Published tribunal order
Tenancy Tribunal case 9056084 — Unit Titles in Auckland Central, Auckland
Decided 20 April 2026 · Published 20 April 2026 · Application 9056084
Landlord favoured
- Unit Titles
Order
costs of $1,910.00 because: 3
- The cross-application, once it was severed from the application was a non-levy proceeding and the common law on costs in Tribunal in Holden v Agricultural Services applies 1 Mr Black appealed the decision to the District Court. The parties have not advised the Tribunal of the outcome of the appeal. 2 In his costs submissions dated 26 June 2025. Pursuant to Unit Titles Act 2010 (UTA) s 124. 3 Reply Submission on Jurisdiction. I treat $1,910,00 as the body corporate’s actual costs. My Wood’s submissions on jurisdiction and abuse were concise and on point. It is likely he efficiently dealt with those matters and invoiced the body corporate this amount.
- Mr Black submits that he abandoned his crossclaim. In that regard, he abandoned his claim for $22,400.00 leaving only his claim for $6,296.00. 4 He asserts that the body corporates costs claim, “is not reasonable, is excessive and...contrary to Mr Wood’s proposal that the District Court scale be applied”. 5 He emphasises that his dispute of the levies claim was not frivolous nor improperly defended. He says the body corporate “cured” deficiencies which he challenged.
- Mr Black apparently claims some of the Court One’s invoices have charged twice for the same attendances or are mistaken. Mr Black refers to costs principles and provided an analysis of likely costs under the District Court scale costs ($3,675 to $4,310.00). Issues and legal principles
- A principal issue in deciding costs in this case is the extent UTA s 124 applies. If the section does apply, the Tribunal must order all reasonable costs. To the extent s 124 does not apply, the Tribunal may order costs in accordance with its usual approach to costs which is by applying the common law costs principles.
- Section 124 relevantly provides: (2) The amount of any unpaid levy, together with any reasonable costs incurred in collecting the levy, is recoverable as a debt due to the body corporate...
- Under s 124 the Tribunal must order all the body corporate’s cost unless they are not reasonable in the context of what steps the body corporate had to take. So, if for instance, the body corporate took needless steps or its lawyers charged it a disproportionately high fee, 6 the costs would not be allowed to the extent they were not objectively justifiable.
- In Gueirard & Vu Judge David J Clark held: 7 [20] Because the recovery of solicitor client costs is a category of cases which can be claimed under s 124 of the UTA, the starting point then is a statutory acceptance solicitor client costs can be granted as of right. 4 In his submission on jurisdiction and abuse of process dated 9 July 2025, Mr Black purported to withdraw part of his claim, submitted that the Tribunal should reverse its severance decision and instead consolidate his claim with the levies claim, and that the Tribunal should await the District Court’s decision of the levies decision. The Tribunal did not accede to those suggestions. It dismissed Mr Black’s crossclaim as an abuse. 5 Mr Black’s Reply Submissions on Costs dated 18 August 2025 at [5]. 6 The touchstone being the requirements of Rule 9 of the Lawyers and Conveyancers Act (Lawyers: Conduct and Client Care) Rules. 7 Body Corporate No. 346799 v Gueirard & Vu [2023] NZDC 19645 at [20].
- In considering whether the solicitor client costs claimed were reasonable His Honour adopted the following approach: 8 (a) Whether the work that was done was reasonably necessary; (b) Whether the amount charged for the reasonably necessary work was reasonable (in both instances, the NZLS Rules and Rule 9 in particular are a prime reference point when assessing reasonableness); (c) Third, test the analysis against other available reference points.
- Where s 124 does not apply, the Tribunal’s applies its own principles largely based on common law. The Tribunal has no costs rules or guideline judgments setting out costs principles. However, it typically applies conventional civil litigation costs principles. As the author of one of the leading textbooks on residential tenancy law, Stewart Benson, has written, “In principle, costs are awarded to the successful party”. 9 The author of the other leading textbook, David Grinlinton wrote: 10 The general principles that are applied by the courts on the quantum of costs, may also be applied by the Tribunal. What is considered a “reasonable contribution” to a successful party's costs will depend on many factors, but there is authority that a figure of 60 per cent is regarded as the average, with most awards falling within the range of 40 - 70 per cent of actual costs.
