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Tenancy Tribunal case 5437242 — State of repair at 132 Norfolk Road Upper, Norfolk, RD 8, Norfolk 4388

Decided 2 April 2026 · Published 2 April 2026 · Application 5437242

Dismissed

State of repair
Healthy homes
Exemplary damages

View official order on MoJ →Explore similar cases

At a glance

Key facts from the published tribunal order.

Outcome

Dismissed

From published order

Location

Norfolk

Tribunal region

Adjudicator

M Kemp

Claims & awards

What this tenancy cost at tribunal — claim, category, amount, and party awarded, with reconciled net total.

No individual claim amounts were reconciled for this order. View the official Ministry of Justice PDF for full detail.

Order

No suppression orders apply to this decision.
The application is dismissed.

Reasons

Both parties attended the hearing.
Ms Neilson attended without Mr Neilson but had a support person.
Both Mr and Ms Weeks attended.
I also heard evidence from a witness called by Ms Neilson who detailed some of the work he had undertaken at the property. Civil burden of proof
The applicant is required to establish the claim to the civil law standard of proof, on the balance of probabilities.
That includes a requirement that the party bringing the claim (the applicant), establish their claims “on the balance of probabilities”. The balance of probabilities means more likely than unlikely, or in mathematical terms, has a fractionally more than 50% likelihood. The Tribunal does not need to be certain or very sure about any claim, only that what is claimed is likely. It is the applicant that must prove their case.
As noted by the District Court in Kaipo v Clarke & McCarthy (DC) TT233/02, in practical terms this means that: ... [L]ike anyone who brings an application before a Tribunal or Court, it is incumbent upon the applicant to provide the evidence necessary to prove the case. If the applicant fails to do that, then their application will be dismissed whether it has merit or not because it is up to the applicant to provide the necessary evidence. It is not up to the other parties, and it is certainly not up to the Tribunal to extract evidence. Facts – Background and dispute The background
The Neilsons say that the Weeks failed to undertake or reimburse them for remedial work that they did at the property arising from an issue that arose in 2024 with the sewerage system.
They seek compensation for costs they incurred and exemplary damages.
I heard how the arrangement between the parties arose following the death of Mr Neilson’s father, Rex. At this point Mr and Ms Neilson were already living in the property which was owned by their wider family. When Rex passed away issues arose within the wider Neilson family concerning their continued occupation. Put simply, if Mr and Ms Neilson wanted to remain in the property it had to be purchased from their wider family.
I heard how Mr and Ms Neilson were not in a position to do this at the time and so, in July 2019, Mr and Ms Weeks, being friends of the wider Neilson family for around 55 years, became involved.
I heard that in order for Mr and Ms Neilson to remain at the property Mr and Ms Weeks purchased the property from the wider Neilson family.
To do this they obtained a mortgage from the ANZ (interest and principal). However, they could not raise the whole of the purchase price via the ANZ bank and so, on top of this, they lent Mr and Ms Neilson $153,500 of their own money which was then put in to fund the remainder of the purchase.
Once the purchase was completed Mr and Ms Weeks became the legal owners of the property in July 2019.
I heard how in February 2025 Mr and Ms Neilson purchased the property from the Weeks.
Mr and Ms Weeks say that Mr and Ms Neilson were essentially the owners of the property from 2019 to 2025, and they were regarded as such and regarded themselves as such.
I heard how there were no formal property inspections between 2019 and 2025 but there would instead be events like dinners at the property together and play between the Neilson’s dogs and the Weeks’s grandchildren. I heard how the Neilsons had treated the property as their own – for instance by adding a conservatory and by running a dog breeding business from the premises. I heard how no bond was paid.
The sums that the Neilsons paid the Weeks varied and were applied reflecting the outgoings and the interest / loan repayments. They paid some money direct into a bank account to cover the ANZ mortgage (both interest and principal) and paid separately to the Weeks a further sum that was split to cover interest on the personal loan, rates, insurance and an amount to reduce the amount on the personal loan itself.
A written agreement was entered into between the parties in 2019. It sets out the circumstances of the occupation and states that the “landlords have purchased the house for the tenants to occupy until such time they are in a position to have the ANZ bank loan transferred to themselves”.
It refers to weekly rent being applied to the ANZ loan, rates, insurance and reduction of the personal loan. Mr and Mrs Weeks provided their account book showing how sums (other than the ANZ loan) had been applied.
The written agreement also set out that “Maintenance and insulation relating to the house are the responsibility of the tenants (despite any law to the contrary) and must be maintained by the tenant to an approved standard”.
It concludes with a term that says that “any failure to comply with the above terms - the landlords will be negotiating to sell the house and will give formal notice to end the tenancy...” The application / issue in dispute
The Neilsons say that in April 2024 an issue arose with a spring (water). It essentially flooded their septic tank and sewerage system and meant extensive work had to be done to the sewerage system as well as resulting in the flooding of their basement.
