What was the outcome of Tenancy Tribunal case 9050484?

The tribunal order states: The Common Area Car Park Agreement – 04-02-2022, which relocated the

How much money was awarded in case 9050484?

Individual award amounts are in the official MoJ PDF. Claim amounts appear on this page when claims and net totals reconcile.

What type of tenancy dispute was case 9050484?

The primary dispute was Harassment. Related themes: Unit Titles, Costs, Ordinary Levy, Interest.

Where can I read the official tribunal order for case 9050484?

The official Ministry of Justice published order is available at https://forms.justice.govt.nz/search/Documents/TTV2/PDF/10927986-Tribunal_Order.pdf.

What was the outcome of Tenancy Tribunal case 9050484?

The tribunal order states: The Common Area Car Park Agreement – 04-02-2022, which relocated the

How much money was awarded in case 9050484?

Individual award amounts are in the official MoJ PDF. Claim amounts appear on this page when claims and net totals reconcile.

What type of tenancy dispute was case 9050484?

The primary dispute was Harassment. Related themes: Unit Titles, Costs, Ordinary Levy, Interest.

Where can I read the official tribunal order for case 9050484?

The official Ministry of Justice published order is available at https://forms.justice.govt.nz/search/Documents/TTV2/PDF/10927986-Tribunal_Order.pdf.

Stanmore Bay, Whangaparaoa Tenancy Tribunal Case 9050484 — Harassment

Order

The Common Area Car Park Agreement – 04-02-2022, which relocated the accessibility car park from the common area is invalid and is cancelled. The body corporate may relocate the mobility car park to its prior position.
Anthony Clements Karloff Nienkemper must: return the four CCTV cameras, two units, and brackets referred to in his invoice to the body corporate dated 9/10/22 to the body corporate within five working days of the date of this order; or alternatively, pay the body corporate $1,322.50 within five working days of the date of this order.
Anthony Clements Karloff Nienkemper must pay Body Corporate 534454 $18,525.06 immediately, calculated as follows: DescriptionsAmounts Recovery of carpark swap expense $657.80 Recovery of fence expense for unit 10$3,220.00 Recovery of post-assault time expense Ordinary levies Interest on outstanding levies to 10.10.24 $1,794.00 $6,651.90 $546.71 Letters of demand$240.00 Levy recovery costs Expenditure recovery costs Disbursements $2,069.68 $2,621.28 $223.69 Filing Fee$500.00 Total award$18,525.06

Reasons

I heard this matter over two half-days on 2 July 2024 and 10 October 2024.
Colin Craig attended the hearing for Centurion Management Services, the body corporate’s body corporate manager.
Mr Nienkemper attended the hearing with Alex McCormick, the former body corporate chairperson. Mr McCormick acted as Mr Nienkemper’s representative. 1
The body corporate seeks orders: a. Confirming the body corporate’s agreement with Mr Nienkemper for the mobility carpark is void and/or is cancelled. b. For recovery of the body corporate’s spending substantially for Mr Nienkemper’s benefit only. 2 c. That Mr Nienkemper pay the body corporate overdue levies and interest on them. d. The body corporate’s costs relating to the claims, including Centurion’s charges for bringing these proceedings. 3
I have read the parties’ written materials and heard submissions. I do not attempt to record and analyse all of them because much of what I heard was not germane. Background
Mr Nienkemper was a member of the body corporate committee and Mr McCormick was the body corporate committee’s chairperson before 28 March 2023 when they were removed by a majority of other unit owners. 1 See Unit Titles Act 2010 (UTA), s 171(2). 2 UTA, s 126., 3 UTA, s 124 Residential Tenancies Act 1986, s 102.
During their tenure on the committee, the body corporate granted Mr Nienkemper a licence to use a mobility carpark located on common area outside his unit, with the mobility carpark relocated to Mr Nienkemper’s basement level carpark.
The committee expended a lot of effort on suppressing a neighbouring business’s abuse of the common right of way. The neighbour clogged the right of way with shipping containers, parked-up trucks, and campervans.
Mr Nienkemper was particularly affected by the neighbour’s activities because his unit’s basement level abuts the right of way and the neighbour’s vehicles passed perilously close to Mr Nienkemper’s unit.
The committee authorised many payments to Mr Nienkemper for things such as monitoring the right of way, arranging trespass notices for transgressors, and making formal complaints to Police. The committee considered paying Mr Nienkemper for these tasks was cheaper than instructing a professional such as a private investigator to do the same thing.
The committee also authorised the cost of installing fencing and planters around the basement level of Mr Nienkemper’s unit to protect it from the neighbour’s vehicles.
Mr Nienkemper led the clampdown on the neighbour’s misuse of the right of way. As a result is relations with the neighbour and its employees became increasingly acrimonious. Finally one day, Mr Nienkemper and Mr McCormick patrolled the right of way with a wheel clamp. As they finished up, an enraged neighbour employee aggressively approached Mr Nienkemper and assaulted him.
Police charged the neighbour’s employee with assault with a weapon and Mr Nienkemper with assault. 4
I now consider each of the body corporate’s claims.

