What was the outcome of Tenancy Tribunal case 9068744?

The tribunal order states: The application for rehearing is dismissed.

How much money was awarded in case 9068744?

Verified claim lines are listed on this page.

What type of tenancy dispute was case 9068744?

The primary dispute was Leaks. Related themes: Unit Titles.

Where can I read the official tribunal order for case 9068744?

The official Ministry of Justice published order is available at https://forms.justice.govt.nz/search/Documents/TTV2/PDF/13474002-Tribunal_Order.pdf.

What was the outcome of Tenancy Tribunal case 9068744?

The tribunal order states: The application for rehearing is dismissed.

How much money was awarded in case 9068744?

Verified claim lines are listed on this page.

What type of tenancy dispute was case 9068744?

The primary dispute was Leaks. Related themes: Unit Titles.

Where can I read the official tribunal order for case 9068744?

The official Ministry of Justice published order is available at https://forms.justice.govt.nz/search/Documents/TTV2/PDF/13474002-Tribunal_Order.pdf.

Auckland Central, Auckland Tenancy Tribunal Case 9068744 — Leaks

Order

The application for rehearing is dismissed.

Reasons

Both parties attended the rehearing consideration hearing held today.
On 16 February 2026 the Tribunal made an order dismissing Mr Pausina’s claim that the Body Corporate has unlawfully towed his vehicle and transferring Mr Puasina’s claim that the Body Corporate has failed in its obligations to maintain the building to the District Court.
On the 26 February 2026 Mr Pausina applied for a rehearing.
The grounds that Mr Pausina relied on, as expressed in his rehearing application and at today’s hearing are: a. That the Tribunal relied too heavily on Mr Campbell’s oral testimony that the likely cost of building repairs was in excess of the $100,000.00 jurisdictional limit of the Tribunal. b. Mr Pausina does not believe that the Body Corporate repairs are necessary to fix the problems to the building and that he believes that less costly repairs under $100,000.00 could be made. He also says that the quoted repairs by Mr Campbell are to complete other work not relevant to the leaks. c. That the hearing did not move matters on, rather it was distracting. d. That the Tribunal referred to Mr Pausina being able to join the committee, but Mr Pausina says he could not join the committee, he had tried that, and he did not manage to get on the committee. e. That Mr Aarts had given the Tribunal misleading and incorrect evidence that the building did not leak. f. That there was further evidence of the Body Corporate towing other vehicles. g. That the Body Corporate was inconsistent and biased in its approach to towing. Mr Pausina submits that it towed some owner’s vehicles when they parked in the spaces but did not tow others who parked there. The law relating to rehearings.
Section 105(1) Residential Tenancies Act 1986 provides that the Tribunal has the power to order a rehearing where “a substantial wrong or miscarriage of justice has or may have occurred or is likely to occur”.
The District Court has held that if the Tribunal was simply wrong in its findings of fact, or its application of the law, this is not sufficient to establish a miscarriage of justice a rehearing is not an alternative to an appeal. 1 Furthermore, a rehearing will not be granted just because a party is unhappy with the decision, or to give them a second opportunity to present their case.
The applicant need not establish an actual miscarriage of justice or substantial wrong, only that it may have occurred. However, in the District Court Judgment of Wellington City Council v McMillan [2003] DCR 50, Judge Tuohy held that the statutory language set a high standard, and that: [18] ... They most obviously apply ... to cases of procedural error eg a hearing which takes place in the absence of a party who has not been given notice of it; the improper admission or rejection of evidence; misconduct by the adjudicator or by one of the parties or a witness. The words may also encompass the discovery of new and important evidence not previously available. [19] In my view, however, the words do not cover a complaint that the Tribunal was merely mistaken or wrong in its findings of fact or in its application of the law. There are two reasons for this. First the strength of the language in s 105 is such that something more than a mere wrong decision must be shown. The section does not speak of a 1 Yogeswaran v Doubletree Properties Ltd [2021] NZDC 15704 decision being wrong, but of a substantial wrong or miscarriage of justice occurring. This implies obvious injustice, not merely an erroneous decision. [20] Secondly, if a mere erroneous decision is enough, whether the error is factual or legal or both, it would enable parties to in effect appeal any decision twice: once to the very Tribunal which made it by way of an application for rehearing, and then again to the District Court against the grant or refusal of the application for rehearing. Not only does that offend the general hierarchical nature of the appeal system, it would also make the time limit for filing notice of appeal against an original decision nugatory.
A rehearing may also be granted where there is new evidence that was not reasonably available at the first hearing, if it could have affected the outcome. In Jemma Trust v Rutherford (DC North Shore, CIV-2009-044-2056, 11 December 1999), the District Court quoted an extract from the Court of Appeal outlining the relevant considerations: The principles upon which further evidence is admitted are designed to balance the interests of the person seeking to adduce such evidence on the one hand with the interests of the opposite party is on the other. They are also designed to reflect the public interest in ensuring, so far as is possible, that parties put up their best case at trial. Any other approach would be very wasteful of public resources. The conventional requirements are that the further evidence must be fresh, it must be credible and it must be cogent. Evidence is not regarded as fresh if it could with reasonable diligence have been produced at the trial....While the absence of freshness is not an absolute disqualification, the criteria for admission in such circumstances must be very strict. In our view, when the evidence is not fresh it should not be admitted unless the circumstances are exceptional and the grounds compelling.
As noted by Judge Christiansen in the District Court appeal of Loh v Puri [2019] NZDC. In this Court’s view the Tribunal’s reasons for refusing a rehearing are correct. Rehearings are about challenges to processes and procedures and are not about what the adjudicator found or the decisions the adjudicator made.

