What was the outcome of Tenancy Tribunal case 9065346?

The tribunal order states: The application for rehearing is dismissed.

How much money was awarded in case 9065346?

Verified claim lines are listed on this page.

What type of tenancy dispute was case 9065346?

The primary dispute was Unit Titles.

Where can I read the official tribunal order for case 9065346?

The official Ministry of Justice published order is available at https://forms.justice.govt.nz/search/Documents/TTV2/PDF/13636278-Tribunal_Order.pdf.

What was the outcome of Tenancy Tribunal case 9065346?

The tribunal order states: The application for rehearing is dismissed.

How much money was awarded in case 9065346?

Verified claim lines are listed on this page.

What type of tenancy dispute was case 9065346?

The primary dispute was Unit Titles.

Where can I read the official tribunal order for case 9065346?

The official Ministry of Justice published order is available at https://forms.justice.govt.nz/search/Documents/TTV2/PDF/13636278-Tribunal_Order.pdf.

Thorndon, Wellington Tenancy Tribunal Case 9065346 — Unit Titles

Order

The application for rehearing is dismissed.

Reasons

The Tribunal must consider an application for rehearing filed by Ms Isaacs, the respondent. A video hearing was convened today to consider that rehearing request.

BACKGROUND

In terms of this rehearing request, the background can be summarised succinctly as follows.
The premises are a unit titled complex in Wellington. Ms Isaac’s is an owner of commercial units with street frontage.
Ms Shelton Agar is also a unit owner in the complex, and filed an application against Ms Isaacs, seeking a declaration that Ms Isaac’s had not complied with the body corporate operational rules around signage on the commercial units.
I prehearing case conference was convened on 11 September 2025. At that case conference, I raised a concern that normally disputes around compliance with operation rules are advanced by the body corporate, not an individual unit owner. In light of that, I directed that a video hearing be convened to consider that jurisdictional question.
The applicant, Ms Shelton Agar, contacted the Tribunal that same day, opposing only hearing the jurisdictional issue.
Having considered that request, I determined that the hearing should proceed to consider the full application. On 30 September 2025, the Tribunal emailed both parties stating: Good morning The adjudicator hearing this matter has advised that given the hearing will not be until November, that in order to reduce any delay with matters when the hearing is convened on 25 November that he would like to hear all of the case. That means he would like to hear what you both have to say about the matter the adjudicator raised regarding the application being from another unit owner, and also the claim from the Agar's that is whether the rules have been breached. You will both need to be prepared to argue both matters on the day of the hearing.
That email was sent the parties at 8:30am on 30 September 2025. The address used for Ms Isaacs was: family@isaacs.gen.nz. Ms Isaac’s reports not receiving that email.
The video hearing proceeded on 25 November 2025 as scheduled. At the hearing Ms Isaacs advised she was not aware that the hearing was proceeding to consider all matters, but was given an option to have the hearing adjourned, but she elected to proceed.
The hearing proceeded, and an order was issued on 28 January 2026. Ms Shelton Agar’s application was successful. The Tribunal made a declaration that Ms Isaacs had not complied with the body corporate operational rules, and she was ordered to pay the $500 filing fee to Ms Shelton Agar.
Ms Isaac’s applied for a rehearing. I will set out the reasons for this below.
A further video hearing was convened today, 21 May 2026, to consider whether a rehearing would be approved. Both parties appeared at the hearing. MS ISAAC’S POSITION
Ms Isaacs submits that a rehearing should be granted for these reasons: a. The hearing process was not a fair process. Ms Issacs states that she was only advised during the hearing that it was to be a full hearing, not just about jurisdiction. Ms Isaacs accepts that she was given the option to adjourn and to hear the matter another day, which she declined, but on reflection, she should have taken up that offer. b. Not all issues were considered, in particular, compliance with the operational rules, rule 7(a) and replacement of a broken window. c. Ms Isaacs has been unable to find any email that the earlier hearing was to consider anything other than jurisdiction. RESPONDENT’S POSITION
The Respondent opposes the rehearing request for these reasons: a. Notice was given that the hearing was for all matters; if Ms Isaacs did not open the email that is not relevant. b. Mr Isaacs waived the option for an adjournment at the hearing. c. This is a case of Ms Isaacs seeking another opportunity to relitigate the matter.

