What was the outcome of Tenancy Tribunal case 5428731?

The tribunal order states: The landlord’s application (5428731) is granted.

How much money was awarded in case 5428731?

Filing Fee: $28.00 awarded to landlord

What type of tenancy dispute was case 5428731?

The dispute type was not classified.

Where can I read the official tribunal order for case 5428731?

The official Ministry of Justice published order is available at https://forms.justice.govt.nz/search/Documents/TTV2/PDF/13054695-Tenancy_Tribunal_Order.pdf.

What was the outcome of Tenancy Tribunal case 5428731?

The tribunal order states: The landlord’s application (5428731) is granted.

How much money was awarded in case 5428731?

Filing Fee: $28.00 awarded to landlord

What type of tenancy dispute was case 5428731?

The dispute type was not classified.

Where can I read the official tribunal order for case 5428731?

The official Ministry of Justice published order is available at https://forms.justice.govt.nz/search/Documents/TTV2/PDF/13054695-Tenancy_Tribunal_Order.pdf.

19 Glucina Place, Glen Eden, Auckland 0602 Tenancy Tribunal Case 5428731 — Tenancy dispute

Claims and awards in Tenancy Tribunal application 5428731 — net $28.00 NZD. Amounts reconciled from the published order (claims sum and net total). Verify on MoJ.
Claim	Landlord	Reason
Filing fee reimbursement	$28.00	Filing fee reimbursement
Net award	$28.00
Total payable by Tenant to Landlord	$28.00

Claims and awards in Tenancy Tribunal application 5428731 — net $28.00 NZD. Amounts reconciled from the published order (claims sum and net total). Verify on MoJ.
Claim	Landlord	Reason
Filing fee reimbursement	$28.00	Filing fee reimbursement
Net award	$28.00
Total payable by Tenant to Landlord	$28.00

Order

The landlord’s application (5428731) is granted.
The tenancy of Paanyyah Toka-Puukawa Miakoda Jhaa and Rhzaney Te Amo at 19 Glucina Place, Glen Eden, Auckland 0602 is terminated, and possession is granted to Spectre Property Management Services Limited As Agent For Alston D'silva and Alston D'Silva, at 11.59 pm, Tuesday, 20 January 2026.
The tenants’ applications (5422196 and 5425268) are dismissed. DescriptionLandlord Filing fee reimbursement$28.00 Total award$28.00 Total payable by Tenant to Landlord$28.00