Should the mobility carpark swap agreement be cancelled?

Mr Nienkemper and the body corporate entered into the Common Area Car Park Agreement in February of 2022. The term was to be 10 years. The mobility park was located on common property directly outside the ground level of Mr Nienkemper’s unit. Under the agreement, the mobility park was moved to Mr Nienkemper’s unit’s basement carpark, and he took over the mobility carpark space.
Mr Craig emphasises the body corporate’s Council obligations under its development consent to provide the mobility carpark in its original location. 4 Police later withdrew the charges against both men. Legal principles
Council exercises a public function when it issues consents for developments so it must comply with Part 1A of the Human Rights Act 1993 (HRA). That means that Council must ensure that persons with disabilities are not materially disadvantaged because of the differential effect that failing to provide suitable mobility carparks would have. 5
This Tribunal is also subject to the HRA because it is a judicial body pursuant to s 3 of the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990. The Tribunal must recognise the fact that New Zealand has ratified the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities. 6 Article 9 of that convention relevantly provides: Accessibility Article 9:
To enable persons with disabilities to live independently and participate fully in all aspects of life, States Parties shall take appropriate measures to ensure to persons with disabilities access, on an equal basis with others, to the physical environment, to transportation, to information and communications, including information and communications technologies and systems, and to other facilities and services open or provided to the public, both in urban and in rural areas. These measures, which shall include the identification and elimination of obstacles and barriers to accessibility, shall apply to, inter alia: a. Buildings, roads, transportation and other indoor and outdoor facilities, including schools, housing, medical facilities and workplaces;
Further, private entities such as body corporates are subject to Part 2 of the HRA which deals with unlawful discrimination in the private sector and includes the area of housing. I body corporate were to fail to reasonably accommodate persons with disabilities that failure may amount to indirect discrimination under s 65 of the HRA, which provides: 65 Indirect discrimination Where any conduct, practice, requirement, or condition that is not apparently in contravention of any provision of this Part has the effect of treating a person or group of persons differently on 1 of the prohibited grounds of discrimination in a situation where such treatment would be unlawful under any provision of this Part other than this section, that conduct, practice, condition, or requirement shall be unlawful under that provision unless the person whose conduct or practice is in issue, or who imposes the condition or requirement, establishes good reason... 5 See Ministry of Health v Atkinson [2012] 3 NZLR 456 (CA) for the elements of a HRA, Part 1A breach. 6 On 25 September 2008. Discussion
Mr Craig submits the carpark agreement is invalid for being in breach of the development’s Council consent which includes the mobility carpark being in the exact location that it originally was. The purpose of the mobility park was to accommodate visitors to the development. Moving the carpark therefore breached the Council consent. The resituated “mobility” carpark could never have been accepted by Council because is located on the lower level which does not provide reasonable access to the development. Only Mr Nienkemper’s unit has a lower level. There is no lift for the lower level. Consequently, any visitors with mobility disabilities visiting anyone other than Mr Nienkemper would have to negotiate stairs or the vehicle ramp to get to the other units.
The point of mobility parks is to enable access to places for people with disabilities. Conveniently located mobility carparks are a reasonable accommodation so people with disabilities can go to places that they who would otherwise find it difficult to access.
Mr Nienkemper submits “This swap can not be canceled due to unit 10’s contractual agreement with Key2” and “Unit 10...rightfully owns [the mobility carpark space]”. Mr Nienkemper believes that his purchase of his unit was for three carparks, including the mobility carpark.
However, the mobility carpark is located on the development’s common area. The vendor had no power to alienate common area. The New Zealand system for land ownership is based on the principle of indefeasibility of title. Consequently, the mobility carpark remains common area because that is what is set out in the certificate of title.
Mr Nienkemper submits that “Any property decision regarding unit 10 AU car parks would need to be adjudicated through the district court under the property law act 2007”. That is not the case here because the certificate of title shows that Mr Nienkemper does not own the carpark in question. He fails to understand that he is the one who is challenging the title and there is ample evidence that the mobility carpark is on common property not his property. Conclusion
The former committee’s agreement to swap the carparks breached the letter and the spirit of the development’s consent. It was unlawful and invalid.
The carpark agreement was invalid. To put the matter beyond doubt the Tribunal formally cancels it.

