Published tribunal order
Tenancy Tribunal case 9039584 — Tenancy dispute in Auckland, Auckland
Decided 7 Aug 2025 · Published 7 Aug 2025 · Application 9039584
Landlord favoured
- Cleanliness
- Costs
- Exemplary damages
- Property damage
- Unit Titles
Order
- Hongcan Chen must pay Body Corporate 389269 $4,127.54 immediately, calculated as follows: DescriptionsApplicantRespondent s127 On- charge Argus Fire Protection$368.00 s127 On-charge Armstrong Security$344.00 Costs: Body Coporate$506.00 Costs: Legal$2,390.66 Filing Fee: Partial reimbursement$283.33 Total award$3,891.99 Total interest$235.55 Total award with interest$4,127.54 Total payable by Respondent to Applicant $4,127.54
Reasons
- Both parties attended the hearing held on the 7 July 2025. Background
- This matter has a long history in the Tribunal which I consider it necessary to set out in detail, because it is relevant to the determination about whether the Body Corporate’s legal costs should be paid by Mr Chen.
- The application was filed by the Body Corporate on the 22 November 2022. The Body Corporate sought an order for $6,502.11 made up of -s127 Unit Titles Act 2010 charges $1,827.00. -the Body Corporate secretary charges of $506.00. - legal costs of $4,168.75. -the Body Corporate also sought reimbursement of the filling fee of $850.00, interest on the amounts owing, and the cost of attending the hearing.
- The first hearing was held on the 24 April 2023 before Adjudicator Kee. On the 20 April Ms MacGregor for Price Baker Berridge (PBB) who acted as legal advisors to the Body Corporate, filed written submissions for the hearing. In those submissions she amended the claim to include $2,686.69 for operational levies.
- At the hearing on the 24 April 2023 the Body Corporate now sought: a. Operational levies of $2686.69 b. Section 127 UTA charges of $1827.36 c. Body Corporate Secretary fees $534.75 d. Section 124 Costs of $8449.67 e. Costs of appearance at hearing $575.00 f. Application fee $850.00 g. Interest to 24 April 2023 $399.32 1
- At the hearing on the 24 April 2023 Mr Chen submitted that he had paid all the operational levies on time and that it was only the very last operational levy due on the 1 April 2023 (due after the application had been filed) which he had not paid in full. He said that because of high interest rates on his mortgage he had written to the Body Corporate asking to pay that levy in three equal instalments of $557.99 rather than the total amount of $1673.97. He had made one payment of the $557.99 so from Mr Chen’s calculation he only was in arrears for the levy due on the 1 April 2023 by $1115.98. He intended to pay the balance of the amount by the end of May.
- Mr Chen disputed the section 127 charges as not being costs ‘reasonably incurred’. Mr Chen disputed the Body Corporate and legal charges on the basis that they were unreasonable as well. 1 See submissions from the applicant dated 20 April 2023.
- On the 26 April 2023 Adjudicator Kee issued his decision. He awarded the Body Corporate: a. Operational levies of $2686.69 b. Tenant related charges (s127) $1712.36. c. Body Corporate secretary charges debt recovery $534.75 d. Interest on overdue debt $395.32 e. Filing fee $850.00 f. Legal costs of the attendance at the hearing of $862.50
- Adjudicator Kee also adjourned the issue and determination of legal costs pending the outcome of another costs appeal case that was currently before the Court.
- Adjudicator Kee recorded in his decision of 26 April 2023:
- Mr Chen says he paid the levies on time and referred to his bank statement indicated the levy amount was paid on time. However, Ms MacGregor submitted that the levy amount referred to on the bank statement is actually for the previous term because Mr Chen is one instalment period behind.
- I prefer the body corporate’s evidence. Price Baker Berridge is highly experienced in this area of practice. It is unlikely that they would make such a fundamental error as failing to check whether the levies were being paid late. (Own emphasis)
- Mr Chen applied for a rehearing on the 1 May 2023. He submitted two grounds: a. That he did not owe the operational levies ordered. b. That he disputed the section 127 charges.
- PBB did not attend the rehearing hearing held on the 7 July 2023 and did not make any submissions. Adjudicator Kee having heard the rehearing, made an order declining the rehearing and upholding his decision of the 26 April 2023.