RELEVANT LAW

Section 105 of the Residential Tenancies Act 1986 relates to rehearings. Subsection 1 confirms that: The Tribunal shall in all proceedings have the power to order a rehearing of the whole or any part of the proceedings on the ground that a substantial wrong or miscarriage of justice has or may have occurred or is likely to occur.
The applicant need not establish an actual miscarriage of justice or substantial wrong, only that it may have occurred. However, in the District Court Judgment of Wellington City Council v McMillan [2003] DCR 50, Judge Tuohy held that the statutory language set a high standard, and that: [18] ... They most obviously apply ... to cases of procedural error eg a hearing which takes place in the absence of a party who has not been given notice of it; the improper admission or rejection of evidence; misconduct by the adjudicator or by one of the parties or a witness. The words may also encompass the discovery of new and important evidence not previously available. [19] In my view, however, the words do not cover a complaint that the Tribunal was merely mistaken or wrong in its findings of fact or in its application of the law. There are two reasons for this. First the strength of the language in s 105 is such that something more than a mere wrong decision must be shown. The section does not speak of a decision being wrong, but of a substantial wrong or miscarriage of justice occurring. This implies obvious injustice, not merely an erroneous decision. [20] Secondly, if a mere erroneous decision is enough, whether the error is factual or legal or both, it would enable parties to in effect appeal any decision twice: once to the very Tribunal which made it by way of an application for rehearing, and then again to the District Court against the grant or refusal of the application for rehearing. Not only does that offend the general hierarchical nature of the appeal system, it would also make the time limit for filing notice of appeal against an original decision nugatory.”
As noted by Judge Christiansen in the District Court appeal of Loh v Puri [2019] NZDC 1993: In this Court’s view the Tribunal’s reasons for refusing a rehearing are correct. Rehearings are about challenges to processes and procedures and are not about what the adjudicator found or the decisions the adjudicator made.

ANALYSIS

I have set out the relevant law that applies to rehearings above. In short, re- hearings are a safety measure should something have gone wrong with the hearing, normally on a procedural basis, in which case a rehearing can be approved so that the matter then returns to the Tribunal for a further hearing.
I have considered the submissions from Ms Isaacs, and find that no procedural issues have been identified sufficient to approve a rehearing. That is, I am not persuaded that there is any potential for a substantial wrong or miscarriage of justice to justify a rehearing, for these reasons. a. I am satisfied that the parties were notified in advance that the hearing would be for all matters. I cannot explain why Ms Isaacs did not receive the email, it was sent at the same time as the email to Ms Shelton Agar, and the Tribunals electronic system records it as sent. b. In any event, Ms Isaacs was given an option to have the hearing rescheduled to another day, and that was taken up. In doing so, Ms Isaacs has waived any detriment to proceeding on the day. c. My practice with hearings, is to focus on matters that are advanced at the hearing, and that is what occurred in this case. If the applicant (Ms Shelton Agar) considered I had not considered particular claims, she could have appealed that or applied for a rehearing, but has not done so. If certain claims were not advanced or considered, that would not be a matter for the respondent (Ms Isaacs) to take, because those are not her applications.
I am not persuaded that there is any prospect of a substantial wrong or miscarriage of justice, so the rehearing application cannot be granted.

Order

The application for rehearing is dismissed.

Reasons

The Tribunal must consider an application for rehearing filed by Ms Isaacs, the respondent. A video hearing was convened today to consider that rehearing request.

BACKGROUND

In terms of this rehearing request, the background can be summarised succinctly as follows.
The premises are a unit titled complex in Wellington. Ms Isaac’s is an owner of commercial units with street frontage.
Ms Shelton Agar is also a unit owner in the complex, and filed an application against Ms Isaacs, seeking a declaration that Ms Isaac’s had not complied with the body corporate operational rules around signage on the commercial units.
I prehearing case conference was convened on 11 September 2025. At that case conference, I raised a concern that normally disputes around compliance with operation rules are advanced by the body corporate, not an individual unit owner. In light of that, I directed that a video hearing be convened to consider that jurisdictional question.
The applicant, Ms Shelton Agar, contacted the Tribunal that same day, opposing only hearing the jurisdictional issue.
Having considered that request, I determined that the hearing should proceed to consider the full application. On 30 September 2025, the Tribunal emailed both parties stating: Good morning The adjudicator hearing this matter has advised that given the hearing will not be until November, that in order to reduce any delay with matters when the hearing is convened on 25 November that he would like to hear all of the case. That means he would like to hear what you both have to say about the matter the adjudicator raised regarding the application being from another unit owner, and also the claim from the Agar's that is whether the rules have been breached. You will both need to be prepared to argue both matters on the day of the hearing.
That email was sent the parties at 8:30am on 30 September 2025. The address used for Ms Isaacs was: family@isaacs.gen.nz. Ms Isaac’s reports not receiving that email.
The video hearing proceeded on 25 November 2025 as scheduled. At the hearing Ms Isaacs advised she was not aware that the hearing was proceeding to consider all matters, but was given an option to have the hearing adjourned, but she elected to proceed.
The hearing proceeded, and an order was issued on 28 January 2026. Ms Shelton Agar’s application was successful. The Tribunal made a declaration that Ms Isaacs had not complied with the body corporate operational rules, and she was ordered to pay the $500 filing fee to Ms Shelton Agar.
Ms Isaac’s applied for a rehearing. I will set out the reasons for this below.
A further video hearing was convened today, 21 May 2026, to consider whether a rehearing would be approved. Both parties appeared at the hearing. MS ISAAC’S POSITION
Ms Isaacs submits that a rehearing should be granted for these reasons: a. The hearing process was not a fair process. Ms Issacs states that she was only advised during the hearing that it was to be a full hearing, not just about jurisdiction. Ms Isaacs accepts that she was given the option to adjourn and to hear the matter another day, which she declined, but on reflection, she should have taken up that offer. b. Not all issues were considered, in particular, compliance with the operational rules, rule 7(a) and replacement of a broken window. c. Ms Isaacs has been unable to find any email that the earlier hearing was to consider anything other than jurisdiction. RESPONDENT’S POSITION
The Respondent opposes the rehearing request for these reasons: a. Notice was given that the hearing was for all matters; if Ms Isaacs did not open the email that is not relevant. b. Mr Isaacs waived the option for an adjournment at the hearing. c. This is a case of Ms Isaacs seeking another opportunity to relitigate the matter.