Should Mr Nienkemper repay the body corporate for some of its expenditure?

Submissions

The body corporates relies on s 126 of the Unit Titles Act 2010 which enables a body corporate to recover various payments to Mr Nienkemper.
Where its expenditure largely benefits only one unit, the body corporate may recover its “any expense” from that unit’s owner under s 126 where s 126(1) applies. That subsection provides: 126 Recovery of money expended for repairs and other work (1) This section applies where the body corporate does any repair, work, or act that it is required or authorised to do, by or under this Act, or by or under any other Act, but the repair, work, or act— (a) is substantially for the benefit of 1 unit only; or (b) is substantially for the benefit of some of the units only; or (c) benefits 1 or more of the units substantially more than it benefits the others or other of them.
Mr Craig submits: The basis for these charges was straightforward. The Body Corporate at the behest of Mr Nienkemper and while Mr Nienkemper and Mr McCormick were at the helm had undertaken work directly to the benefit of Mr Nienkemper. The most significant of these costs was the supply and erection of a fence around Mr Nienkemper’s property.
Mr Nienkemper resists the body corporate’s claims. He says the committee correctly paid Mr Nienkemper and the payments represent only a fraction of the work he did for the body corporate. The committee’s decisions were entirely correct. The payments cannot be clawed back under s 126 because they were made for the benefit on all the unit owners. Protective fencing and planters
Mr Nienkemper submits Mr Craig is incorrect to characterise the protective fence as benefitting only Mr Nienkemper’s unit. He states: The decision was made to protect our Body corporate façade by placing a protection fencing in front of unit 10 below in the best interests of our Body Corporate as a whole.
In his costs submissions, Mr Nienkemper submits that the building’s cladding is infrastructure that relates to more than one unit:
The applicant made false and misleading statements a. “that Body Corporate owners are responsible for any damages to their portion of the exterior of the BC building.” b. Refer to section 138 - 1d “The body corporate is responsible for repairing and maintaining the common property, any assets owned by the body corporate or designed for use in connection with the common property and any building elements and infrastructure that relates to or serve more than one unit.”
Section 126 contemplates that the body corporate may be responsible for carrying out work pursuant to s 138, but that the body corporate may recover its expenses to carry out the work from the unit or units that substantially benefit from the work. Cladding generally serves more than one unit. However, this part of the cladding affected only unit 10.
The protective fencing and planters were substantially for the benefit of only Mr Nienkemper’s unit. Therefore, the body corporate is entitled to recover the cost of them from Mr Nienkemper.
The body corporate seeks reimbursement of $3,220.00 based on Mr Nienkemper’s (undated) invoice to the body corporate for the fencing and pot plants. That assessment is based on the cost of the fencing materials and the labour, less the cost of pot plants and shrubs, plus GST.
Mr Nienkemper objects to this calculation. He says in his costs submissions: Hypocritically, the applicant now demands that unit 10 pays costs for the protective fencing of $3220.00 which differs from the original invoice $4945.00 paid on 28-09-2022 at which time the applicant wrongly deemed the fencing beneficial to unit 10.
Mr Nienkemper’s invoice indicates that Nienkemper charged the body corporate for installing the protective fence but also refers to pot plants. The “Cartage & building labour” was $1,800.00. Mr Craig submits that the cartage and labour relates to the fence and placing the pot plants in planters around the basement floor of Mr Nienkemper’s unit. That is plausible. Mr Craig added that (ironically given the committee was concerned about abuse of the right-of-way) some of the plant boxers were placed on the right of way easement and had to be moved.
Mr Nienkemper did not provide an alternative narrative for the labour despite it being contained in his own invoice.
Accordingly, the Tribunal orders Mr Nienkemper to reimburse the body corporate $3,220.00 for the cost of the protective fencing. Carpark swap repainting
Mr Nienkemper on-charged the body corporate $657.80 for the painting required to swap the mobility carpark around. The carpark change substantially benefitted only Mr Nienkemper’s unit.
The body corporate is entitled to recover the cost. The Tribunal orders the amount sought. Time spent in hospital and Police after assault incident
Mr Nienkemper charged the body corporate for his time in hospital and with Police following the incident in which the neighbour’s employee assaulted him. 7