- Mr Chen filed another (second rehearing) on the 13 July 2023. He was adamant that he had paid all of the operational levies on time until the 1 April 2023 and did not owe the amount awarded. Mr Chen provided a statement from the Body Corporate which appeared to show, that he was correct in his submission that he had paid all of the levies before 1 April 2023 on time, and that at the time the Body Corporate filed its application in November 2022 he was fully paid up, and therefore Ms McGregor’s submission to the Tribunal at the hearing on the 24 April 2023 that he was one levy behind, was incorrect.
- Adjudicator Kee was concerned about the situation, on the 31 July he asked the registry to send the following message to the parties: The unit owner's second application for a rehearing has been forwarded to the Tribunal. The Tribunal would be obliged for the Body Corporate's response to Mr Chen's latest application. Mr Chen claims miscarriage of justice because the Body Corporate did not fully account for all of his levy payments. He seeks a stay of the Tribunal's order. In its decision, the Tribunal preferred the Body Corporate's evidence. The Tribunal would be grateful for the Body Corporate's assurance that all of Mr Chen's payments have been accounted and that the Body Corporate is not aware of any miscarriage of justice or substantial wrong arising from the Tribunal's decision.
- Following that minute the Tribunal received submissions from PBB on the 8 August 2023, whereby PBB submitted that the ledger it has received from the Body Corporate before the hearing in April 2023 contained an error and as a result it claimed operational levies of $2686.69 and s127 charges of $1827 which were awarded by the Tribunal.
- PBB submitted the correct figure owing at the 24 April 2024 for both the operational levies and the s127 charges as at 24 April was a total $2943.34. It did not give a breakdown as to how that amount was made up.
- Adjudicator Kee noted in his decision of 14 August that: On this occasion, the body corporate has filed a memorandum dated 8 August 2023 confirming that the Tribunal’s decision of 24 April 2023 was based on incorrect information it [PBB] provided.
- Adjudicator Kee was satisfied that a substantial wrong or miscarriage of justice had or may occur and granted a rehearing for the total claim.
- After the rehearing was granted, there were adjournments and the parties attended mediation, however as the matter was not resolved then it came to me for hearing. The hearing before me
- A rehearing means the claim starts over. I am not bound by the previous determinations of Adjudicator Kee.
- The claims before me for adjudication are: -Claim for charges under s127 of $1827.36. -Interest $603.93 -Claim for the Body Corporate’s reasonable costs in attempting to recovery these costs $506.00 -Claim for the PBB’s costs pursuant to s124 and 127 UTA. $30,859.50 together with the costs of attendance at the hearing -Claim for the filing fee of $850.00.
- There is no claim for operational levies, as Mr Chen has paid the levies due on the 1 April 2023 and has continued to pay levies on time.
- I record that having reviewed the evidence I am satisfied that up until 1 April 2023 Mr Chen had paid all the operational levies on time and that he was not one instalment behind before the 1 April 2023. I am satisfied that he did not pay the full amount of the operational levies due 1 April 2023 on time, but by the end of May had paid that levy as promised. The on-charges
- Is the Respondent liable for the following charges pursuant to s127 Unit Titles Act 2010? a. Moore and Moore Docks Limited invoice dated 2/12/21 for removal of rubbish - $328.75. b. Moore and Moore Docks Limited invoice dated 20/01/22 for $228.75- for after hour visits. c. Moore and Moore Docks Limited invoice dated 7/03//22 $568.00 (this relates to a fire alarm that had been tampered with) d. Moore and Moore Docks Limited call out fee for domestic violence incident 14 April 2022 $228.75. e. Moore and Moore Docks Limited call complaint call 16 March 2022 outside of Building Managers hours invoice dated 19 April 2022 $128.75 f. Armstrong Smarter security invoice – profile key cut $344.
- Section 127 of the UTA says: Recovery of money expended where person at fault (1)This section applies if the body corporate does any repair, work, or act that it is required or authorised to do, by or under this Act, or by or under any other Act, and the repair, work, or act was rendered necessary by reason of any wilful or negligent act or omission on the part of, or any breach of the Act, the body corporate operational rules, or any regulations by, any unit owner or his or her tenant, lessee, licensee, or invitee. (2) Any expense incurred by the body corporate in doing the repair, work, or act, together with any reasonable costs incurred in collecting the expense, is recoverable as a debt due to the body corporate (less any amount already paid) by the person who was the unit owner at the time the expense became payable or by the person who is the unit owner at the time proceedings are instituted.
