compensation and fresh evidence

The landlord sought “full compensation” for the damage to the trees via a rehearing. The quantum awarded was considered too low and she believed could “obtain evidence from the listing agent that the tree damage affected the price achieved for the sale of the property”.

I deal firstly with the desire of the landlord to adduce further evidence. This was not the first time in this dispute where the production of fresh evidence was later cited as grounds for a rehearing. That was successfully argued at the first rehearing where a partial rehearing on the trees only was ordered.

A rehearing may be granted where there is new evidence that was not reasonably available at the first hearing, if it could have affected the outcome. In Jemma Trust v Rutherford (DC North Shore, CIV-2009-044-2056, 11 December 1999), the District Court quoted an extract from the Court of Appeal outlining the relevant considerations: The principles upon which further evidence is admitted are designed to balance the interests of the person seeking to adduce such evidence on the 1 On the hearing of an appeal under section 117 RTA, a District Court Judge may— (a) quash the order of the Tribunal and order a rehearing of the claim by the Tribunal on such terms as the Judge thinks fit; or (b) quash the order, and substitute for it any other order or orders that the Tribunal could have made in respect of the original proceedings; or (c) dismiss the appeal one hand with the interests of the opposite party is on the other. They are also designed to reflect the public interest in ensuring, so far as is possible, that parties put up their best case at trial. Any other approach would be very wasteful of public resources. The conventional requirements are that the further evidence must be fresh, it must be credible and it must be cogent. Evidence is not regarded as fresh if it could with reasonable diligence have been produced at the trial....While the absence of freshness is not an absolute disqualification, the criteria for admission in such circumstances must be very strict. In our view, when the evidence is not fresh it should not be admitted unless the circumstances are exceptional and the grounds compelling.

The sale of the property and the impact on any possible reinstatement of the trees, being the basis for establishing the loss to the landlord was not raised by the landlord. The discussion was instigated by the tenants. It was an important factor to be considered.

No condition in the sale and purchase agreement addressed the trees. If they were considered in establishing the asking price, that is not obvious and, even if so, would be one of many factors considered by the vendor in establishing such a price.

The landlord tabled an email from the listing agent that she requested from him after the final hearing. Even if considered fresh, I consider that email of limited value to clearly link the historic quote of some $11,000 for the reinstatement with the sale price later agreed.

It was not lost on me that the tenant actions were wrong but with a enhanced rather than diminished result being their motivation. They were living there and sought to introduce more direct sunlight into the home, restricted due to extended tree shadow caused by the trees. It is perfectly conceivable the new owner might concur and not remedy as the landlord costed. I did not consider any transferable loss to the landlord was established by the sale and purchase process. This was reflected in the final order and remains my view. I appreciate the landlord has a different perspective on this.

Regardless, I do not consider the subsequent desire to introduce further evidence from the listing agent can be considered fresh. It was reasonably available before the hearing. The prior experience through the journey to date of these applications should have alerted the landlord to the need for timely evidence to support claims of any loss. I note that even if wrong, the statement by the agent lacks strong compulsion to conclude a direct causation between the damaged trees and diminished sale price.

I conclude by copying below one section from the 14 November 2025 order.

For the reasons above, I do not consider the cited grounds to justify a rehearing in this Tribunal establishes a substantial wrong or miscarriage of justice has occurred.

The application for a rehearing must be dismissed.

Reasons

Both parties attended the hearing to consider the landlord application for a rehearing.

These applications have been the subject of a number of prior hearings and orders. These are briefly recounted here.

The appeal withdrawal meant the rehearing of the pending rehearing of the claim regarding tree damage and any compensation could now be scheduled by the Tribunal.

A late adjournment request by the tenants meant the next hearing scheduled for 22 September 2025 had to be adjourned. This was not the first adjournment.

The matter was then set down for 11 November 2025. A Direction was issued by me on 12 November 2025.

It required:

Has a substantial wrong or miscarriage of justice occurred?

I consider the two grounds cited for a rehearing. First ground claimed – the incorporation of the prior 26 August 2024 monetary order into the final order.

As noted above, the intention to incorporate the previous order was signalled prior to the final order by my minute of 12 November 2025.

The incorporation of the previous order provided a final order for clarity and any subsequent enforcement purposes. This is usual practise and has merit for a number of practical reasons.

I conclude by copying below one section from the 14 November 2025 order.

For the reasons above, I do not consider the cited grounds to justify a rehearing in this Tribunal establishes a substantial wrong or miscarriage of justice has occurred.

The application for a rehearing must be dismissed.

Reasons

Both parties attended the hearing to consider the landlord application for a rehearing.

These applications have been the subject of a number of prior hearings and orders. These are briefly recounted here.

The appeal withdrawal meant the rehearing of the pending rehearing of the claim regarding tree damage and any compensation could now be scheduled by the Tribunal.

A late adjournment request by the tenants meant the next hearing scheduled for 22 September 2025 had to be adjourned. This was not the first adjournment.

The matter was then set down for 11 November 2025. A Direction was issued by me on 12 November 2025.

It required:

Has a substantial wrong or miscarriage of justice occurred?

I consider the two grounds cited for a rehearing. First ground claimed – the incorporation of the prior 26 August 2024 monetary order into the final order.

As noted above, the intention to incorporate the previous order was signalled prior to the final order by my minute of 12 November 2025.

The incorporation of the previous order provided a final order for clarity and any subsequent enforcement purposes. This is usual practise and has merit for a number of practical reasons.

I conclude by copying below one section from the 14 November 2025 order.

For the reasons above, I do not consider the cited grounds to justify a rehearing in this Tribunal establishes a substantial wrong or miscarriage of justice has occurred.

The application for a rehearing must be dismissed.