Tenantcheck Insights · Case study

Tenancy Tribunal case 5419309 — 14-day notice at 55 Wrantage Street, Westown, New Plymouth 4310

Published 30 January 2026 · Application 5419309

Landlord favoured

14-day notice
Harassment

View official order on MoJ →Explore similar cases

At a glance

Key facts from the published tribunal order.

Outcome

Landlord favoured

From published order

Location

New Plymouth

Tribunal region

Adjudicator

M Kemp

Claims & awards

What this tenancy cost at tribunal — claim, category, amount, and party awarded, with reconciled net total.

No individual claim amounts were reconciled for this order. View the official Ministry of Justice PDF for full detail.

Order

The tenancy of Kevin John Jenkins at 55 Wrantage Street, Westown, New Plymouth 4310 is terminated, and possession is granted to Occupy Property Management Limited As Agent For Liam Thompson And Joel Ward, at 11.59pm on Monday 9 February 2026.
Kevin John Jenkins must pay Occupy Property Management Limited As Agent For Liam Thompson And Joel Ward $28.00 immediately, being reimbursement for the filing fee.

Reasons

One of the property owners (Mr Ward) and his property manager (Mr Harris) attended the hearing for the landlord. The tenant also attended the hearing and had a support person.
During the hearing I heard witness evidence from a witness who was called by the landlord (Mr Hooper). Mr Hooper remained in the hearing room after giving evidence but as an observer only.
The landlord seeks termination of the tenancy based on a threat of an assault.
The landlord says there was a threat of an assault made against Mr Harris by the tenant on 21 December 2025. The landlord clarified that other issues raised in the landlord’s application were not issues that the landlord wanted me to consider as part of this application. The law
The relevant law that applies is found in the Residential Tenancies Act 1986 (“RTA”).
With any claim before the Tenancy Tribunal, the Tribunal applies the usual civil law standards and expectations. That includes a requirement that the party bringing the claim (the applicant), establish their claims “on the balance of probabilities”. The balance of probabilities means more likely than unlikely, or in mathematical terms, has a fractionally more than 50% likelihood. The Tribunal does not need to be certain or very sure about any claim, only that what is claimed is likely.
Not all of the evidence referred to at the hearing is referred to in this decision; however, the parties are assured that all evidence has been considered.
Section 55(1)(c) RTA provides that a landlord may apply for, and the Tribunal shall grant, termination of the tenancy if the Tribunal is satisfied that: ...the tenant has assaulted, or has threatened to assault, or has caused or permitted any person to assault, or to threaten to assault, any of the following persons: (i) the landlord or any member of the landlord’s family: (ii) the owner of the premises or any member of the owner’s family: (iii) any agent of the landlord: (iv) any occupier of any building of which the premises constitute a part: (iv) any neighbour of the premises or of any building of which the premises constitute a part. (My emphasis added).
A threat of assault is an expression of intent to do harm to another person by use of force and does not require an intention or capacity to act on the threat or that the threat is passed to the person to whom the threat related. The threat must be deliberate, that is, the tenant intends it to be heard.
A leading case which considered a threat to assault in a residential tenancy context, is the High Court decision of Collins v Housing New Zealand Limited [2004] NZAR 665. In that case the Tenancy Tribunal ordered termination of the tenancy for a threat to assault the landlord’s housing officer, and that decision was confirmed on appeal to the District Court. The tenant, Mr Collins, then appealed to the High Court. The threat in that case was a telephone call made not to the landlord’s officer, but to the officer’s father.
The High Court supported a finding from the District Court Judge, confirming that: The Judge was right to find a threat by the tenant because under s 55(1)(c) of the Act “threaten to assault” meant an expression of intent to do harm to another person by use of force. There was no need to intend or have the capacity to act on the threat or for the threat to be passed on to the person to whom it related and, given the intent of s 55 to protect certain classes of persons, the fact of a threat was enough and it mattered little if the tenant was under an incapacity.