- Mr Chen’s arguments as to why he is not liable for the claims can be summarised as follows: a. That it was not necessary for the Body Corporate to carry out the work that it did or that it was not authorised to do so. b. That the work was not because of a wilful or negligent act or a breach of the operational rules. c. That the amounts charged are a penalty and therefore not recoverable, d. That the amounts charged are unreasonable for the work that was done. Moore and Moore Docks Limited invoice dated 2/12/21 for removal of rubbish $328.75.
- Clause 10 (a) of the operational rules requires unit owners not to leave rubbish or recycling material in the any common area except for areas designated for rubbish collection.
- The building manager invoiced the Body Corporate $300.00 on the 25 November 2021 for work in excess of the normal duties, rubbish removal. The Body Corporate then invoiced the owner.
- The invoice received from the Moore and Moore Docks Limited was for $300.00 the invoice to the owner was for $328.75, with the body corporate adding a $28.75 administration charge.
- There is no doubt that the owner’s tenants dumped rubbish and recycling material outside of the designated areas. Mr Chen submits that items were left out on the street as they weren’t rubbish but were useful, such as blankets etc, and the tenant was leaving them there for the homeless.
- The Body Corporate submits that the tenants left the rubbish in common areas or in places that would create a bad impression for the Docks, that it had previously warned the tenants about leaving rubbish out and that it incurred a cost from its building manager. It is noted that whilst the invoice was provided to the Tribunal there was no proof that this amount had actually been paid by the Body Corporate.
- Having considered the evidence and submissions I am satisfied that Mr Chen’s tenants were in breach of the operational rules by dumping rubbish in areas not designated for that purpose, but I am not satisfied that the Body Corporate incurred the costs of rubbish removal. The Body Corporate pays its building manager under a building managers contract, I would expect that as part of the building manager’s contract that it is required to remove rubbish from common areas and to keep areas outside the units tidy and attractive. In additional there are cleaners at the property that are paid under a cleaning contract.
- I was not given a copy of the building managers contract nor a copy of the cleaning contract, so I could not ascertain if removal of rubbish put in the areas and identifying culprits was not already paid for or expected of the building managers. I consider it more than likely that removal of rubbish was part of the building managers scope of work.
- Even if I am wrong in that aspect; there was no detail as in the invoice as to how the ‘fee’ was arrived at. It appears from an email between the building manager and Mr Chen that the building manger will issue each invoice for $100.00. I do not consider that the amount of $100 for each occasion as building manager has to dispose of rubbish to be reasonable. Is the Mr Chen liable for the amounts invoiced by Moore and Moore Docks Limited for the callouts?
- These invoices mainly relate to ‘afterhours’ callouts for complaints about noise, to allow the Police into the apartment and to allow Argus Fire Service and Armstrong Smarter into the apartment.
- Mr Chen submits that these amounts amount to a penalty or are not reasonably incurred because the work was part of the normal work that the building manager was expected to undertake, that the building manger was paid a significant sum to undertake that work by the owners, and that effectively if he was asked to pay separate invoices he was being ask to pay the building manager twice.
- In Body Corporate v Collins TT 9033661, 17 May 2023, the Tribunal determined that “The UTA does not authorise a Body Corporate to pass resolutions bringing into effect a penalty regime.” And “The tribunal has no jurisdiction to consider penalties – see s176 UTA which excludes s109RTA (unlawful acts and claims for exemplary damages) That reinforces that fact that a Body Corporate has no power to introduce or make rules about penalties.”
- The Body Corporate submits that these amounts are not a penalty but rather invoices for work completed by the building manager outside the normal scope of their business.
- It is clear from the evidence provided by the body corporate, including email correspondence from neighbouring units and correspondence between the building manager and the owner, that the neighbours were making complaints to the building corporate and building manager about Mr Chen’s tenants. I am satisfied that on occasion Mr Chen’s tenants did breach clause 18(a) of the operational rules.
- However, I am not satisfied that Mr Chen is liable for invoices from Moore and Moore Docks Limited for the following reasons: a. The Body Corporate did not provide me with the contract with the building manager, so I was unable to determine what was or was not within the scope of the works the building manager was already paid for. The Body Corporate provided the building manager’s annual reports for the relevant years, that report discloses that the building managers live on site. The Body Corporate also provided me with Approved Annual budget for the 2021-2022 year, that showed building managers fees (coded as caretaking- building manager) amounted to $128,500.00 including rent. b. I would have expected that in a complex of this size, that the building manager would expect that part of their role would be to deal with noise complaints, and to allow, if necessary, Police or other emergency services into units. c. There is no evidence provided that the building managers were entitled to charge the Body Corporate for attendances after a certain hour. d. There is no record of the basis of how the accounts were invoices, for instance are they an agreed amount (if so then that would be a penalty regime and not able to be collected by the Body Corporate) or are they an hourly rate? e. The amounts charged appear excessive for the work that was done – for example $100.00 to conduct a welfare check on the 16 March 2022. f. There is also no evidence that the invoices were in fact paid by the Body Corporate. g. The invoice 0059 relating to the Domestic Violence callout on the 16 March is dated 2 March 2022. There is no explanation as to how an invoice could be raised before the incident occurred and brings into question the veracity of the document. The other charges.