I heard how trenches and pits were excavated, work was done on the septic bed, the water diverted to the storm water drainage and a new temporary effluent pit was dug into a paddock. Once the situation was more under control remedial work included installing a new chamber at the septic tank, creating a new septic bed (I heard the old one had to be decommissioned), installing a pump and filling in the trenches and associated electrical work. The Neilsons arranged and paid for this work.
I heard how Mr Neilson spoke to Mr Weeks when the issues started in April 2024. Mr Weeks says he was not told of the gravity of the situation in the initial call. He says he was told that there had been a flood in the basement but that the water had been sucked out and that the Neilsons had it under control. Both Mr and Ms Weeks came to the property later on in May when some of the work had already been done. At this point the Weeks provided the Neilsons with insurance details.
However, the insurer would not pay for the work to the sewerage system. I heard how the insurer said sediment had moved a pipe causing it to break. The insurer did cover remedial work to the toilet shower and laundry walls in the house - but not to the sewerage system itself.
Mr Weeks says the Neilsons essentially went ahead and did the works themselves and did not involve them. Had they known at the time he might have got involved but he thought the Neilsons, as the owners and as per the agreement and what they had said, had matters under control. They did not know anything about this being a “natural disaster”, as the tenant claims (referred to below), and question that.
The Weeks also say that they had not known about the costs incurred by the Neilsons until the Tribunal application and had not seen the invoices claimed by the Neilsons until today’s hearing. In response to this Ms Neilson simply made reference to her telling the Weeks she had a plumber’s invoice still to pay when the Neilsons were buying the house. Analysis
First, I consider the Weeks’s argument that Mr and Ms Neilson were the owners due to there being a bare trust.
Mr and Ms Neilson were not the legal owners of the premises at the relevant time. They may have been equitable owners but the Tribunal has no jurisdiction to determine whether this is the case and whether a bare or other type of trust might arise here.
Section 2(1) RTA defines a landlord as the grantor of a tenancy under a tenancy agreement of residential premises. A tenant is the grantee of the tenancy. The terms ’residential premises’, ‘tenancy’, ‘tenancy agreement’ and ‘rent’ are defined as: rent means any money, goods, services, or other valuable consideration in the nature of rent to be paid or supplied under a tenancy agreement by the tenant; but does not include any sum of money payable or paid by way of bond residential premises means any premises used or intended for occupation by any person as a place of residence, whether or not the occupation or intended occupation for residential purposes is or would be unlawful tenancy, in relation to any residential premises, means the right to occupy the premises (whether exclusively or otherwise) in consideration for rent; and includes any tenancy of residential premises implied or created by any enactment; and, where appropriate, also includes a former tenancy tenancy agreement, in relation to any residential premises, means any express or implied agreement under which any person, for rent, grants or agrees to grant to any other person a tenancy of the premises; and, where appropriate, includes a former tenancy agreement and any variation of a tenancy agreement
I am not satisfied that this is an arrangement to which the RTA applies. This is because I am not satisfied that the sums the Neilsons paid the Weeks were “in the nature of rent”.
I find that the payments they made were reflective of the arrangement entered into for them to ultimately purchase the property from the Weeks and the overall finance arrangement arising out of that.
The Neilsons serviced a mortgage and also serviced a loan which they had borrowed from the Weeks and which was then directly invested back into the property. They met property outgoings. Amounts payable and the application of those sums to the outgoings / the loan would fluctuate - rather than any rental assessment.
An element of the payments made by the Neilsons relate to costs incurred in funding the property purchase - Essentially an investment by the Neilsons. The personal loan particularly points the payments away from being in the nature of rent. Rent is, by its nature, a payment made for occupation, whereas repayment of a loan is the discharge of a pre-existing capital obligation. Here, the personal loan was entered into and applied to the acquisition of the property. The sums the Neilson’s paid in part reduced that debt. The Neilsons were repaying money they had already advanced for investment purposes in the property. The fact that the repayment is tied to a loan, with a principal sum and interest, and would reduce over time as the debt is discharged, is inconsistent with rent, which does not extinguish any capital liability. This is supported by the ultimate purchase by the Neilsons in which the sums that the Neilsons had paid to the Weeks for the loans (both the ANZ loan and the personal loan) were taken into account in the purchase price. An adjustment was also made to take into account equity (referencing the bare trust). The purchase price was calculated by reference to the remaining amount on the ANZ loan, the remaining amount on the personal loan and an adjustment for equity. This is set out in evidence in a letter from BDO who provided tax advice to the Weeks.
I find that this means that the RTA does not apply and this is sufficient to dismiss the claim. The Neilson’s claim is dismissed.
However, for completeness, I have gone on below to consider what the position would be if there was a residential tenancy and the RTA applied.
My conclusion is that the application would still fail for the reasons set out below.