There does not appear to be a proper basis for the body corporate to pay Mr Nienkemper for this either as a contractor or as a member of the committee. A body corporate who employs, say, a security guard contractor would not expect the security guard to charge for their time spent in hospital due to an assault when on duty. Body corporate committee members are unpaid volunteers. If, for example, a committee member were assaulted during a committee meeting, it would not make sense to indemnify them for their time spent in hospital or with Police, calculated on an hourly basis.
The legitimacy of the payment is to be put to one side however, because the body corporate has not challenged it.
Section 126 is broad enough to apply to this situation. Only Mr Nienkemper, as the owner of unit 10, substantially benefitted from this payment.
The body corporate is entitled to recover the expense.
The Tribunal orders Mr Nienkemper to repay the $1,794.00 he received. Other invoices
Mr Craig relied on a decision of Her Honour Judge Sharp to prove that Mr Nienkemper was the principal benefactor of the costs associated with the right of way. 8 In her oral decision, Her Honour commented: His, I would say complete obsession with this (which is based on a complete legal misunderstanding of who owns what and who has what rights) has caused him to take the attitude that has which has brought everybody here before the Court. 7 The District Court found the wheel clamping to be unlawful: Nienkemper v Ridling [2023] NZDC 26444 at [12]. 8 Nienkemper v Ridling [2023] NZDC 26444 at [16].
Further, Her Honour observed: 9 [25] ...In particular, I note and am persuaded that she considered Mr Nienkemper to have a menacing demeanour, exhibiting erratic and unpredictable behaviour, unnecessarily antagonising neighbouring property owners and have a personal vendetta against the respondent, Mr Ridling; behaving abusively, intimidatingly and insultingly towards Ms Gellechan with the intention of forcing her to break the law; going out of his way to make a nuisance of himself and continually provoke others around him; intentionally obstructing the right of way serving the properties of the Body Corporate and the respondent. And that his claim to being victimised by anybody, let alone Mr Ridling is outlandish.
And: 10 [34] It is very clear to me that Mr Nienkemper simply fails to understand the legal position in respect to the driveway and the various easements over it and what that means is that he had and has no legal right to police the driveway.
Mr Nienkemper has appealed that decision. He says witnesses gave perjured evidence. Hopefully, he has instructed counsel given Her Honour’s comments about Mr Nienkemper’s misunderstanding basic legal principles.
Her Honour’s decision indicates that Mr Nienkemper was on a personal crusade in respect to the right-of-way issues. His combative approach led to acrimony with the neighbour’s employees, culminating in the assault matter. At one point the committee trespassed even its own unit owners.
Mr Nienkemper’s passion for the issue does not mean, however, that the effects of his actions were substantially only to his unit’s benefit. The legitimacy of the committee’s decisions (however wrongheaded) has not been challenged. That the committee’s decisions had a negative rather than a constructive effect is neither here nor there. Rather, the issue remains whether the expenditure benefitted Mr Nienkemper’s unit and not others.
I cannot readily isolate the benefit of the expenditure in most cases as being substantially only for Mr Nienkemper’s unit for several of the invoices the body corporate seeks to recover on because all of the unit owners benefitted by the right of way being kept clear. The attendances charged for were for that purpose.
Therefore, the Tribunal declines to order Mr Nienkemper to reimburse his attendances for: o28/9/2022 Orewa Police – Unit 7 trespass$276.00 o29/9/2022 Orewa Police – Unit 8 trespass$138.00 o7/9/2022 Orewa Police – Mark Ridling$138.00 o9/9/2020 Orewa Police – Shane King $414.00 9 Ibid at [25]. 10 Ibid at [34]. o1/10/2022 Orewa police – Ridling/King$276.00
Mr Craig withdrew a claim for an invoice relating to Mr McCormick for $657.80.
Similarly, after discussion, Mr Craig elected not to purse reimbursement of part of the barrister, Katrin Wendt’s invoice for $1,298.93. Most of the invoice related to body corporate interests. Only a negligibly small amount of Ms Wendt’s invoice could conceivably be isolated as being only for Mr Nienkemper’s benefit. Conclusion
The Body Corporate sought to recover $8,638.80 of its . I note the Tribunal orders Mr Nienkemper to repay $5,671.80 of that amount for the reasons discussed above. CCTV equipment
The body corporate has asked Mr Nienkemper to return the CCTV equipment it purchased. He has not yet done so. It belongs to the body corporate.
The Tribunal orders that he return the equipment.
If he fails to return the equipment as ordered he must pay the body corporate $1,322.50, which was the purchase cost of the CCTV hardware. Levies
The body corporate has applied for recovery of unpaid levies and interest.