Has a substantial wrong or miscarriage of justice occurred?

For the following reasons Mr Pausina has failed to establish the grounds for a rehearing: a. Mr Pausina’s grounds are essentially that he does not agree with or is unhappy with the Tribunal’s decision. b. Mr Pausina’s own evidence on the potential cost, nature and extent of repairs was contradictory, on one hand he submitted that the repairs could be completed for under $100,000, and yet on the other he described the building as one of the “leakiest apartment blocks in the city.” c. Whilst Mr Pausina disputes Mr Campbell’s evidence that the costs are likely to be much more than $100,000, he did not provide any new independent evidence that supported his submissions on costs. d. Much of both Mr Pausina’s and Mr Aarts submissions today went to the heart of the dispute of whether the Body Corporate has failed to maintain the building. The purpose of the rehearing application is not to determine the dispute; but to consider whether there was any miscarriage of justice in transferring the claim to the District Court to be heard. For the above reasons I do not consider that there was any miscarriage of justice. e. The further evidence on towing is not likely to change the outcome nor is it new in the sense that it could have been obtained before the previous hearing.
As the rehearing has not been granted the decision of the 16 February 2026 stands.

Order

The application for rehearing is dismissed.

Reasons

Both parties attended the rehearing consideration hearing held today.
On 16 February 2026 the Tribunal made an order dismissing Mr Pausina’s claim that the Body Corporate has unlawfully towed his vehicle and transferring Mr Puasina’s claim that the Body Corporate has failed in its obligations to maintain the building to the District Court.
On the 26 February 2026 Mr Pausina applied for a rehearing.
The grounds that Mr Pausina relied on, as expressed in his rehearing application and at today’s hearing are: a. That the Tribunal relied too heavily on Mr Campbell’s oral testimony that the likely cost of building repairs was in excess of the $100,000.00 jurisdictional limit of the Tribunal. b. Mr Pausina does not believe that the Body Corporate repairs are necessary to fix the problems to the building and that he believes that less costly repairs under $100,000.00 could be made. He also says that the quoted repairs by Mr Campbell are to complete other work not relevant to the leaks. c. That the hearing did not move matters on, rather it was distracting. d. That the Tribunal referred to Mr Pausina being able to join the committee, but Mr Pausina says he could not join the committee, he had tried that, and he did not manage to get on the committee. e. That Mr Aarts had given the Tribunal misleading and incorrect evidence that the building did not leak. f. That there was further evidence of the Body Corporate towing other vehicles. g. That the Body Corporate was inconsistent and biased in its approach to towing. Mr Pausina submits that it towed some owner’s vehicles when they parked in the spaces but did not tow others who parked there. The law relating to rehearings.
Section 105(1) Residential Tenancies Act 1986 provides that the Tribunal has the power to order a rehearing where “a substantial wrong or miscarriage of justice has or may have occurred or is likely to occur”.
The District Court has held that if the Tribunal was simply wrong in its findings of fact, or its application of the law, this is not sufficient to establish a miscarriage of justice a rehearing is not an alternative to an appeal. 1 Furthermore, a rehearing will not be granted just because a party is unhappy with the decision, or to give them a second opportunity to present their case.
The applicant need not establish an actual miscarriage of justice or substantial wrong, only that it may have occurred. However, in the District Court Judgment of Wellington City Council v McMillan [2003] DCR 50, Judge Tuohy held that the statutory language set a high standard, and that: [18] ... They most obviously apply ... to cases of procedural error eg a hearing which takes place in the absence of a party who has not been given notice of it; the improper admission or rejection of evidence; misconduct by the adjudicator or by one of the parties or a witness. The words may also encompass the discovery of new and important evidence not previously available. [19] In my view, however, the words do not cover a complaint that the Tribunal was