RELEVANT LAW

Section 105 of the Residential Tenancies Act 1986 relates to rehearings. Subsection 1 confirms that: The Tribunal shall in all proceedings have the power to order a rehearing of the whole or any part of the proceedings on the ground that a substantial wrong or miscarriage of justice has or may have occurred or is likely to occur.
The applicant need not establish an actual miscarriage of justice or substantial wrong, only that it may have occurred. However, in the District Court Judgment of Wellington City Council v McMillan [2003] DCR 50, Judge Tuohy held that the statutory language set a high standard, and that: [18] ... They most obviously apply ... to cases of procedural error eg a hearing which takes place in the absence of a party who has not been given notice of it; the improper admission or rejection of evidence; misconduct by the adjudicator or by one of the parties or a witness. The words may also encompass the discovery of new and important evidence not previously available. [19] In my view, however, the words do not cover a complaint that the Tribunal was merely mistaken or wrong in its findings of fact or in its application of the law. There are two reasons for this. First the strength of the language in s 105 is such that something more than a mere wrong decision must be shown. The section does not speak of a decision being wrong, but of a substantial wrong or miscarriage of justice occurring. This implies obvious injustice, not merely an erroneous decision. [20] Secondly, if a mere erroneous decision is enough, whether the error is factual or legal or both, it would enable parties to in effect appeal any decision twice: once to the very Tribunal which made it by way of an application for rehearing, and then again to the District Court against the grant or refusal of the application for rehearing. Not only does that offend the general hierarchical nature of the appeal system, it would also make the time limit for filing notice of appeal against an original decision nugatory.”
As noted by Judge Christiansen in the District Court appeal of Loh v Puri [2019] NZDC 1993: In this Court’s view the Tribunal’s reasons for refusing a rehearing are correct. Rehearings are about challenges to processes and procedures and are not about what the adjudicator found or the decisions the adjudicator made.

ANALYSIS

I have set out the relevant law that applies to rehearings above. In short, re- hearings are a safety measure should something have gone wrong with the hearing, normally on a procedural basis, in which case a rehearing can be approved so that the matter then returns to the Tribunal for a further hearing.
I have considered the submissions from Ms Isaacs, and find that no procedural issues have been identified sufficient to approve a rehearing. That is, I am not persuaded that there is any potential for a substantial wrong or miscarriage of justice to justify a rehearing, for these reasons. a. I am satisfied that the parties were notified in advance that the hearing would be for all matters. I cannot explain why Ms Isaacs did not receive the email, it was sent at the same time as the email to Ms Shelton Agar, and the Tribunals electronic system records it as sent. b. In any event, Ms Isaacs was given an option to have the hearing rescheduled to another day, and that was taken up. In doing so, Ms Isaacs has waived any detriment to proceeding on the day. c. My practice with hearings, is to focus on matters that are advanced at the hearing, and that is what occurred in this case. If the applicant (Ms Shelton Agar) considered I had not considered particular claims, she could have appealed that or applied for a rehearing, but has not done so. If certain claims were not advanced or considered, that would not be a matter for the respondent (Ms Isaacs) to take, because those are not her applications.
I am not persuaded that there is any prospect of a substantial wrong or miscarriage of justice, so the rehearing application cannot be granted.

Tenancy Tribunal case 9065346 — Unit Titles in Thorndon, Wellington

At a glance

Tenancy Tribunal case 9065346 — Unit Titles in Thorndon, Wellington

At a glance

Claims & awards

Order

Reasons

BACKGROUND

RELEVANT LAW

ANALYSIS

Topics & place

Residential Tenancies Act sections

Key findings

Property management

Frequently asked questions

Claims & awards

Order

Reasons

BACKGROUND

RELEVANT LAW

ANALYSIS

Topics & place

Residential Tenancies Act sections

Key findings

Property management

Frequently asked questions