How much money was awarded in case 9064624?

Verified claim lines are listed on this page.

What type of tenancy dispute was case 9064624?

The primary dispute was Unit Titles.

Where can I read the official tribunal order for case 9064624?

The official Ministry of Justice published order is available at https://forms.justice.govt.nz/search/Documents/TTV2/PDF/13009845-Tribunal_Order.pdf.

How much money was awarded in case 9064624?

Verified claim lines are listed on this page.

What type of tenancy dispute was case 9064624?

The primary dispute was Unit Titles.

Where can I read the official tribunal order for case 9064624?

The official Ministry of Justice published order is available at https://forms.justice.govt.nz/search/Documents/TTV2/PDF/13009845-Tribunal_Order.pdf.

Mount Albert, Auckland Tenancy Tribunal Case 9064624 — Unit Titles

Q: What was the outcome of Tenancy Tribunal case 9064624?

The tribunal order states: The unit owner’s claim is hereby transferred to the District Court in its ordinary civil

Order

The unit owner’s claim is hereby transferred to the District Court in its ordinary civil jurisdiction.

Reasons

This claim by the unit owner Mr Sergio de Caires was originally a counterclaim to and consolidated with the unit titles application number 9059704 filed by Body Corporate 314950 for recovery of unpaid levies and associated costs and interests.
By Memorandum dated 3 December 2025, counsel for the unit owner applied to remove this counterclaim and the body corporate’s levy claim under application 9059704 to the District Court pursuant to section 175 Unit Titles Act 2010 (‘UTA’).
Section 175 UTA provides: Transfer of proceedings to District Court or High Court (1) If any proceedings have been commenced before the Tribunal that the Tribunal has no jurisdiction to hear and determine, the Tribunal may, instead of striking out the proceedings, order that they be transferred to either the District Court or the High Court, depending on which court has jurisdiction to determine the dispute. (2) Any proceedings transferred under subsection (1) are to be treated as having been commenced in the court to which the proceedings have been transferred and are to be dealt with by that court accordingly.
Counsel for the unit owner submits that aggregated value of the unit owner’s counterclaims, at present, and before interest, is $251,745.
The unit owner’s claims plainly exceed the monetary jurisdiction of the Tenancy Tribunal under s171 UTA.
Counsel for the body corporate does not oppose the transfer of the unit owner’s claims to the District Court.
Instead of striking out the proceedings filed by the unit owner, I hereby order that the unit owner’s claims be transferred to the District Court.
For reasons set out below, I decline the unit owner’s request for the body corporate’s levy claim under application 9059704 to be transferred alongside with the unit owner’s claims. Should the body corporate’s levy claim be transferred to the District Court together with the unit owner’s counterclaim?
Counsel for the unit owner submits the counterclaims are inextricably linked with the body corporate’s levy recovery claim.
The alleged links involve allegations that the unit owner is owed a refund on remedial levies, that their property was damaged by someone, and that levies have been misused.
Relying on the High Court judgment in Body Corporate 324525 v Stent [2016] NZHC 2442, at [42], the High Court noted the benefit of all related matters in dispute being resolved in one jurisdiction: I am accordingly satisfied that the body corporate’s claims against all the defendants are within the jurisdiction of this court. The claims for over $200,000 are not within the jurisdiction of the Tenancy Tribunal under s 171 of the Unit Titles Act or the District Courts under s 172. Those claims that are for less than $200,000 but more than $50,000 are also within the jurisdiction of District Court. That is concurrent with this court’s inherent jurisdiction under s 16 of the Judicature Act 1908. Given that there are common issues in the claims against all defendants, the body corporate was obviously sensible to bring the claims for less than $200,000 in this court so that all matters could be heard together in one proceeding.
Counsel for the unit owner says the body corporate’s claim and Mr de Caires’ defence and counterclaims are all inextricably intertwined: The Respondent's position is that levies have been misused, and also that levy arrears (to the extent that levies were validly raised or expended) only arose because of the Body Corporate's own wrongful conduct, which caused the loss of rental income intended to cover those levies. Moreover, the counterclaims if successful will also provide a full set-off defence, should the Body Corporate claim succeed to any extent. The interests of justice therefore require the determination of claim, defence and counterclaims together in the same forum. This is the only efficient course and removes the risk of inconsistent findings and related jurisdictional complexity. Additionally, the dispute involves complex issues, including alleged waiver, equitable set- off, trespass, and breaches of statutory and common law duties. There may be issues of joinder, potentially including parties not falling within the limited categories the Tribunal may join set as out in s171(2). These are all matters better suited to the formal procedures and jurisdiction of the District Court.