Further: [29] To “threaten to assault” means just what it says: it is an expression of intent to do harm to another person by use of force. The fact of the threat can be enough. Even under the criminal law, there is no need to intend to act on the threat, or to have the capacity to act on it; or that it be to, or be passed on to, the person to whom the threat relates: Police v Lloyd [1973] 2 NZLR 486 (CA); R v Meek [1981] l NZLR 499 (CA). [30] Under the criminal law, what does have to be proved is the intent that the threat be taken seriously by the person to whom it is made. But how far that applies under this Act is another question. The intent of s 55 is to protect the classes of persons to whom it refers: the landlord, the landlord’s family or agents, and indeed other occupiers. In this context, the fact of a threat has to be enough.
Section 55(2) RTA provides the Tribunal with a discretion to refuse to order termination in such cases if, but only if: ...it is satisfied that the breach has been remedied (where it is capable of remedy), the landlord has been compensated for any loss arising from the breach, and it is unlikely that the tenant will commit any further breach of a kind to which this section applies (but see also section 78A(3)(b)).
In Collins v Housing New Zealand Limited Keane J also discussed the Tribunal’s exercise of the discretion and stated: [37] ... A threat once made, or an assault once committed, cannot be remedied. But I am loathe to conclude that, once the Tribunal finds as a fact a threat or an assault, the discretion becomes spent. That could mean that a technical assault, or words in haste, could pre-empt the Tribunal from considering the two remaining issues s 55(2) presents, which are of equal significance. [38] I prefer the interpretation that, if the breach cannot be remedied, that issue is to be set to one side and the Tribunal is to consider the two remaining issues. There may well be cases where the Tribunal concludes, despite the fact of breach, the landlord can be compensated for any loss, and there is unlikely to be any further breach. The Tribunal might then well be justified in deciding to refuse to make the otherwise mandatory order. [39] Of those two conditions, only the third is of significance in this case. There is no question of compensation for loss. But, to be satisfied as to that, the Tribunal did have to assess Mr Collins and whether he was likely to be threatening again... The facts
I heard that on 21 December 2025 Mr Ward and his friend Mr Hooper were attending the property in connection with the installation of a garden shed. The property manager was not present.
I heard evidence from Mr Ward that the tenant said to him: “Gavin [Mr Harris] that dirty saffa cunt I was about to smack him over”.
Mr Ward says that he considered this a threat to assault Mr Harris in the future (by smacking him) the next time he came around or sometime in the future, so, he called Mr Harris on the Monday to warn him (Monday being the following day).
Mr Ward says that this raised red flags for him, and he did not take it lightly. He says the tenant was not joking and he says he was concerned that Mr Harris was going to get assaulted. Mr Ward says he specifically remembered the above phrase because it worried him for Mr Harris’s safety.
I also heard witness evidence from Mr Hooper that he overheard the tenant say: “Gavin that dirty saffa cunt he’s lucky I didn’t smack him over”. Mr Hooper took the view that the threat was a reference to the past, but he did perceive a future threat to Mr Harris by the way it was said and the tone and the fact the tenant was upset and angry showing he did not want Mr Harris at the property again. He was concerned there would be a physical altercation if Mr Harris turned up at the premises again. I heard how he thought “saffa” was a reference to South Africa.
Mr Ward and Mr Hooper also say that while they were at the premises the tenant also made other ongoing abusive remarks about Mr Harris but the precise nature of these were not recalled by them as they were of a more general but Mr Ward said that they made it clear the tenant was not a fan of Mr Harris and he was badmouthing him.
By way of background and other behaviour, Mr Harris says that the tenant was also swearing and shouting and got angry causing him to leave the property feeling unsafe on an occasion on 4 December when he visited the property to discuss subdivision plans with the tenant. He also refers to communication sent by the tenant some of which are more aggressive in tone.
The tenant says that he did not say the words Mr Ward and Mr Hooper have claimed he said on 21 December. He says that what he said was not as harsh. He says Mr Hooper also would not have heard him and was not there. Mr Hooper says this is not the case (and he did hear him).