- I am satisfied that Mr Chen is liable under s127 for the Argus Fire Protection invoice of $339.25 and the Armstrong Smarter security invoice of $315.61 for rekeying the property because: a. Both invoices related to work completed solely at Mr Chen’s apartment. b. The Argus Fire Protection work was required because the tenant had damaged the fire detection alarm a breach of clause 5(a)(ii) of the operational rules because the tenants caused damage which has the potential to cause damage or harm to the common area, infrastructure or another unit. I consider the costs reasonable. c. The Armstrong Security work was necessary because the previous tenant had not returned keys and security cards (breach of clause 20 of the operational rules) Is Mr Chen liable for the Body Corporate fees of $506.00?
- These fees arise from the Body Corporate seeking to recover payment of all the amounts invoiced (on charges) (they do not relate to seeking recovery of operational levies). Mr Chen has disputed liability for all of the costs the whole way along, it is arguable that even if the Body Corporate was only collecting the invoices that have been awarded the fire protection work and the Armstrong Security invoice that Mr Chen may have still disputed those amounts and the Body Corporate would have found itself in exactly the same position as it does today, having had to instigate proceedings in order to collect repayment.
- It is equally plausible that if the Body Corporate had only sought to collect the amounts by Argus Fire Protection and Armstrong, that Mr Chen may have paid those amounts and averted litigation. However, Mr Chen did not make payment of those amounts, and put the rest into dispute and therefore I must view the recoverable costs in that light.
- I am satisfied that the Body Corporate fees were necessary and reasonable in order to recover the Argus fire protection and Armstrong Security invoices. The purpose of s127 is to ensure that unit owners pay for work that is necessary because of their breaches, it would be unfair on other unit owners to be required to pay this work. I consider that the Body Corporate has an obligation to recover those costs, and I consider that the steps that they took to do so reasonable in the circumstances and I also note that the debt recovery regime was raised and resolved at the Annual General Meeting of the Body Corporate owners on the 6 November 2019. Mr Chen owned his apartment at that stage.
- I award the Body Corporate Collection costs of $506.00. Is Mr Chen liable for PBB’s costs?
- PBB submit in their submissions dated 6 July 2025, that the seek $30,859.50 pursuant to s 124 and 127 UTA.
- It is important to note that PBB are not claiming costs pursuant to s102 RTA- they are claiming costs pursuant to s124 and 127 of the UTA 2010 which allow the reasonable costs of recovery of a debt.
- PBB submit “substantial legal costs have been incurred by the Body Corporate for the period 15 July 2022 to 6 July 2025 in bringing statutorily authorised proceedings for the recover of the previously outstanding levies, on-charges, interest and costs because of the Respondent’s failure to pay those amounts.” 2
- PBB submit that “the Body Corporate is entitled to recover all costs incurred in collecting unpaid amounts as a debt due from the Respondent”. 3
- That submission is incorrect. There is no authority that allows a Body Corporate to simply, as a matter of right, collect any costs (including legal costs) of collecting a debt. Those fees must be both incurred and reasonable.
- It is generally accepted that costs are incurred when the recipient becomes liable, usually on the issuing of an invoice.
- What is reasonable was discussed in detail in the decision of Body Corporate 346799 v Gueirand & Vu [2023] NZDC 19645. The District Court set out the 2 Paragraph 25 of Applicant’s submissions dated 6 July 2025 3 Paragraph 30 of the Applicant’s submissions dated 6 July 2025. factors that should be taken into consideration in determining if the fee is reasonable. (a) Whether the work that was done was reasonably necessary; (b) Whether the amount charged for the reasonably necessary work was reasonable (in both instances, the NZLS Rules and Rule 9 in particular are a prime reference point when assessing reasonableness); (c) Third, test the analysis against other available reference points.
