What was the outcome of Tenancy Tribunal case 9048164?

The tribunal order states: Joseph Rajend Prasad and Caitlin Prasad must pay Body Corporate 467784

How much money was awarded in case 9048164?

Verified claim lines are listed on this page.

What type of tenancy dispute was case 9048164?

The primary dispute was Unit Titles.

Where can I read the official tribunal order for case 9048164?

The official Ministry of Justice published order is available at https://forms.justice.govt.nz/search/Documents/TTV2/PDF/11425829-Tribunal_Order.pdf.

What was the outcome of Tenancy Tribunal case 9048164?

The tribunal order states: Joseph Rajend Prasad and Caitlin Prasad must pay Body Corporate 467784

How much money was awarded in case 9048164?

Verified claim lines are listed on this page.

What type of tenancy dispute was case 9048164?

The primary dispute was Unit Titles.

Where can I read the official tribunal order for case 9048164?

The official Ministry of Justice published order is available at https://forms.justice.govt.nz/search/Documents/TTV2/PDF/11425829-Tribunal_Order.pdf.

Hamilton, Hamilton Tenancy Tribunal Case 9048164 — Unit Titles

Order

Joseph Rajend Prasad and Caitlin Prasad must pay Body Corporate 467784 $15,362.16 immediately, calculated as follows: DescriptionsApplicantRespondent Costs following unsuccessful application $15,362.16 Total payable by Applicant to Respondent $15,362.16