However, I find that the Tribunal does not have jurisdiction to transfer the body corporate’s claim, which has been properly filed within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal, to the District Court, and even if the Tribunal had jurisdiction to transfer the body corporate’s claim, it is not appropriate to do so.
I acknowledge there are sensible arguments centered around convenience, efficiency and expediency in transferring both the body corporate’s levy claim and the unit owner’s counterclaim. In other words, that the whole dispute between the parties may be more efficiently determined in the District Court.
I consider however that the “pay now, argue later” principle on unit titles levy recovery trumps considerations of convenience, efficiency and expediency of having both claim and counterclaim determined in one forum.
Transferring both matters by reason of convenience and expediency strikes at the heart of the body corporate’s ability to have a speedy determination on levy recovery claims and indirectly defeats the “pay now, argue later” principle which underpins the unit titles levy recovery regime.
I consider that the purpose of section 124 UTA is to ensure levy recovery on a “pay now and argue later” basis, recognising that bodies corporate rely on levies in order to fund collective interests and remedial costs and other owners must subsidise short-paid levies.
Hinton J in Singh v Body Corporate 207650 [2018] NZHC 1932 involving a levy summary judgment endorsed the position of District Court Judge Harrison at [22] and [43] that the UTA operates under what is essentially a pay now, argue later regime. In this case, the levies in the body corporate’s levy claim comprise a substantial amount of over $30,000, which must be met by others for as long as the respondent does not pay.
A body corporate’s levy claim is regarded as a statutory debt under section 124 UTA.
Accordingly, the allegations in the unit owner’s counterclaim are not interdependent, on fact or law, with the levy claim, and it is not necessary for both to be heard together.
An alleged set-off by way of counterclaim cannot negate a right to bring a claim for a statutory debt due. See NZME v Grant [1988] NZCA 135.
I therefore do not consider the body corporate’s levy claim to be interdependent or sufficiently connected to the unit owner’s counterclaims.
The unit owner’s proceedings involving allegations that the unit owner is owed a refund on remedial levies, that their property was damaged by someone, and that levies have been misused are independent of the unit owner’s statutory obligations to pay his levies to the body corporate.
I note for the record that the body corporate disputes the unit owner’s counterclaims and allegations.
First, the alleged remedial levies the unit owner claims a right to – which the body corporate says have never been paid – do not relate to body corporate’s present operational levies claim. The remedial levies are a separate fund, struck in 2014, and originally administered under a High Court Scheme.
The substantial unpaid remedial levies by the unit owner were abandoned as unrecoverable and any enforcement is now time-barred.
The body corporate’s operational levy claim under application 9059704 relate to amounts raised from 2019, to fund operating costs and ground rent. There have been earlier unpaid amounts by the unit owner, but these are time-barred, and more recent levies unpaid not the subject of these proceedings, needed to fund the current financial year.
While the unit owner refuses to pay the outgoings of ground rent and operating levies, all other unit owners are prejudiced.
The Court of Appeal in Manchester Securities Limited v Body Corporate 172108 [2018] NZCA 190 at [57] agreed that “pay now argue later” has an obvious practical purpose – cashflow is assured and while dissident owners are still required to pay, they are not prevented from having their complaints heard.
While Manchester Securities dealt with unpaid remedial levies in the context of a Scheme, and an arbitration over a set-off by a principal unit owner, I consider these remarks applicable to the two proceedings before me: “It could also include court proceedings. What is clear is that the obligation to pay levies is special.”
I agree with counsel for the body corporate that liability for body corporate levies is an incident of ownership, rather than use, possession or occupation. These are specific statutory obligations set out in section 80(1)(f) of the Act, that an owner of a principal unit “pay all rates, taxes, charges, body corporate levies, and other outgoings that are from time to time payable in respect of that unit”.
In the recent case of Body Corporate 447594 v AY & Co Limited [2025] NZHC 2985 Associate Judge Cogswell at [27] put the matter this way: One of the most persuasive arguments raised by the plaintiff is that the failure to pay levies that are properly raised and payable causes loss to the other members of the Body Corporate. Failure to pay by one member causes an unfair burden to fall on the others.