Reasons

The hearing was conducted by video conference on 30 January 2026.
Ms Erlikhman attended for the landlord by teleconference.
Ms Te Amo attended and addressed me on behalf of the tenants by teleconference. Ms Jhaa, the second tenant, attended the hearing but did not address me. Introduction
There are three applications before the Tribunal: a. a landlord application (5428731) dated 20 January 2026 seeking termination and possession of the premises following the expiry of a 42- day notice. b. a tenant application (5425268) dated 13 January 2026 challenging the validity of that termination notice and seeking to have it set aside or suspended; and c. an earlier tenant application (5422196) dated 6 January 2026 alleging misrepresentation at the start of the tenancy.
I will first deal with the landlord’s application dated 20 January 2026 together with the tenant’s second application dated 13 January 2026. These applications are closely connected because the tenant’s second application directly challenges the validity of the termination notice relied upon by the landlord. The outcome of that challenge necessarily determines whether the landlord is entitled to possession.
I will then deal with the tenant’s first application dated 6 January 2026. The landlord’s application (5428731) and the tenant’s second application (5425268) Background
On 4 December 2025, the landlord’s agent issued a written notice to terminate the tenancy under section 51(2)(a) of the Residential Tenancies Act 1986 (“the Act”). The notice stated that the landlord or the landlord’s family wished to move into the premises and required vacant possession by the end of the day on 20 January “2025”. (emphasis mine)
It is common ground that the reference to the year “2025” was incorrect and that the notice was intended to take effect on 20 January 2026.
The tenants did not vacate on that date and remain in occupation. The landlord therefore applied for termination and possession. The tenants filed a second application seeking Tribunal oversight of the notice and interim relief. Issues
The issues I must determine are: a. Whether the termination notice dated 4 December 2025 is valid under section 51(2)(a) of the Act, notwithstanding the incorrect year and later correspondence; and b. If the notice is valid, whether the Tribunal has jurisdiction to suspend or set it aside on an interim basis. Submissions and evidence
Ms Te Amo challenged the validity of the termination notice on two principal grounds. a. First, Ms Te Amo submitted that the termination notice dated 4 December 2025 was defective because it referred to a termination date of 20 January 2025 rather than 20 January 2026. She submitted that section 54 of the Act requires a termination notice to be clear and to specify the correct termination date. She said that an incorrect year rendered the notice invalid. Ms Te Amo accepted that the tenants understood the notice to be a 42-day notice, but submitted that it was not her responsibility to identify or correct the landlord’s error. She said that she did not calculate the days herself and relied on the notice as written. She submitted that the landlord, through the agent, was required to ensure the notice was accurate and compliant, and that the defect could not be cured by the tenants’ understanding or conduct. b. Second, Ms Te Amo submitted that the landlord’s reasons for requiring the premises were inconsistent and therefore undermined the validity of the notice. She referred to the original notice, which stated that the landlord or the landlord’s family intended to occupy the property, and contrasted this with later correspondence dated 13 January 2026, which referred to the property being developed at a later stage. Ms Te Amo submitted that this created confusion as to whether the landlord genuinely required the premises as a principal place of residence. She said that she did not understand whether the landlord intended to move in, intended to develop the property, or required the property because of a loss of employment. She submitted that these shifting explanations caused her to question whether section 51(2)(a) had been properly relied upon. She said that this confusion, together with the incorrect termination date, led her to lodge the second tenant application seeking Tribunal oversight and interim relief.
Ms Erlikhman submitted that the reference to 20 January 2025 in the termination notice was an obvious typographical error. She submitted that the tenants clearly understood that the intended termination date was 20 January 2026, being 42 days from the date the notice was issued.
Ms Erlikhman relied on the tenants’ conduct and correspondence, including emails in which the tenants sought an extension of time in January 2026 and advised, on 20 January 2026, that they were unable to vacate on that date. She submitted that this demonstrated the tenants’ awareness of the correct termination date and that they were not misled or prejudiced by the error.
In relation to the reasons for termination, Ms Erlikhman submitted that the landlord genuinely required the premises for occupation due to a change in personal circumstances, including the need to vacate his current accommodation. She accepted that an email referred to the property being developed at a later stage, but submitted that this did not change the basis of the termination notice. She said that the reference to future development was explanatory only and that the landlord’s intention to occupy the premises was genuine and consistent with section 51(2)(a). Validity of the termination notice – incorrect termination year
The termination notice dated 4 December 2025 plainly contains a typographical error in referring to the year “2025” rather than “2026”. The issue is whether that error renders the notice invalid.
In assessing this issue, I must consider the substance and effect of the notice, rather than the presence of a technical defect alone. The purpose of a termination notice under section 51 of the Act is to give the tenant clear and adequate notice of when the tenancy will end so that the tenant has a fair opportunity to vacate.
I am satisfied that Ms Te Amo was aware that the intended termination date was 20 January 2026. The tenants’ conduct demonstrates this clearly. They did not attempt to vacate in January 2025, which would in any event have been impossible as the tenancy had not yet commenced at that time. Instead, the tenants treated the notice as expiring in January 2026. They sought an extension of time in January 2026 and, on 20 January 2026, advised the landlord that they were unable to vacate on that date.