The tenant admits that the comment that he did make to Mr Ward was: “I am pissed off. He [Mr Harris] needs a smack in the head”. He says he did say a few horrible words, but he was angry and upset.
The tenant expresses an apology but explains he was upset about the subdivision that was taking place and what was happening to his garden and vegetables.
He says by way of background that a previous inspection took place in November where he says he was not given notice and that made him angry and wild. He says that at this inspection he told Mr Harris: “you can fuck off and leave the property”. He says he was angry then because he was upset about the sub-division and the impact on him, but not physically angry. He cites health as a factor in not being physically capable.
The tenant did not remember there being two sperate occasions being both the inspection (November) and a separate occasion on which the plans were discussed (4 December). Analysis
I accept that there was both an inspection and a separate visit on 4 December when Mr Harris visited the premises. This is supported by clear oral evidence from Mr Harris and is also reflected in an email in which the tenant refers to the visit on 4 December. However, nothing turns on the precise date the tenant swore telling Mr Harris to leave the property. I accept that there was swearing, and anger directed at Mr Harris while he was visiting the property on one of these dates.
Key is the alleged threat of an assault on 21 December. There is a divergence of opinion on what was said. I recognise there are differences of viewpoint between the parties around some of the details over what was said on 21 December.
However, ultimately the tenant admits that he did say that Mr Harris “needs a smack in the head”. The comment that was made concerned Joel (who was the person to whom the comment was made) sufficiently to alert Mr Harris because of a fear that the tenant was going to assault Mr Harris in the future.
I am satisfied that the words the tenant says he used are sufficient to establish a threat of an assault. It is not relevant if the tenant did not intend to act on it or have the capacity to act on it.
I must now consider whether the Tribunal should exercise its discretion to refuse to order termination.
While the breach cannot be remedied I must consider if the landlord can be compensated for any loss, and there is unlikely to be any further breach. If so, then the Tribunal might then well be justified in deciding to refuse to make the otherwise mandatory order.
There was no suggestion that the landlord has suffered a loss requiring compensation.
Turning to if there is likely to be a further breach, the tenant has clearly been angered and/or frustrated by the conduct of Mr Harris, but this does not excuse anti-social behaviour or the making of threats.
Mr Harris feels uncomfortable visiting the property in the future and in the light of the threat made with the other general displeasure expressed about Mr Harris when the shed was being installed combined with the past anger when Mr Harris was sworn at and told to leave the property, I consider Mr Harris’s position to be reasonable. The anger has been not just a one-off event. The relationship has broken down. I am not satisfied on the basis of the evidence before me that the tenant will not commit any further breaches of this kind.
Overall, I find there are insufficient grounds to exercise the Tribunal’s discretion to refuse to order termination.
The landlord’s application for termination of the tenancy is therefore granted.
I have allowed a slightly longer possession date from termination so the tenant has a sufficient opportunity to arrange his affairs before needing to vacate the property.
During this time, the tenant’s obligations to the landlord continues. Suppression and filing fee
Because the landlord has been successful, the tenant is to reimburse the landlord the cost of the Tribunal filing fee.
The Tribunal must, on the application of a party that has wholly or substantially succeeded in proceedings, order that the party’s name or identifying particulars not be published, unless the Tribunal considers that publication is in the public interest or is justified because of the party’s conduct or any other circumstances of the case (s95A RTA).
The tenant sought name suppression but has not been successful. I see no other reason to grant suppression of the tenant’s identifying details. Having regard to the public interest and the interest of the parties, the dispute before me is not unusual or other than the ordinary business of the Tribunal. Therefore, no suppression order is made. The landlord did not seek suppression.