Reasons

On 15 August 2024, the Tribunal issued its decision dismissing an application Mr and Mrs Prasad (the Prasads) made against the body corporate.
The Tribunal considered several issues raised by the Prasads including a claim for $20,000.00 arising from a disputed Deed of Settlement between the parties (which followed an earlier Tribunal application and decision), levies the Prasads claimed were ultra vires, a dispute about insurance cover, the correctness of historical levies, and a request for a forensic financial audit dating back to 2014.
I made a timetable for submission on costs. I received submissions from counsel for the body corporate, but not from the Prasads. I therefore issued a decision on costs on the assumption that the Prasads did not wish to make submissions.
I was unaware that counsel for the body corporate did not send his costs submissions to the Prasads. Equally, the Prasads made no enquiry of the registry when they did not receive costs submissions on the timetable I had set.
After I issued my decision, the Prasads applied for a rehearing. I granted that application on the papers, given the procedural flaw that had occurred.
I set a new timetable for submission on costs. At the request of the Prasads, I extended that timetable. I receive their costs submissions in terms of the timetable I set, and reply submissions from counsel for the body corporate. The rehearing
As is usual, costs are considered on the papers based on the written submissions the parties provide. The Prasads have submitted that another adjudicator should make the costs decision, a rehearing having been granted.
The usual process in this Tribunal is that when a rehearing is granted, a different adjudicator will hear the case afresh. However, that is more a practice than a legal requirement. The law does not automatically exclude the same adjudicator from conducting a rehearing.
A decision on costs does not require the adjudicator to hear witness evidence or make credibility findings. It is, in a sense, an administrative type of decision. The adjudicator weighs the application against the applicable legal principles that apply to costs and makes a decision.
It is appropriate that I conduct the rehearing on costs because only I know how the hearing progressed and only I can assess objectively the amount of work required by counsel to answer the matters raised by the Prasads in the application.
I assured the Prasads that I would consider the issue of costs afresh and that is what I have done. The timetable for submissions on costs ended on 25 April 2025 and I have given a lot of thought to the application and to the parties’ submissions over the last 3 weeks. The law on costs
I need not set out the law as I did in my first decision on costs as the parties are familiar with it. I have been guided by the 2 decisions I referred to in that decision – BC 346799 v Ikeda 1 and Holden v Architectural Fisheries Ltd 2 .
As I noted in my decision, the Tribunal must have regard to the factors set out in those decisions – the amount of money involved; the length of the hearing; the legal and factual complexity; and the time involved in preparation – and where appropriate the District Court scale can be considered as a guide.
Overall, the Tribunal aims to make a decision that is objectively reasonable, legally correct, and fair to both parties. Discussion
Counsel for the body corporate sought full indemnity costs, because the application was akin to a levy recovery application where the law provides for the full recovery of costs by the body corporate pursuing a claim for outstanding levies.
Here, the issues were far wider ranging, and complex. It was never a claim for levies by the body corporate.
Mr Prasad submits that the case was not too complex and would have required minimal preparation. He notes that the hearing was confined to a morning.
In response Mr Gibbons has submitted (and I will set this out): e The applicant’s description of the claim and reference to various points of statute highlights that the claim warranted counsel. A number of arguments which the body corporate believes lacked substance were advanced, and the factual and legal complexity is reflected in the owners of PU24 seeking to revisit various points in their lengthy costs submissions (in addition to the existing submissions and what the applicant describes as a “truckload” of supporting material). f. Further, the owners of PU24 not suggest the issues were of “moderate to low importance”, and that the body corporate “raised unmeritorious arguments”. The body corporate disputes these assertions: given the high utility interest of PU24 and the potential liability of the body corporate, defending the claim was of high importance to the body corporate, and based on the result, the body corporate believes it is the applicant who raised unmeritorious arguments (and continues to do so in its costs submission). g. In addition, the applicant’s costs submissions contain unnecessary and inappropriate criticisms of various parties, including the Tribunal, the body corporate 1 [2020] NZDC 3669 2 [1997] 3NZLR 143 committee other owners, and counsel. These reflect the applicant’s carriage of the claim.
I agree with those observations. An example of the litigious approach adopted by Mr Prasad is further illustrated in his submissions on costs which run to 35 pages plus annexures. He variously addresses some of the substantive issues again, expresses his disagreement with the Tribunal’s findings, and is generally critical. While he refers to a ‘without prejudice save as to costs offer’ to somehow support his submission that no costs or very limited costs should be awarded, there appears to have been very little willingness by him to engage in settlement discussions.
I accept Mr Gibbons’ submissions that all costs not associated with the claim have been removed and the costs claimed are properly within the scope of what can be considered. No additional costs have been sought responding to the Prasads’ submissions on costs.
The Tribunal stands by its observation that this was not a ‘bread and butter’ case; the application raised complex issues and the hearing process was protracted. The rehearing application (of the substantive decision) was considered to have no merit. And the body corporate’s attempts at settlement were rejected, or at least, not accepted.
Before I had the benefit of considering the Prasads’ submissions on costs, I found that a 70% contribution to costs was a fair and reasonable contribution, at the upper level as referred to in Holden, but for justifiable reasons.
With the benefit of the Prasads’ submissions, I now consider that a 55% contribution to costs is a fair and reasonable exercise of the Tribunal’s discretion in this case.
The Prasads refer to the body corporate bearing all or most of the responsibility for its legal costs. How can that be fair? The body corporate is the sum of the unit owners. It is not objectively fair for the other unit owners to bear the cost of the body corporate’s legal representation in a case it succeeded in defending.
However, relevant to a lower award in this case is the fact that the Prasads as owners of PU24 have a much higher level of ownership and utility interest. The balance of the legal costs will be levied by the body corporate either as part of the next annual levies or as a special levy. So, the Prasads will have a levy apportionment for the balance of the body corporate’s legal costs based on their high utility interest. Even so, the other unit owners will still be levied for part of the balance of the body corporate’s legal costs. Result
Joseph Rajend Prasad and Caitlin Prasad must pay Body Corporate 467784 $15,362.16 for the body corporate’s legal costs following the Prasads’ unsuccessful application.

Tenancy Tribunal case 9048164 — Unit Titles in Hamilton, Hamilton

At a glance

Tenancy Tribunal case 9048164 — Unit Titles in Hamilton, Hamilton

At a glance

Claims & awards

Order

Reasons

Topics & place

Residential Tenancies Act sections

Key findings

Frequently asked questions

Claims & awards

Order

Reasons

Topics & place

Residential Tenancies Act sections

Key findings

Frequently asked questions