Section 45 of the Residential Tenancies Act 1986 provides that the landlord must provide and maintain the premises in a reasonable state of repair having regard to the age and character of the premises and the period during which the premises are likely to remain habitable and available for residential purposes. Sections 49A and 49B also set out key provisions in relation to liability for damage.
Section 11 of the RTA provides that the RTA prevails over any tenancy agreement. Any term of an agreement that is inconsistent with the RTA, or that seeks to exclude, modify, or restrict its operation, is of no effect unless such a departure is expressly permitted by the RTA (s 11(1)(a)), or the Tribunal is satisfied that, having regard to the nature of the tenancy, the terms of the agreement, the interests of the parties, and all relevant circumstances, the departure should be allowed (s 11(1)(b)).
In all the very specific circumstances of this case, having carefully considered the position overall, the term placing the obligation for maintenance (or put another way, making the Neilsons responsible for the remedy of damage at the premises) on the Neilsons is reasonable and is a term that should have effect pursuant to section11(1)(b) RTA.
This is because: a. The Neilsons were already living at the property when the Weeks bought it. The intention of all the parties was that the Neilsons were going to live in the property and buy it (and they did do this) from the Weeks when they were able to “have the ANZ loan transferred to themselves”. b. There was no suggestion that the Weeks wanted to buy this property other than to assist their long-term family friends. There was no suggestion that the Weeks made a profit when the property was later purchased by the Neilsons. c. The sale and purchase agreement referred to the Neilsons having equity in the property, there being credit for this in the sale and purchase agreement and it being held on a bare trust. d. The Neilsons had a financial interest in the property. This is particularly due to the personal loan invested back into the property. e. The parties clearly signed a written agreement that made it clear from the outset that the Neilsons would be responsible for maintenance. The clause expressly referred to this applying even though there may be law (the RTA) to the contrary. Thereby highlighting this oddity to the parties. f. The term was not a term hidden in the agreement but one of 5 terms that were written in capital letters on a single sheet of paper and signed by all the parties in 2019. g. The Neilsons and the Weeks treated the property as one that would be purchased by the Neilsons as shown by the alterations to the property done by the Neilsons, the business they operated from it, the lack of inspections, the lack of a bond, the family and financial situation, the way payments were made and the family/friendship ties. h. I consider that the Neilsons must have regarded themselves as liable for the work at the time, otherwise they would not have undertaken the extent of the work they did without more significant involvement or agreement of the Weeks to incur the ongoing costs. I cannot accept that all of the work was so urgent that the Weeks could not be involved. i. It would be unfair, now the house has been sold to the Neilsons (in February 2025), for the Weeks to pay for this work. There is no evidence to show that the Neilsons showed the Weeks of the costs they were incurring / would be incurring or that they involved them sufficiently in the repair process at the time or that they indicated that they regarded the Weeks as liable at the time to undertake the repairs.
Ms Neilson raised an argument that what had happened was not a maintenance issue, as set out in the agreement, but what had happened was a natural event or an act of God. She says this is why the Weeks should be paying for it. She says the costs is for insurance. As set out above, the Weeks expressed that they had not heard of this reasoning previously.
There was no evidence to sufficiently prove that this was an event caused by a natural event or “act of God”. The insurer declined coverage in relation to the work required outside and that would indicate otherwise.
In any event, regardless, I find that by agreeing to maintain the property the Neilsons have agreed to undertake maintenance work which would include remedying issues that arise at the property such as this.
This further analysis means the Weeks would not be liable to repay the Neilsons the sums they have incurred even if there were a residential tenancy.
Finally, I note, but do not need to consider it further, that it is highly irregular for a tenant to undertake the extent of this work with virtually no involvement from the landlord. The extent of landlord’s obligation to compensate a tenant for work done is limited by section 45(d) RTA.
The Neilsons application cannot succeed. Suppression
The Tribunal must, on the application of a party that has wholly or substantially succeeded in proceedings, order that the party’s name or identifying particulars not be published, unless the Tribunal considers that publication is in the public interest or is justified because of the party’s conduct or any other circumstances of the case (s 95A RTA).
The Neilsons seek suppression but have not been successful. I see no other reason to award them suppression. It is common for parties appearing before the Tribunal to seek suppression orders but that is not of itself a sufficient reason to make the order. The open justice principle requires the outcome of adjudication to be available to the public; and weighing up the interests of the parties and the public interest, the public interest and the Weeks’s interest outweighs the Neilson’s interest. In taking into account the interest of the parties I have taken into account the fact that the Weeks, who have been the successful party, expressly have said they do not want suppression of their details. Awarding the Neilson’s suppression would likely necessitate the suppression of the Weeks’s details as well (given their close ties) and I do not consider that to be appropriate or justified in the circumstances.