Topics & place

Topics are dispute themes across the order (not the same as claim-type money lines).

14-day notice Harassment New Plymouth

Residential Tenancies Act sections

s27, s55, s55(1), s55(2), s78A(3), s95A

Key findings

Dispute theme: termination 14day
Dispute theme: harassment
Dispute theme: filing fee

Property management

OCCUPY PROPERTY MANAGEMENT LIMITED as agent for Liam Thompson and Joel Ward (applicant)

Frequently asked questions

Common questions about this Tenancy Tribunal case.

What was the outcome of Tenancy Tribunal case 5419309?

The tribunal order states: The tenancy of Kevin John Jenkins at 55 Wrantage Street, Westown, New

How much money was awarded in case 5419309?

Verified claim lines are listed on this page.

What type of tenancy dispute was case 5419309?

The primary dispute was 14-day notice. Related themes: Harassment.

Where can I read the official tribunal order for case 5419309?

The official Ministry of Justice published order is available at https://forms.justice.govt.nz/search/Documents/TTV2/PDF/13045947-Tenancy_Tribunal_Order.pdf.

Order

The tenancy of Kevin John Jenkins at 55 Wrantage Street, Westown, New Plymouth 4310 is terminated, and possession is granted to Occupy Property Management Limited As Agent For Liam Thompson And Joel Ward, at 11.59pm on Monday 9 February 2026.

Kevin John Jenkins must pay Occupy Property Management Limited As Agent For Liam Thompson And Joel Ward $28.00 immediately, being reimbursement for the filing fee.

Reasons

One of the property owners (Mr Ward) and his property manager (Mr Harris) attended the hearing for the landlord. The tenant also attended the hearing and had a support person.

During the hearing I heard witness evidence from a witness who was called by the landlord (Mr Hooper). Mr Hooper remained in the hearing room after giving evidence but as an observer only.

The landlord seeks termination of the tenancy based on a threat of an assault.

The landlord says there was a threat of an assault made against Mr Harris by the tenant on 21 December 2025. The landlord clarified that other issues raised in the landlord’s application were not issues that the landlord wanted me to consider as part of this application. The law

The relevant law that applies is found in the Residential Tenancies Act 1986 (“RTA”).

With any claim before the Tenancy Tribunal, the Tribunal applies the usual civil law standards and expectations. That includes a requirement that the party bringing the claim (the applicant), establish their claims “on the balance of probabilities”. The balance of probabilities means more likely than unlikely, or in mathematical terms, has a fractionally more than 50% likelihood. The Tribunal does not need to be certain or very sure about any claim, only that what is claimed is likely.

Not all of the evidence referred to at the hearing is referred to in this decision; however, the parties are assured that all evidence has been considered.

Section 55(1)(c) RTA provides that a landlord may apply for, and the Tribunal shall grant, termination of the tenancy if the Tribunal is satisfied that: ...the tenant has assaulted, or has threatened to assault, or has caused or permitted any person to assault, or to threaten to assault, any of the following persons: (i) the landlord or any member of the landlord’s family: (ii) the owner of the premises or any member of the owner’s family: (iii) any agent of the landlord: (iv) any occupier of any building of which the premises constitute a part: (iv) any neighbour of the premises or of any building of which the premises constitute a part. (My emphasis added).

A threat of assault is an expression of intent to do harm to another person by use of force and does not require an intention or capacity to act on the threat or that the threat is passed to the person to whom the threat related. The threat must be deliberate, that is, the tenant intends it to be heard.

A leading case which considered a threat to assault in a residential tenancy context, is the High Court decision of Collins v Housing New Zealand Limited [2004] NZAR 665. In that case the Tenancy Tribunal ordered termination of the tenancy for a threat to assault the landlord’s housing officer, and that decision was confirmed on appeal to the District Court. The tenant, Mr Collins, then appealed to the High Court. The threat in that case was a telephone call made not to the landlord’s officer, but to the officer’s father.

The High Court supported a finding from the District Court Judge, confirming that: The Judge was right to find a threat by the tenant because under s 55(1)(c) of the Act “threaten to assault” meant an expression of intent to do harm to another person by use of force. There was no need to intend or have the capacity to act on the threat or for the threat to be passed on to the person to whom it related and, given the intent of s 55 to protect certain classes of persons, the fact of a threat was enough and it mattered little if the tenant was under an incapacity.