- PBB relies on three cases in its claim for costs. Body Corporate 346799 v Vu, Godoy & Anor v Body Corporate 164980 HC Auckland M 1906-98 and Body Corporate 331094 v Smith [2025] 17745. PBB were Counsel for the Body Corporate on all those cases.
- The Vu and Smith cases both related to claims for operational levies. In Smith the unit owner paid the levies on the eve of the Tribunal proceedings. The Body Corporate successfully argued that it could use s127 to recover the costs it had expended by instructing legal counsel to date. The Court also observed that s124 also allowed the Body Corporate to recover those costs.
- Godoy v Godoy v Body Corporate 164980 was a case heard under s34 of the Unit Titles Act 1972, that section is analogous to s127 Unit Titles Act 2010.The unit owner failed in their application to the Court to have their dog remain living in the unit. The Body Corporate sought costs of their defence of the claim under s 34. UTA 1972. The Court observed that under s34 costs could be awarded and that those costs could be full indemnity costs. Accordingly, the Court awarded the Body Corporate $16,000 which was full solicitor indemnity costs. In making this award Justice Fisher first considered the reasonableness of the award and then whether there was any bar to awarding indemnity costs, he said: As I read s 34, a body corporate can recover from a proprietor any expense incurred in taking any statutorily authorised step made necessary by that proprietor’s breach of a rule. The act in the present case was the bringing of proceedings and pursuing them to completion along with the consequential defence of the proceedings brought by Mr and Mrs Godoy. There is also a contractual basis for recovery in the Body Corporate’s own rules. Rule 2.3(h) and the concluding words of cl 2.3 would have provided a contractual basis for indemnity costs had s 34 not been available. I am satisfied that there is a legal basis for indemnity costs. I can see no basis in discretion or evaluation for denying recovery of the sum claimed. 4
- Therefore, in determining the costs in a claim under s127 I consider that I am guided by the following legal principles. a. The Body Corporate is able to recover from a proprietor legal costs that are reasonably incurred, in recovering a debt owed by the unit owner. b. There is no bar to awarding full indemnity costs. 4 Godoy & Anor v Body Corporate No 164980 HV Auckland M 1906-98 page 11. c. The costs must be reasonable.
- When determining what is reasonable, I must only consider what are the reasonable costs of recovery of the Argus Fire Protection invoice and the Armstrong Security Invoice. This is because the right to costs only arises as a consequence of the recovery of the expense. Any expense incurred by the body corporate in doing the repair, work, or act, together with any reasonable costs incurred in collecting the expense, is recoverable as a debt due to the body corporate. 5
- In other words, if the expense is not awarded, then the costs cannot be awarded as well.
- My starting position in determining costs is the claim filed on 22 November 2022 which was only seeking to recover s127 charges (not operational levies). 6
- As no claim at the hearing in front of me was made for operational levies then I cannot consider a claim for costs under s124.
- I consider that there was work conducted by PBB up until the first hearing was reasonably necessary, including the filing of proceedings, I say this because Mr Chen was intransigent in his position that he was not liable for any of the costs claimed. Therefore, for the Body Corporate to collect those costs then they would have had to file proceedings and obtain an order from the Tribunal.
- I have reviewed PBB’s timesheets from the date they were instructed by the Body Corporate until the date of hearing. There is over 20 hours of time claimed for work done up until the date of hearing. I am struck by this amount. It seems to be a considerable amount of work for a firm that holds itself out as having particular expertise in this area. I would expect that if a firm were charging higher rates for the expertise, then the time that they would spend on tasks would be less than a firm that has no particular expertise in this area. I note that 2 hours of the time is for drafting the Tenancy Tribunal application (one hour on the 25/8/ 22 and another on the 25/10/22). The application form is a template that is filled out online, PBB file similar applications every day. This application was not long in length, I do not know why it took 2 hours, with a period of 2 months in between. If the application was stopped halfway through and the picked up again, then I do not think that it is reasonable to expect the unit owner to pay this cost for ‘getting up to speed’ twice.
- The Body Corporate has only been successful in claiming some of the claims, therefore they can only be awarded for some of the costs. There were 6 separate invoices that the Body Corporate were seeking to collect under s127 (tougher with the costs of recovery). The Body Corporate have only been successful in collecting 2/6 and therefore I have awarded the Body Corporate 1/3 of the fees 5 Section 127 (2) UTA 2010. 6 I observe that even in the first letter of demand to Mr Chen, which is only about on-charges under s127, PBB refers to the ability to recover cost under s124, which is plainly wrong. claimed to hearing on the 24 April 2023 (recorded in the submissions as $7172.00 7 ). Therefore, the amount awarded as the costs of recovery by PBB is $2390.66. Why PBB is not entitled to recover any costs on or after 24 April 2023.