Topics & place

Topics are dispute themes across the order (not the same as claim-type money lines).

State of repair Healthy homes Exemplary damages Norfolk

Residential Tenancies Act sections

s11, s11(1), s2(1), s29, s45, s49A, s95A

Key findings

Dispute theme: state of repair
Dispute theme: healthy homes
Dispute theme: exemplary damages

Frequently asked questions

Common questions about this Tenancy Tribunal case.

What was the outcome of Tenancy Tribunal case 5437242?

The tribunal order states: No suppression orders apply to this decision.

How much money was awarded in case 5437242?

Verified claim lines are listed on this page.

What type of tenancy dispute was case 5437242?

The primary dispute was State of repair. Related themes: Healthy homes, Exemplary damages.

Where can I read the official tribunal order for case 5437242?

The official Ministry of Justice published order is available at https://forms.justice.govt.nz/search/Documents/TTV2/PDF/13380926-Tenancy_Tribunal_Order.pdf.

Reasons

Both parties attended the hearing.

Ms Neilson attended without Mr Neilson but had a support person.

Both Mr and Ms Weeks attended.

I also heard evidence from a witness called by Ms Neilson who detailed some of the work he had undertaken at the property. Civil burden of proof

The applicant is required to establish the claim to the civil law standard of proof, on the balance of probabilities.

That includes a requirement that the party bringing the claim (the applicant), establish their claims “on the balance of probabilities”. The balance of probabilities means more likely than unlikely, or in mathematical terms, has a fractionally more than 50% likelihood. The Tribunal does not need to be certain or very sure about any claim, only that what is claimed is likely. It is the applicant that must prove their case.

As noted by the District Court in Kaipo v Clarke & McCarthy (DC) TT233/02, in practical terms this means that: ... [L]ike anyone who brings an application before a Tribunal or Court, it is incumbent upon the applicant to provide the evidence necessary to prove the case. If the applicant fails to do that, then their application will be dismissed whether it has merit or not because it is up to the applicant to provide the necessary evidence. It is not up to the other parties, and it is certainly not up to the Tribunal to extract evidence. Facts – Background and dispute The background

The Neilsons say that the Weeks failed to undertake or reimburse them for remedial work that they did at the property arising from an issue that arose in 2024 with the sewerage system.