In my view, this conduct is inconsistent with any genuine misunderstanding about the termination date. It demonstrates that the tenants understood the notice to be a 42-day notice expiring on 20 January 2026, notwithstanding the incorrect year.
The critical question is whether the tenants were prejudiced by the error. I am satisfied that they were not. Ms Te Amo was not required to vacate earlier than 42 days after service of the notice. She was afforded the full statutory notice period and, in fact, has remained in occupation for longer than that minimum period.
The Act recognises that errors can occur in termination notices. Where a landlord inadvertently gives less than the minimum statutory notice, the Tribunal has jurisdiction under sections 51(7) and 51(9) to vary the notice so that the required minimum period is met. Those provisions are directed at preventing prejudice to tenants where insufficient notice has been given.
This is not a case where the notice period was shortened or where the tenants’ ability to comply with the notice was compromised. The incorrect year did not deprive the tenants of time, clarity, or opportunity to vacate. Accordingly, the protective purpose of sections 51(7) and 51(9) is not engaged.
In these circumstances, I find that the incorrect year was a clerical error that did not affect the validity or operation of the notice. The notice achieved its statutory purpose of giving the tenants at least 42 days’ notice of termination. Alleged inconsistency in reasons
Ms Te Amo also relied on an email dated 13 January 2026 which referred to the property being developed at a later stage. She submitted that this was inconsistent with the original reason given in the termination notice and undermined the validity of the notice.
In assessing this submission, I begin with the termination notice itself. The notice expressly relied on section 51(2)(a) and stated that the landlord or the landlord’s family wished to occupy the premises. That is a lawful ground for termination of a periodic tenancy on 42 days’ notice.
Section 51(2)(a) does not require that occupation be the landlord’s sole or permanent intention, nor does it prohibit the landlord from having future plans for the property. What the section requires is that the landlord genuinely requires the premises, within 90 days after the termination date, as the principal place of residence for the landlord or a member of the landlord’s family for at least 90 days.
The later reference to possible development was confusing and poorly expressed. However, when read in context, it did not state that the landlord would not occupy the premises or that development would occur immediately. Rather, it referred to development at some future point.
Importantly, the evidence before me supports the conclusion that the landlord required the premises for occupation due to a change in personal circumstances and the need to vacate his current accommodation. Ms Erlikhman’s submissions were consistent on this point, and there was no evidence that the landlord did not intend to occupy the premises in accordance with section 51(2)(a).
I am therefore satisfied that the reference to possible future development did not change or materially alter the basis on which the termination notice was issued. The statutory ground relied upon remained occupation by the landlord or the landlord’s family.
In those circumstances, I do not accept Ms Te Amo’s submission that the termination notice was invalid because of inconsistent reasons. Conclusion on validity
Taking these matters together, I find that the termination notice dated 4 December 2025 is a valid notice under section 51(2)(a) of the Act. The tenancy terminated in accordance with that notice on 20 January 2026. Interim relief or suspension
Ms Te Amo sought to have the termination notice suspended on an interim basis. She submitted that suspension was necessary to allow the Tribunal to determine the issues she had raised, including the incorrect termination year and the alleged inconsistency in the landlord’s reasons for requiring the premises.
I have considered whether I have jurisdiction under the Act to suspend the operation of the termination notice. Once I have determined that a termination notice is lawful and effective, the Act does not confer any general power on the Tribunal to suspend, stay, or otherwise delay the effect of that notice.
The Tribunal’s powers in relation to termination notices are limited. Where a notice is invalid, the Tribunal may declare it retaliatory and of no effect under section 54 of the Act. Where insufficient notice has been given, the Tribunal may vary the notice under sections 51(7) and 51(9) so that the minimum statutory notice period is met. However, where a valid notice has been given and the statutory requirements are satisfied, the Tribunal does not have authority to prevent the notice from taking effect.
In this case, having found that the termination notice dated 4 December 2025 is valid and that the tenants were given at least the minimum notice required by the Act, there is no statutory basis upon which I can suspend its operation. I cannot grant interim relief that would have the effect of extending a tenancy beyond the termination date fixed by a lawful notice.
Accordingly, the tenants’ application dated 13 January 2026, insofar as it seeks suspension or interim relief in relation to the termination notice, is dismissed.
As the tenancy terminated on 20 January 2026 in accordance with the notice, possession of the premises reverted to the landlord on that date. The tenant’s first application (5422196)
I now turn to the tenants’ first application dated 6 January 2026.
In this application, Ms Te Amo alleges that she entered into the tenancy agreement as a result of misrepresentation by the landlord. She relies on two alleged representations. a. that the property included a garage structure (also referred to by the parties as a shed); and b. that the landlord told one of the tenants that he intended to be away from the property for at least one year, creating an expectation of stability. The law
Under section 78(1)(g) of the Act, the Tribunal may vary or set aside a tenancy agreement if it is satisfied that the tenant entered into the agreement because of the landlord’s misrepresentation. The onus is on the tenant to establish, on the balance of probabilities, both that a misrepresentation was made and that it induced the tenant to enter into the tenancy. Expectation of stability