- I do not consider that any work completed by PBB after the original hearing of the 24 April 2023 was reasonably necessary. It was Ms MacGregor’s (from PBB) errors at the hearing on the 24 April 2023, both seeking operational levies that were not due and by submitting that Mr Chen was already in arrears before the 1 April 2023 levy, that put in motion the need for the rehearing application and further Tribunal time. Put another way if Ms MacGregor had not made this mistake, it is likely that that the proceedings would have finished at that point. Whilst Mr Chen may have sought rehearing on other grounds, we will never know. But we do know that the Ms MacGregor’s error was such that Adjudicator Kee later considered that the grounds for a rehearing – a serious wrong or miscarriage of justice - had been made out.
- I do not consider it just that a representative can make an error causing a miscarriage or justice, and then argue that those actions were ‘reasonable’.
- I also note that when Mr Chen filed his first rehearing application on the 1 May 2025 that PBB has time records on the 4 May 2023 for one hour of reviewing ledger and recalculating sums owing and 17 May 2023 of 5 units (half an hour) for checking figures owed to date. Despite checking the figures, it does not appear that the error that was noted at that point, or if it was, the Tribunal was not alerted.
- It was not until the second rehearing application was filed and Adjudicator Kee asked for written submissions that the error was accepted, and even then it does not appear that PBB appreciated that the error occurred both in the written the submission, where the amount of $2686.69 was sought for operational levies that were overdue and at the hearing (This figure they later accepted was incorrect) and that Ms MacGregor had mistakenly told Adjudicator Kee that the levies were in arrears beforehand “Because Mr Chen is one instalment period behind.”
- I also consider the factors in NZLS Rules of Client Care – Rule 9. PBB hold themselves out to have expertise in UTA disputes, they regularly appear in the Tribunal on such cases and it clear even in this proceeding the weight that is given to their experience and expertise. 8 This is usually recognised by the Tribunal in costs awards made. But that is a double-edged sword, If PBB are holding themselves out as having specialist skills and knowledge, and therefore can charge rates that reflect that skill and knowledge, then they must also be accountable when that skill and knowledge falls short as it did in this case. It is 7 Applicant’s submissions dated 20 April 2023 pages 19-21. 8 Mr Kee notes in paragraph 10 of his decision – Price Baker Berridge is highly experienced I this area of practice .It is unlikely that they would make such a fundamental error as failing to check whether the levies were being paid late. expected that they would have checked the ledger. It is not lost on me that in the timesheets a significant amount of time between the hearing in April and the rehearing in August is spent “checking” and yet the error was not discovered until Mr Kee specifically asked the Body Corporate to check their records.
- The amount now charged by PBB is out of proportion to the claimed amounts in the application.
- If an award was made for the total amount this would be an affront to the rule of law as it would have the effect of discouraging unit owners from disputing legitimate claims with their Body Corporate managers and their legal counsel. If the full amount was awarded it would not be hard to conceive of a situation where any owner who questioned a Body Corporate charge is told of the time that Mr Chen disputed his charges and ended up with paying a legal bill of $30,859.00! This would be a significant deterrent and would in my view result in claims not being brought to the Tribunal that may have merit and advance jurisprudence in this area.
- There is an argument that by not making Mr Chen liable for these costs, that I am making the other unit owners liable, because this will become a cost of the Body Corporate. The Body Corporate has a duty to all owners not to incur unreasonable costs and this includes litigation risk. For the reasons I have given above I do not consider that it is fair and reasonable for Mr Chen to bear all the costs of litigation. Interest
- The Body Corporate resolved that interest of 10% be charged 9 any unpaid debts.
- The date the interest becomes payable is from the date that the debt is due. The date the Argus Fire Protection charge became due was 20 March 2022
- The date that the Armstrong Security debt became due was 20 May 2022.
Is the filing fee to be reimbursed?
- S102(4)(b) RTA provides that the filing fee may be awarded if a party has been partly successful.
- The Body Corporate has been successful in some of its claims. Mr Chen has been successful in defending some claims. I consider given the nature and extent of proceedings that the filling fee should be borne by both parties and therefore I order Mr Chen to pay a third of filing fee of $283.33. 9 AGM – 10 November 2021 at resolution 13 – page 118 Applicants bundle of documents in submission 7 July 2025