As for the unit owner’s allegation of misuse or unfairness in the use of funds, it is in order for the unit owner can ask the District Court to review the exercise of the body corporate’s decision-making in that Court. However, review of a separate decision does not impugn the validity of the levy per se. There is no nexus between governance decisions and the obligation to pay a validly raised levy. See Body Corporate 447594 v AY & Co Limited [2025] NZHC 2985 at [21].
The body corporate’s claim is, as a matter of law, within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal after abandoned part of its claim to come within the monetary jurisdiction of the Tribunal under section 171(7) UTA.
The amount of the alleged counterclaims cannot factor into the assessment of jurisdiction for the operational levy claim. Associate Judge Bell in Stent addressed this as follows: It is the amount of the judgment or order sought by the plaintiff that sets the value of the claim to establish jurisdiction under ss 171 and 172. This follows the approach taken in establishing the jurisdiction of the District Court in its civil jurisdiction.
I therefore accept that a counterclaim is not a defence and is treated conceptually and procedurally as a case against the plaintiff or applicant. It is filed separately.
I disagree with counsel for the unit owner that Grant is simply an authority that a closely related counterclaim may operate as a setoff which supports the unit owner’s case for a transfer of both proceedings.
The Court of Appeal in Grant held that the principle is clear that a defendant may set-off a crossclaim which so affects a plaintiff’s claim that it would be unjust to allow the plaintiff to have judgment without bringing the crossclaim to account. The link must be such that the two are in fact interdependent that judgment on one cannot fairly be given without regard to the other. The defendant’s claim must call into question or impeach the plaintiff’s demand.
Applying Grant, I do not consider the body corporate’s claim for recovery of a statutory debt under section 121 and 124 UTA to be interdependent to the unit owner’s counterclaim that judgment on the body corporate’s claim one cannot fairly be given without regard to unit owner’s counterclaim. Indeed, the reverse is true, in that the pay now, argue later principle on recovery of the statutory debt expressly prevents the unit owner’s counterclaims to call into question or impeach the body corporate’s demand for payment of levies under section 121 and 124 UTA.
Consequently, I find that the unit owner may not set-off his crossclaim against the body corporate’s levy claim because the unit owner’s crossclaims do not affect the body corporate’s claim. I consider that it is not unjust to allow the body corporate to have judgment on their levy claim without bringing the unit owner’s crossclaim to account.
I therefore hold that the right to recover levies as a statutory debt exists irrespective of any claim to set-off.
Further, I agree with counsel for the body corporate that a District Court cannot hear the body corporate’s operational levy claim because the amount of the claim is not more than $100,000.00. The District Court has no jurisdiction over a claim of $100,000 or below under section 172 UTA, and as a statutory court (and unlike the High Court), it has no inherent jurisdiction that could expand or create jurisdiction outside those provisions.
The case of Stent, and the more recent decision of Hill v Body Corporate 37218513 [2024] NZHC 600 both deal with matters in which parties sought to challenge the jurisdiction of the High Court for matters the defendants said belonged in the Tribunal. These cases involved plaintiffs filing in the High Court. The High Court found section 171 UTA did not create exclusive jurisdiction, in the context of the High Court’s inherent jurisdiction. Those decisions do not say that inherent or originating jurisdiction can operate as a mechanism for transfer under section 175 of the Act. Inherent jurisdiction is engaged when proceedings are filed with the High Court, rather than here which concerns whether the District Court may hear the body corporate’s claim for an order that is at $100,000.
For those reasons, I separate the unit owner’s claims filed under 9064624 and the body corporate’s levy claim under application 9059704, and order that only the unit owner’s claims under 9064624 be removed and transferred to the District Court in its ordinary civil jurisdiction.
I will issue separate directions/order for hearing of the body corporate’s levy claim under application 9059704 in that proceeding.

Tenancy Tribunal case 9064624 — Unit Titles in Mount Albert, Auckland

At a glance

Tenancy Tribunal case 9064624 — Unit Titles in Mount Albert, Auckland

At a glance

Claims & awards

Order

Reasons

Topics & place

Residential Tenancies Act sections

Key findings

Frequently asked questions

Claims & awards

Order

Reasons

Topics & place

Residential Tenancies Act sections

Key findings

Frequently asked questions