- The District Court approves of that approach. 11 Generally, the Tribunal should order costs where “the parties are represented by counsel, the dispute is complex, and the amount of the claim is substantial: Westwood v Western [1994] DCR 759”. 12
- What will amount to a reasonable contribution to costs will depend on a range of factors. The following factors are often relevant to be considered when assessing costs: (a) The length of the hearing. (b) The sum of money involved. (c) The legal and factual complexity. (d) Whether argument lacking substance was advanced. 8 Ibid at [31]. 9 Stewart Benson Residential Tenancy Law in New Zealand (Thomson Reuters New Zealand Limited 2018) at p 284. 10 David Grinlinton Residential Tenancies: The Law and Practice (4 th ed, Lexis Nexis, Wellington, 2012) at 8.3.5. 11 See for example, Body Corporate 346799 v Ikeda [2020] NZDC 3669 [5 March 2020]; and French v Ryan DC Auckland CIV-2012-004-000711, 29 November 2012. Judge Taumanu increased the Tribunal’s costs award applying the conventional civil litigation principles. 12 Civil Procedure: District Courts and Tribunals Westlaw online service at TE3.05. (e) The degree of success achieved by the parties.
- In Holden v Architectural Finishes Ltd Justice McGechan held that: 13 ...the sum in issue is a ‘reasonable’ ‘contribution’. It is not some mere gesture. It is not some virtual payment in full. It is merely a contribution, and a reasonable one. At the outer limits, proportions of reasonable actual fees can afford some guidance. A 10% or even 20% contribution – very little indeed – may seldom qualify. A 90% or 80% contribution, virtually the total, may be regarded as likewise...if the ‘reasonable contribution’ earlier determined falls within a middle range, say 40% to 70%, there is a feeling of some comfort...
- His Honour went on to emphasis the important principles underlying “shopping lists” of specific factors for determining a reasonable contribution: 14 These specific factors, generally referred to as the first port of call, have their important place, but a Court should not forget the ultimate question, or overlook the principles which underlie. There is a wood as well as these trees. The ultimate question always remains: What is a reasonable contribution in these particular circumstances? In my view, there are two underlying principles to be kept in mind. They underlie most if not all of the "shopping list" factors just noted. They interweave, and at times conflict. (1) The wrongdoer should pay the costs of the injured party obtaining compensation for the wrong, unless good reason exists to the contrary. The wrongdoer - not the injured party - should bear that further expense. That, I suggest, is a matter of elementary justice. It is not comprehensive. As noted, there is a threshold rule that costs nevertheless will be a "reasonable contribution" only, and not a total recovery. That is for public policy
Reasons
. However, the Court's first inclination properly can be to lean toward a high level of compensation for the injured party, rather than the other way. (2) Court time is a valuable public resource. It is expensive, and in short supply. It always has been, and I fear it always will be. As a matter of public interest, Court time must not be wasted. There should be corresponding disincentives to unwarranted proceedings, or elements of proceedings, and to inefficient practice within proceedings. An injured party can expect some initial leaning towards a high level of recovery from the wrongdoer, but there must be a significant leaning the other way to the extent the injured party's own proceeding has been misguided or inefficient. The unsuccessful party should be placed under the same discipline. So far as disincentives to waste are concerned, this public interest coincides with and shelters the opposite and affected successful party. In reaching any final decision as to "reasonable contribution", Courts should include a broader consideration in principle along these lines, as well as focusing on traditional specific factors. Analysis
- It is useful to consider firstly whether Court One’s invoices for its work and expenses on these matters are reasonable. Court One’s invoices total $20,289.11. 13 [1997] 3 NZLR 143. 14 Ibid p 149.
- I agree with the Mr Wood’s narrative that Mr Black’s approach made a straightforward levies claim difficult: 15
- Ultimately this ought to have been a straightforward matter. Mr Black, through an error, short paid one year's worth of levies. Once this matter was pointed out to him he ought to have made up the difference.