Further: [29] To “threaten to assault” means just what it says: it is an expression of intent to do harm to another person by use of force. The fact of the threat can be enough. Even under the criminal law, there is no need to intend to act on the threat, or to have the capacity to act on it; or that it be to, or be passed on to, the person to whom the threat relates: Police v Lloyd [1973] 2 NZLR 486 (CA); R v Meek [1981] l NZLR 499 (CA). [30] Under the criminal law, what does have to be proved is the intent that the threat be taken seriously by the person to whom it is made. But how far that applies under this Act is another question. The intent of s 55 is to protect the classes of persons to whom it refers: the landlord, the landlord’s family or agents, and indeed other occupiers. In this context, the fact of a threat has to be enough.

Section 55(2) RTA provides the Tribunal with a discretion to refuse to order termination in such cases if, but only if: ...it is satisfied that the breach has been remedied (where it is capable of remedy), the landlord has been compensated for any loss arising from the breach, and it is unlikely that the tenant will commit any further breach of a kind to which this section applies (but see also section 78A(3)(b)).

In Collins v Housing New Zealand Limited Keane J also discussed the Tribunal’s exercise of the discretion and stated: [37] ... A threat once made, or an assault once committed, cannot be remedied. But I am loathe to conclude that, once the Tribunal finds as a fact a threat or an assault, the discretion becomes spent. That could mean that a technical assault, or words in haste, could pre-empt the Tribunal from considering the two remaining issues s 55(2) presents, which are of equal significance. [38] I prefer the interpretation that, if the breach cannot be remedied, that issue is to be set to one side and the Tribunal is to consider the two remaining issues. There may well be cases where the Tribunal concludes, despite the fact of breach, the landlord can be compensated for any loss, and there is unlikely to be any further breach. The Tribunal might then well be justified in deciding to refuse to make the otherwise mandatory order. [39] Of those two conditions, only the third is of significance in this case. There is no question of compensation for loss. But, to be satisfied as to that, the Tribunal did have to assess Mr Collins and whether he was likely to be threatening again... The facts

I heard that on 21 December 2025 Mr Ward and his friend Mr Hooper were attending the property in connection with the installation of a garden shed. The property manager was not present.

I heard evidence from Mr Ward that the tenant said to him: “Gavin [Mr Harris] that dirty saffa cunt I was about to smack him over”.

Mr Ward says that he considered this a threat to assault Mr Harris in the future (by smacking him) the next time he came around or sometime in the future, so, he called Mr Harris on the Monday to warn him (Monday being the following day).

Mr Ward says that this raised red flags for him, and he did not take it lightly. He says the tenant was not joking and he says he was concerned that Mr Harris was going to get assaulted. Mr Ward says he specifically remembered the above phrase because it worried him for Mr Harris’s safety.

I also heard witness evidence from Mr Hooper that he overheard the tenant say: “Gavin that dirty saffa cunt he’s lucky I didn’t smack him over”. Mr Hooper took the view that the threat was a reference to the past, but he did perceive a future threat to Mr Harris by the way it was said and the tone and the fact the tenant was upset and angry showing he did not want Mr Harris at the property again. He was concerned there would be a physical altercation if Mr Harris turned up at the premises again. I heard how he thought “saffa” was a reference to South Africa.

Mr Ward and Mr Hooper also say that while they were at the premises the tenant also made other ongoing abusive remarks about Mr Harris but the precise nature of these were not recalled by them as they were of a more general but Mr Ward said that they made it clear the tenant was not a fan of Mr Harris and he was badmouthing him.

By way of background and other behaviour, Mr Harris says that the tenant was also swearing and shouting and got angry causing him to leave the property feeling unsafe on an occasion on 4 December when he visited the property to discuss subdivision plans with the tenant. He also refers to communication sent by the tenant some of which are more aggressive in tone.