Does Mr Nienkemper owe the levies claimed?

Unit owners must pay all body corporate levies and outgoings payable for the unit. 11
The body corporate has determined the levies payable, and Mr Nienkemper's share has been calculated according to his utility interest. The body corporate has fixed the due date for the levies to be paid, and Mr Nienkemper has not paid the levies by that date. 12 11 UTA, ss 80(1)(f), and 121(1). 12 UTA, s 124.
Mr Nienkemper says Centurion’s opening statement is incorrect because he paid Barfoot & Thompson $87.92 which has not been recorded. The levies are reduced by that amount because I am not satisfied on the balance of probabilities Mr Nienkemper did not pay that amount.
Mr Nienkemper submits: Colin Craig has intentionally ignored our emails, preventing us from paying our correct invoices. Therefore all the penalties against us should be null and void. Due to the fact we have continually requested full disclosure without any response...
Whether or not Centurion replied to Mr Nienkemper’s emails does not alter Mr Nienkemper’s fundamental duty (just like the other unit owners) to pay levies when they fall due. The same applies to Mr Nienkemper disclosure requests.
Mr Nienkemper may or may not have a valid claim against the body corporate. If he does have a claim, he is at liberty to file a claim in the Tribunal. He must still pay his levies in the meantime.
Mr Nienkemper points to another brewing conflict, this time with the body corporate manager and the new committee: Colin Craig has presented no documented evidence of the facts to prove this case, instead Colin Craig has referred to hearsay and misguided false accusations from the contentious committee with a personal agenda to isolate and remove us from the complex, which can only be interpreted as victimization and harassment.
Mr Nienkemper seems to misunderstand the basic legal obligations and how claims are typically heard. The body corporate’s claim was clearly set out and supported by appropriate evidence. The claims do not reveal ulterior motives or malicious intent.
The body corporate provided records to prove Mr Nienkemper owes the levies claimed (less the $87.92).
The Tribunal orders that amount.

Is Mr Nienkemper liable for interest?