They seek compensation for costs they incurred and exemplary damages.

I heard how the arrangement between the parties arose following the death of Mr Neilson’s father, Rex. At this point Mr and Ms Neilson were already living in the property which was owned by their wider family. When Rex passed away issues arose within the wider Neilson family concerning their continued occupation. Put simply, if Mr and Ms Neilson wanted to remain in the property it had to be purchased from their wider family.

I heard how Mr and Ms Neilson were not in a position to do this at the time and so, in July 2019, Mr and Ms Weeks, being friends of the wider Neilson family for around 55 years, became involved.

I heard that in order for Mr and Ms Neilson to remain at the property Mr and Ms Weeks purchased the property from the wider Neilson family.

To do this they obtained a mortgage from the ANZ (interest and principal). However, they could not raise the whole of the purchase price via the ANZ bank and so, on top of this, they lent Mr and Ms Neilson $153,500 of their own money which was then put in to fund the remainder of the purchase.

Once the purchase was completed Mr and Ms Weeks became the legal owners of the property in July 2019.

I heard how in February 2025 Mr and Ms Neilson purchased the property from the Weeks.

Mr and Ms Weeks say that Mr and Ms Neilson were essentially the owners of the property from 2019 to 2025, and they were regarded as such and regarded themselves as such.

I heard how there were no formal property inspections between 2019 and 2025 but there would instead be events like dinners at the property together and play between the Neilson’s dogs and the Weeks’s grandchildren. I heard how the Neilsons had treated the property as their own – for instance by adding a conservatory and by running a dog breeding business from the premises. I heard how no bond was paid.

The sums that the Neilsons paid the Weeks varied and were applied reflecting the outgoings and the interest / loan repayments. They paid some money direct into a bank account to cover the ANZ mortgage (both interest and principal) and paid separately to the Weeks a further sum that was split to cover interest on the personal loan, rates, insurance and an amount to reduce the amount on the personal loan itself.

A written agreement was entered into between the parties in 2019. It sets out the circumstances of the occupation and states that the “landlords have purchased the house for the tenants to occupy until such time they are in a position to have the ANZ bank loan transferred to themselves”.

It refers to weekly rent being applied to the ANZ loan, rates, insurance and reduction of the personal loan. Mr and Mrs Weeks provided their account book showing how sums (other than the ANZ loan) had been applied.

The written agreement also set out that “Maintenance and insulation relating to the house are the responsibility of the tenants (despite any law to the contrary) and must be maintained by the tenant to an approved standard”.

It concludes with a term that says that “any failure to comply with the above terms - the landlords will be negotiating to sell the house and will give formal notice to end the tenancy...” The application / issue in dispute

The Neilsons say that in April 2024 an issue arose with a spring (water). It essentially flooded their septic tank and sewerage system and meant extensive work had to be done to the sewerage system as well as resulting in the flooding of their basement.

I heard how trenches and pits were excavated, work was done on the septic bed, the water diverted to the storm water drainage and a new temporary effluent pit was dug into a paddock. Once the situation was more under control remedial work included installing a new chamber at the septic tank, creating a new septic bed (I heard the old one had to be decommissioned), installing a pump and filling in the trenches and associated electrical work. The Neilsons arranged and paid for this work.

I heard how Mr Neilson spoke to Mr Weeks when the issues started in April 2024. Mr Weeks says he was not told of the gravity of the situation in the initial call. He says he was told that there had been a flood in the basement but that the water had been sucked out and that the Neilsons had it under control. Both Mr and Ms Weeks came to the property later on in May when some of the work had already been done. At this point the Weeks provided the Neilsons with insurance details.

However, the insurer would not pay for the work to the sewerage system. I heard how the insurer said sediment had moved a pipe causing it to break. The insurer did cover remedial work to the toilet shower and laundry walls in the house - but not to the sewerage system itself.

Mr Weeks says the Neilsons essentially went ahead and did the works themselves and did not involve them. Had they known at the time he might have got involved but he thought the Neilsons, as the owners and as per the agreement and what they had said, had matters under control. They did not know anything about this being a “natural disaster”, as the tenant claims (referred to below), and question that.