The tenant says that he did not say the words Mr Ward and Mr Hooper have claimed he said on 21 December. He says that what he said was not as harsh. He says Mr Hooper also would not have heard him and was not there. Mr Hooper says this is not the case (and he did hear him).

The tenant admits that the comment that he did make to Mr Ward was: “I am pissed off. He [Mr Harris] needs a smack in the head”. He says he did say a few horrible words, but he was angry and upset.

The tenant expresses an apology but explains he was upset about the subdivision that was taking place and what was happening to his garden and vegetables.

He says by way of background that a previous inspection took place in November where he says he was not given notice and that made him angry and wild. He says that at this inspection he told Mr Harris: “you can fuck off and leave the property”. He says he was angry then because he was upset about the sub-division and the impact on him, but not physically angry. He cites health as a factor in not being physically capable.

The tenant did not remember there being two sperate occasions being both the inspection (November) and a separate occasion on which the plans were discussed (4 December). Analysis

I accept that there was both an inspection and a separate visit on 4 December when Mr Harris visited the premises. This is supported by clear oral evidence from Mr Harris and is also reflected in an email in which the tenant refers to the visit on 4 December. However, nothing turns on the precise date the tenant swore telling Mr Harris to leave the property. I accept that there was swearing, and anger directed at Mr Harris while he was visiting the property on one of these dates.

Key is the alleged threat of an assault on 21 December. There is a divergence of opinion on what was said. I recognise there are differences of viewpoint between the parties around some of the details over what was said on 21 December.

However, ultimately the tenant admits that he did say that Mr Harris “needs a smack in the head”. The comment that was made concerned Joel (who was the person to whom the comment was made) sufficiently to alert Mr Harris because of a fear that the tenant was going to assault Mr Harris in the future.

I am satisfied that the words the tenant says he used are sufficient to establish a threat of an assault. It is not relevant if the tenant did not intend to act on it or have the capacity to act on it.

I must now consider whether the Tribunal should exercise its discretion to refuse to order termination.

While the breach cannot be remedied I must consider if the landlord can be compensated for any loss, and there is unlikely to be any further breach. If so, then the Tribunal might then well be justified in deciding to refuse to make the otherwise mandatory order.

There was no suggestion that the landlord has suffered a loss requiring compensation.

Turning to if there is likely to be a further breach, the tenant has clearly been angered and/or frustrated by the conduct of Mr Harris, but this does not excuse anti-social behaviour or the making of threats.

Mr Harris feels uncomfortable visiting the property in the future and in the light of the threat made with the other general displeasure expressed about Mr Harris when the shed was being installed combined with the past anger when Mr Harris was sworn at and told to leave the property, I consider Mr Harris’s position to be reasonable. The anger has been not just a one-off event. The relationship has broken down. I am not satisfied on the basis of the evidence before me that the tenant will not commit any further breaches of this kind.

Overall, I find there are insufficient grounds to exercise the Tribunal’s discretion to refuse to order termination.

The landlord’s application for termination of the tenancy is therefore granted.

I have allowed a slightly longer possession date from termination so the tenant has a sufficient opportunity to arrange his affairs before needing to vacate the property.

During this time, the tenant’s obligations to the landlord continues. Suppression and filing fee

Because the landlord has been successful, the tenant is to reimburse the landlord the cost of the Tribunal filing fee.

The Tribunal must, on the application of a party that has wholly or substantially succeeded in proceedings, order that the party’s name or identifying particulars not be published, unless the Tribunal considers that publication is in the public interest or is justified because of the party’s conduct or any other circumstances of the case (s95A RTA).

The tenant sought name suppression but has not been successful. I see no other reason to grant suppression of the tenant’s identifying details. Having regard to the public interest and the interest of the parties, the dispute before me is not unusual or other than the ordinary business of the Tribunal. Therefore, no suppression order is made. The landlord did not seek suppression.