If a unit owner fails to pay levies by the due date, interest accrues on the unpaid balance. A body corporate may charge interest up to 10 percent per annum. 13
The Body Corporate has proved the amount of interest owing from the due date to 1 July 2024 (less $11.32 for interest on the $87.92 opening balance). 13 UTA, s 128. Costs Legal principles
Sections 124 and 127 apply to the body corporate’s claim for recovery of levies and expenditure. Under ss 124 and 127 of the UTA, the body corporate is entitled to recover any reasonable costs incurred by it in collecting unpaid levies or expense as a debt due by the owner to the body corporate.
On the other hand, the body corporate’s costs claim for the orders relating to the carpark swap are governed by s 102(1) of the of the Residential Tenancies Act 1986 (RTA). That section limits the Tribunal’s ability to award costs to cases in which counsel appear, proceedings are frivolous, a matter ought to have been settled, or the applicant does not appear at the hearing.
Section 102(4)(b) applies to the claim for the filing fee. That paragraph provides: (4) If the applicant— (a) ... (b) has been partly successful in his or her claim, the Tribunal may order that the respondent pay the applicant the filing fee paid for the application. Costs sought
The body corporate applies for its costs comprising: o Centurion fees and disbursements: $10,794.45 o Body Corporate costs for levy recovery: $240.00 o Filing fee: $500.00
Centurion’s invoice to the body of $10,794.45 includes disbursements totalling $309.32 (for the Council property file, to obtain a certificate of title, and for photocopying). Its fee for its actual attendances therefore totals $10,485.13.
It is necessary to apportion that amount between the body corporate’s three claims because different cost principles apply to each. The three claims were: a. That the carpark exchange agreement was invalid. Section 102 of the RTA applies. b. For recovery of the body corporate’s spending substantially for Mr Nienkemper’s benefit only. 14 Section 127 of the UTA applies. 14 UTA, s 126., c. Mr Nienkemper owed overdue levies and interest on them. Section 124 of the UTA applies.
Based on the relevant documents, complexity, and time spent during the hearing on each claim, I would assess the time required for the carpark issue at about 40 per cent of Centurion’s time ($4,194.05), for the expenditure recovery about 40 per cent ($4,194.05), and for the levies recovery about 20 per cent ($2,097.03). Mr Nienkemper’s submissions on costs
I have read Mr Nienkemper’s submissions.
The matters he raised were directed at the substantive hearing rather than costs. For instance, he submitted that it would be unjust to award costs because the Tribunal could not access some of his documents prior to the hearing. However, that did not prevent Mr Nienkemper from referring to or producing any relevant documents at hearing if he wished.
Among other things Mr Nienkemper also submitted: In conclusion we ask the adjudicator to consider the following: a. That the applicants defamatory remarks to defame our credibility without supporting evidence is unacceptable and not considered for this application for costs. b. That the applicant's hearsay comments made without supportive evidence presented should not be admissible in consideration for the applicants costs. c.That as the defendants we dispute the applicants application for costs to be unjustifiable, considering the applicants continual refusal to mediate and rectify incorrect invoicing prior and post cost application. d. That as the defendants in the lengthy defense of our case against the applicants false and misleading accusations our costs should be considered equally. And that in all fairness without clear decision either way the costs should lay with both
I have considered these submissions, but do not find them on point.
Civil litigation, including UTA litigation, typically results in costs being ordered against the unsuccessful party. It is unlikely to be in Mr Nienkemper’s best interests to prolong this litigation because the costs against him are liable to increase. It may be in his best interests to obtain professional legal advice before he proceeds with further litigation. Costs related to the carpark issue
About $4,194.05 of Centurion’s attendances relate to the carpark issue for which the ordinary RTA costs rules apply.
Where counsel is involved, s 102(2)(b) of the RTA applies and the Tribunal has a discretion to order case. In such a case, the Tribunal would typically order between 40 and 70 percent of the successful party’s reasonable costs. If Mr Craig were counsel, I would likely have ordered about 55 per cent of Centurion’s time attendance costs to the body corporate, which would resulted in a $2,306.73 award in favour of the body corporate.
However, because Mr Craig is not counsel, the Tribunal does not have the power to order costs for this part of the case.
Therefore, the Tribunal makes no order for costs for this part of the claim.
The disbursement for an updated certificate of title for $34.50 likely related to this part of the claim. No order is made for this cost because once again the Tribunal does not have the power to make an order by virtue of s 102(1) and (2). Recovery of expenditure
About $4,194.05 of the body corporate’s costs for Centurion’s attendances is for the recovery of expenses. The body corporate succeeded in obtaining an order for $5,671.80 of the $8,638.80.
A fair approximation of the time Centurion spent on the part of the claim that was successful is 5/8 ths of the time claimed for. The amount ordered is reasonable.
Therefore it is appropriate to order $2,621.28 under s 127 of the UTA.
The update certificate of title disbursement of $34.50 likely relates to this part of the claim. It is also allowed pursuant to s 127 of the UTA. Costs related to recovering overdue levies
The body corporate seeks in the order of $2,097.03 for its costs related to recovering overdue levies. Tribunal must order that the reasonable costs incurred by the body corporate in recovering the levies, objectively assessed, be paid by a defaulting unit owner.
The body corporate succeeded in obtaining $6651.90 of the $6,739.82 it sought.
I reduce the costs for this to $2,069.68 to account for the body corporate not being completely successful in its claim for levies, which I have calculated based on the proportion of success to what was sought.
I also allow the $147.00 disbursement for obtaining the Council property file because it related to the levies claim.
These amounts are ordered under s 124 of the UTA. Photocopying disbursement
The Tribunal orders 60 percent of the photocopying disbursement because the Tribunal only has the power to order costs for approximately that percentage of the body corporate’s claims.
The Tribunal orders $76.69 for the copying. Letters of demand
The $240.00 charged for letters of demand for the levies is allowed under s 124. Filing fee
Mr Nienkemper must reimburse the body corporate for the filing fee because it has been substantially successful in its claim. 15

Tenancy Tribunal case 9050484 — Harassment in Stanmore Bay, Whangaparaoa

Tenancy Tribunal case 9050484 — Harassment in Stanmore Bay, Whangaparaoa

Order

Reasons

Should the mobility carpark swap agreement be cancelled?

Should Mr Nienkemper repay the body corporate for some of its expenditure?

Does Mr Nienkemper owe the levies claimed?

Is Mr Nienkemper liable for interest?

Order

Reasons

Should the mobility carpark swap agreement be cancelled?

Should Mr Nienkemper repay the body corporate for some of its expenditure?

Does Mr Nienkemper owe the levies claimed?

Is Mr Nienkemper liable for interest?