merely mistaken or wrong in its findings of fact or in its application of the law. There are two reasons for this. First the strength of the language in s 105 is such that something more than a mere wrong decision must be shown. The section does not speak of a 1 Yogeswaran v Doubletree Properties Ltd [2021] NZDC 15704 decision being wrong, but of a substantial wrong or miscarriage of justice occurring. This implies obvious injustice, not merely an erroneous decision. [20] Secondly, if a mere erroneous decision is enough, whether the error is factual or legal or both, it would enable parties to in effect appeal any decision twice: once to the very Tribunal which made it by way of an application for rehearing, and then again to the District Court against the grant or refusal of the application for rehearing. Not only does that offend the general hierarchical nature of the appeal system, it would also make the time limit for filing notice of appeal against an original decision nugatory.
A rehearing may also be granted where there is new evidence that was not reasonably available at the first hearing, if it could have affected the outcome. In Jemma Trust v Rutherford (DC North Shore, CIV-2009-044-2056, 11 December 1999), the District Court quoted an extract from the Court of Appeal outlining the relevant considerations: The principles upon which further evidence is admitted are designed to balance the interests of the person seeking to adduce such evidence on the one hand with the interests of the opposite party is on the other. They are also designed to reflect the public interest in ensuring, so far as is possible, that parties put up their best case at trial. Any other approach would be very wasteful of public resources. The conventional requirements are that the further evidence must be fresh, it must be credible and it must be cogent. Evidence is not regarded as fresh if it could with reasonable diligence have been produced at the trial....While the absence of freshness is not an absolute disqualification, the criteria for admission in such circumstances must be very strict. In our view, when the evidence is not fresh it should not be admitted unless the circumstances are exceptional and the grounds compelling.
As noted by Judge Christiansen in the District Court appeal of Loh v Puri [2019] NZDC. In this Court’s view the Tribunal’s reasons for refusing a rehearing are correct. Rehearings are about challenges to processes and procedures and are not about what the adjudicator found or the decisions the adjudicator made.

Has a substantial wrong or miscarriage of justice occurred?

For the following reasons Mr Pausina has failed to establish the grounds for a rehearing: a. Mr Pausina’s grounds are essentially that he does not agree with or is unhappy with the Tribunal’s decision. b. Mr Pausina’s own evidence on the potential cost, nature and extent of repairs was contradictory, on one hand he submitted that the repairs could be completed for under $100,000, and yet on the other he described the building as one of the “leakiest apartment blocks in the city.” c. Whilst Mr Pausina disputes Mr Campbell’s evidence that the costs are likely to be much more than $100,000, he did not provide any new independent evidence that supported his submissions on costs. d. Much of both Mr Pausina’s and Mr Aarts submissions today went to the heart of the dispute of whether the Body Corporate has failed to maintain the building. The purpose of the rehearing application is not to determine the dispute; but to consider whether there was any miscarriage of justice in transferring the claim to the District Court to be heard. For the above reasons I do not consider that there was any miscarriage of justice. e. The further evidence on towing is not likely to change the outcome nor is it new in the sense that it could have been obtained before the previous hearing.
As the rehearing has not been granted the decision of the 16 February 2026 stands.

Tenancy Tribunal case 9068744 — Leaks in Auckland Central, Auckland

At a glance

Tenancy Tribunal case 9068744 — Leaks in Auckland Central, Auckland

At a glance

Claims & awards

Order

Reasons

Has a substantial wrong or miscarriage of justice occurred?

Topics & place

Residential Tenancies Act sections

Key findings

Frequently asked questions

Claims & awards

Order

Reasons

Has a substantial wrong or miscarriage of justice occurred?

Topics & place

Residential Tenancies Act sections

Key findings

Frequently asked questions