The Weeks also say that they had not known about the costs incurred by the Neilsons until the Tribunal application and had not seen the invoices claimed by the Neilsons until today’s hearing. In response to this Ms Neilson simply made reference to her telling the Weeks she had a plumber’s invoice still to pay when the Neilsons were buying the house. Analysis

First, I consider the Weeks’s argument that Mr and Ms Neilson were the owners due to there being a bare trust.

Mr and Ms Neilson were not the legal owners of the premises at the relevant time. They may have been equitable owners but the Tribunal has no jurisdiction to determine whether this is the case and whether a bare or other type of trust might arise here.

Section 2(1) RTA defines a landlord as the grantor of a tenancy under a tenancy agreement of residential premises. A tenant is the grantee of the tenancy. The terms ’residential premises’, ‘tenancy’, ‘tenancy agreement’ and ‘rent’ are defined as: rent means any money, goods, services, or other valuable consideration in the nature of rent to be paid or supplied under a tenancy agreement by the tenant; but does not include any sum of money payable or paid by way of bond residential premises means any premises used or intended for occupation by any person as a place of residence, whether or not the occupation or intended occupation for residential purposes is or would be unlawful tenancy, in relation to any residential premises, means the right to occupy the premises (whether exclusively or otherwise) in consideration for rent; and includes any tenancy of residential premises implied or created by any enactment; and, where appropriate, also includes a former tenancy tenancy agreement, in relation to any residential premises, means any express or implied agreement under which any person, for rent, grants or agrees to grant to any other person a tenancy of the premises; and, where appropriate, includes a former tenancy agreement and any variation of a tenancy agreement

I am not satisfied that this is an arrangement to which the RTA applies. This is because I am not satisfied that the sums the Neilsons paid the Weeks were “in the nature of rent”.

I find that the payments they made were reflective of the arrangement entered into for them to ultimately purchase the property from the Weeks and the overall finance arrangement arising out of that.

The Neilsons serviced a mortgage and also serviced a loan which they had borrowed from the Weeks and which was then directly invested back into the property. They met property outgoings. Amounts payable and the application of those sums to the outgoings / the loan would fluctuate - rather than any rental assessment.

An element of the payments made by the Neilsons relate to costs incurred in funding the property purchase - Essentially an investment by the Neilsons. The personal loan particularly points the payments away from being in the nature of rent. Rent is, by its nature, a payment made for occupation, whereas repayment of a loan is the discharge of a pre-existing capital obligation. Here, the personal loan was entered into and applied to the acquisition of the property. The sums the Neilson’s paid in part reduced that debt. The Neilsons were repaying money they had already advanced for investment purposes in the property. The fact that the repayment is tied to a loan, with a principal sum and interest, and would reduce over time as the debt is discharged, is inconsistent with rent, which does not extinguish any capital liability. This is supported by the ultimate purchase by the Neilsons in which the sums that the Neilsons had paid to the Weeks for the loans (both the ANZ loan and the personal loan) were taken into account in the purchase price. An adjustment was also made to take into account equity (referencing the bare trust). The purchase price was calculated by reference to the remaining amount on the ANZ loan, the remaining amount on the personal loan and an adjustment for equity. This is set out in evidence in a letter from BDO who provided tax advice to the Weeks.

I find that this means that the RTA does not apply and this is sufficient to dismiss the claim. The Neilson’s claim is dismissed.

However, for completeness, I have gone on below to consider what the position would be if there was a residential tenancy and the RTA applied.

My conclusion is that the application would still fail for the reasons set out below.

Section 45 of the Residential Tenancies Act 1986 provides that the landlord must provide and maintain the premises in a reasonable state of repair having regard to the age and character of the premises and the period during which the premises are likely to remain habitable and available for residential purposes. Sections 49A and 49B also set out key provisions in relation to liability for damage.

Section 11 of the RTA provides that the RTA prevails over any tenancy agreement. Any term of an agreement that is inconsistent with the RTA, or that seeks to exclude, modify, or restrict its operation, is of no effect unless such a departure is expressly permitted by the RTA (s 11(1)(a)), or the Tribunal is satisfied that, having regard to the nature of the tenancy, the terms of the agreement, the interests of the parties, and all relevant circumstances, the departure should be allowed (s 11(1)(b)).