- Instead he insisted that this was bound up in wider issues with the body corporate, his actual defence to the levy claim was vague and not readily ascertainable from the documents he filed (which were voluminous). It only became apparent during the hearing that he considered that money that he paid towards a special levy in the year before these levies accrued (and directed that it be paid towards a special levy) should not have been applied towards that levy and should have been applied to his ordinary levies the following year.
- That approach led counsel for the body corporate and the Tribunal having to spend significantly more time than would otherwise have been the case.
- The steps referred to in Court One’s invoices were necessary due to the content of Mr Black’s case and the way Mr Black conducted it. Mr Black appears to challenge Court One’s invoices as involving double billing for the same work but (if that is so) that is a misreading of the invoices which are for continuing work on the same matter, for example work on more than one occasion to prepare an affidavit. It is not likely that counsel would mistakenly double bill for the same work or make similar basic mistakes leading to overcharging.
- An unopposed levies claim in the Tribunal might typically see costs awards of $3,500.00 to $5,000.00 in my experience. An opposed claim with slight-to-moderate complexity may see figures of $5,000 to $10,000, or more. Mr Black compares what the costs might be under the District Court scale and suggests they could be no more than $3,675 to $4,310.00.
- This was a simple levies claim to begin with, but Mr Black’s approach changed that. Court One’s fees are unsurprising and fair considering how the cases unfolded. Court One’s invoices to the body corporate for the litigation strike me as fair and reasonable in the circumstances. Positing for a moment the body corporate sought a costs review of the fees, I cannot see that the invoices would impugn of the Lawyers and Conveyancers Act (Lawyers: Conduct and Client Care) Rules.
- The fees are “reasonable costs” under s 124(2) and are reasonable actual costs in terms of common law costs principles. 15 Submissions on Costs on the Claim dated 26 June 2025. Mr Black does not agree with (among other things) that he simply short paid one year’s worth of levies that he ought to have made up.
- The most debatable issue in this case is how to apportion the costs between s 124 and Mr Wood submits that s 124 applies until Mr Black’s claim was separated from the levies claim. That would mean only a small fraction of the body corporate’s costs would fall outside s 124. However, Mr Black’s crossclaim concerned historical levies and claimed for set-off. The Tribunal itself found Mr Black’s claim was not logically connected to the levies claim: 16
- I invited Mr Black to set out a basis for his claim being consolidated with the body corporate’s claim for ordinary levies. Mr Black addressed the Tribunal for some time. However, I could not discern any logical connection between the claims. They are based on different facts.
- The crossclaim complicated the levies claim. I agree with Mr Wood to some extent that it cannot be treated as completely separate from the levies claim until the claims were formally separated (Mr Black also considers the claims were interdependent at least in part). However, treating only the latterly charged fees of $1,910.00 as arising from Mr Black’s claim does not sufficiently recognise that Mr Black’s claim was more than just a defence to the levies claim.
- Upon reflection, I have decided to attribute 50 percent of the body corporate’s costs to the levies claim and the other 50 percent to the unconnected part of Mr Black’s crossclaim. Conclusion
- For the 50 percent of legal costs attributable to s 124, costs must be ordered in full. That amount is $10,144.56.
- The Tribunal must decide the remaining 50 percent under common law costs principles. Costs follow the event. In its discretion, the Tribunal may order the losing party to make a reasonable contribution to the other party’s costs.
- The Tribunal found Mr Black’s proceedings were an abuse. It naturally follows that the Tribunal should consider an uplift from the typical 40 to 70 percent range in accordance with broader considerations. As McGechan J said (above), “[t]here should be corresponding disincentives to unwarranted proceedings, or elements of proceedings, and to inefficient practice within proceedings”. The proceedings were unwarranted and were handled inefficiently. The Tribunal orders 80 percent of the remaining 50 percent. That amounts to $8,115.64. 16 Tribunal’s order of 23 May 2025 at [14].
- The total amount ordered for legal costs is $18,260.20.
- The Tribunal must order Mr Black to reimburse the body corporate for the filing fee of $500.00. 17