I accept that Ms Te Amo was seeking a stable home and that stability was important to her personal circumstances. She gave evidence that she wanted certainty and believed she would be able to remain in the property for a reasonable period.
However, the tenancy agreement signed on 4 September 2025 clearly created a periodic tenancy, not a fixed-term tenancy. The agreement did not specify any minimum duration or guarantee of occupation for a particular period.
A periodic tenancy carries risk for both parties. A tenant may terminate a periodic tenancy at any time by giving at least 21 days’ notice under section 51(2A). A landlord may terminate a periodic tenancy by giving at least 90 days’ notice under section 51(1), or by giving at least 42 days’ notice in the specific circumstances set out in section 51(2).
Even if I accept Ms Te Amo’s evidence that the landlord told her that he intended to be away from the property for approximately one year, such a statement cannot override the legal effect of the tenancy agreement that was entered into. The agreement did not reflect a fixed-term arrangement and did not provide contractual certainty of occupation for any defined period.
In those circumstances, I am not satisfied that any expectation of stability relied upon by Ms Te Amo can amount to a misrepresentation capable of engaging section 78(1)(g). I therefore reject the submission that the tenancy should be set aside or varied on this basis. Alleged misrepresentation about the garage structure
Ms Te Amo also alleged that the property was advertised as including a garage structure, which she variously described as a shed or garage, and that this was a material factor in her decision to accept the tenancy.
At the hearing, it became clear that both parties were referring to the same structure. The structure is a freestanding garage building located on the property. It is of a size comparable to a single garage and includes a workshop area. For clarity, I refer to it as the garage structure.
Ms Te Amo submitted that the garage structure was shown to her during a video viewing of the property and that she believed it formed part of the tenancy. She said that she required the garage structure for storage and practical use and would not have accepted the tenancy had she known it was excluded.
Ms Erlikhman accepted that an advertisement may have incorrectly referred to a garage, but submitted that the tenancy agreement clearly excluded the garage structure from the tenancy. She relied on the tenancy agreement itself, including clause 45, which expressly states that the garage does not form part of the tenancy and that the tenant has no right of access to it.
The tenancy agreement also excludes the garage structure under the “Chattels Provided with the Tenancy” section on page 1. The agreement was signed by Ms Te Amo.
Ms Te Amo gave evidence that she did not read the tenancy agreement carefully and simply signed it. She said that she would not have signed the agreement had she appreciated that the garage structure was excluded.
I find that this evidence is inconsistent with Ms Te Amo’s conduct after the tenancy commenced. There is no evidence that she raised the issue promptly, protested to the agent, or otherwise asserted that the garage structure should have been included contrary to the written agreement.
If the inclusion of the garage structure had been a material factor inducing the tenancy, I would expect the issue to have been raised immediately or very shortly after possession was taken. It was not. The absence of any prompt complaint weighs against the claim that the garage structure was central to Ms Te Amo’s decision to enter into the tenancy.
Further, Ms Te Amo stated in an email to Ms Erlikhman dated on or about 22 August 2025: “Since the owner would consider us can we please take the home and sign forms I like the house I don’t need to see the inside I’m happy to take the house...”. If the garage structure had been a material factor in her decision to accept the tenancy, I would have expected it to be raised in that correspondence or shortly after possession was taken. It was not.
Having considered all the evidence, I am not satisfied on the balance of probabilities that Ms Te Amo entered into the tenancy agreement because of a misrepresentation about the garage structure. While there may have been confusion or misunderstanding, that is not sufficient to meet the statutory test under section 78(1)(g).
Accordingly, the tenant’s claim of misrepresentation in relation to the garage structure is not proved. Documentary material
Ms Te Amo objected to additional documents being received.
The contents of those documents were discussed during the hearing. Ms Te Amo had an opportunity to respond and did not challenge their contents. None of the documents raised new issues.
Under section 97(4) of the Act, the Tribunal may receive any document that may assist it to deal effectually with the matters before it. I was entitled to receive and consider the material. Filing fee
Because Spectre Property Management Services Limited As Agent For Alston D'silva, Alston D'Silva has wholly succeeded with the claim, I must reimburse the filing fee. Name suppression
Paanyyah Toka-Puukawa Miakoda Jhaa, Rhzaney Te Amo sought name suppression under section 95A(4) of the Act.
Section 95A(4) provides that the Tribunal may make an order suppressing the name of a party, having regard to the interests of the parties and the public interest.
The onus is on Ms Te Amo to establish the grounds in support of her application for name suppression. General concern, embarrassment, or the ordinary consequences of being a party to Tribunal proceedings are not sufficient to meet that threshold.
Ms Te Amo did not provide evidence that publication of her name would adversely affect her interests or those of Ms Jhaa within the meaning of section 95A(4). While I acknowledge that Tribunal proceedings can be stressful and that Ms Te Amo has experienced housing difficulties, those matters do not, of themselves, justify suppression.
I am not satisfied that Ms Te Amo has discharged that burden. Accordingly, her application for name suppression is declined.

Tenancy Tribunal case 5428731 — Tenancy dispute at 19 Glucina Place, Glen Eden, Auckland 0602

At a glance

Tenancy Tribunal case 5428731 — Tenancy dispute at 19 Glucina Place, Glen Eden, Auckland 0602

At a glance

Award balance

Claims & awards

Order

Reasons

Topics & place

Residential Tenancies Act sections

Key findings

Property management

Frequently asked questions

Award balance

Claims & awards

Order

Reasons

Topics & place

Residential Tenancies Act sections

Key findings

Property management

Frequently asked questions