In all the very specific circumstances of this case, having carefully considered the position overall, the term placing the obligation for maintenance (or put another way, making the Neilsons responsible for the remedy of damage at the premises) on the Neilsons is reasonable and is a term that should have effect pursuant to section11(1)(b) RTA.

This is because: a. The Neilsons were already living at the property when the Weeks bought it. The intention of all the parties was that the Neilsons were going to live in the property and buy it (and they did do this) from the Weeks when they were able to “have the ANZ loan transferred to themselves”. b. There was no suggestion that the Weeks wanted to buy this property other than to assist their long-term family friends. There was no suggestion that the Weeks made a profit when the property was later purchased by the Neilsons. c. The sale and purchase agreement referred to the Neilsons having equity in the property, there being credit for this in the sale and purchase agreement and it being held on a bare trust. d. The Neilsons had a financial interest in the property. This is particularly due to the personal loan invested back into the property. e. The parties clearly signed a written agreement that made it clear from the outset that the Neilsons would be responsible for maintenance. The clause expressly referred to this applying even though there may be law (the RTA) to the contrary. Thereby highlighting this oddity to the parties. f. The term was not a term hidden in the agreement but one of 5 terms that were written in capital letters on a single sheet of paper and signed by all the parties in 2019. g. The Neilsons and the Weeks treated the property as one that would be purchased by the Neilsons as shown by the alterations to the property done by the Neilsons, the business they operated from it, the lack of inspections, the lack of a bond, the family and financial situation, the way payments were made and the family/friendship ties. h. I consider that the Neilsons must have regarded themselves as liable for the work at the time, otherwise they would not have undertaken the extent of the work they did without more significant involvement or agreement of the Weeks to incur the ongoing costs. I cannot accept that all of the work was so urgent that the Weeks could not be involved. i. It would be unfair, now the house has been sold to the Neilsons (in February 2025), for the Weeks to pay for this work. There is no evidence to show that the Neilsons showed the Weeks of the costs they were incurring / would be incurring or that they involved them sufficiently in the repair process at the time or that they indicated that they regarded the Weeks as liable at the time to undertake the repairs.

Ms Neilson raised an argument that what had happened was not a maintenance issue, as set out in the agreement, but what had happened was a natural event or an act of God. She says this is why the Weeks should be paying for it. She says the costs is for insurance. As set out above, the Weeks expressed that they had not heard of this reasoning previously.

There was no evidence to sufficiently prove that this was an event caused by a natural event or “act of God”. The insurer declined coverage in relation to the work required outside and that would indicate otherwise.

In any event, regardless, I find that by agreeing to maintain the property the Neilsons have agreed to undertake maintenance work which would include remedying issues that arise at the property such as this.

This further analysis means the Weeks would not be liable to repay the Neilsons the sums they have incurred even if there were a residential tenancy.

Finally, I note, but do not need to consider it further, that it is highly irregular for a tenant to undertake the extent of this work with virtually no involvement from the landlord. The extent of landlord’s obligation to compensate a tenant for work done is limited by section 45(d) RTA.

The Neilsons application cannot succeed. Suppression

The Tribunal must, on the application of a party that has wholly or substantially succeeded in proceedings, order that the party’s name or identifying particulars not be published, unless the Tribunal considers that publication is in the public interest or is justified because of the party’s conduct or any other circumstances of the case (s 95A RTA).

The Neilsons seek suppression but have not been successful. I see no other reason to award them suppression. It is common for parties appearing before the Tribunal to seek suppression orders but that is not of itself a sufficient reason to make the order. The open justice principle requires the outcome of adjudication to be available to the public; and weighing up the interests of the parties and the public interest, the public interest and the Weeks’s interest outweighs the Neilson’s interest. In taking into account the interest of the parties I have taken into account the fact that the Weeks, who have been the successful party, expressly have said they do not want suppression of their details. Awarding the Neilson’s suppression would likely necessitate the suppression of the Weeks’s details as well (given their close ties) and I do not consider that to be appropriate or justified in the circumstances.