What was the outcome of Tenancy Tribunal case 5238031?

The tribunal order states: Milton Bloomfield must pay A1 Property Managers Limited and Kura Ratana

How much money was awarded in case 5238031?

Filing Fee: $27.00 awarded to landlord; Property Damage: $500.00 awarded to landlord

What type of tenancy dispute was case 5238031?

The primary dispute was Property damage.

Where can I read the official tribunal order for case 5238031?

The official Ministry of Justice published order is available at https://forms.justice.govt.nz/search/Documents/TTV2/PDF/11959070-Tenancy_Tribunal_Order.pdf.

What was the outcome of Tenancy Tribunal case 5238031?

The tribunal order states: Milton Bloomfield must pay A1 Property Managers Limited and Kura Ratana

How much money was awarded in case 5238031?

Filing Fee: $27.00 awarded to landlord; Property Damage: $500.00 awarded to landlord

What type of tenancy dispute was case 5238031?

The primary dispute was Property damage.

Where can I read the official tribunal order for case 5238031?

The official Ministry of Justice published order is available at https://forms.justice.govt.nz/search/Documents/TTV2/PDF/11959070-Tenancy_Tribunal_Order.pdf.

16 Wheatsheaf Lane, Heathcote Valley, Christchurch 8022 Tenancy Tribunal Case 5238031 — Property damage

Claims and awards in Tenancy Tribunal application 5238031 — net $27.00 NZD. Amounts reconciled from the published order (claims sum and net total). Verify on MoJ.
Claim	Landlord	Reason
Damaged Hob (insurance excess	$500.00	Damaged Hob (insurance excess
Filing fee reimbursement	$27.00	Filing fee reimbursement
Net award	$27.00
Total payable by Tenant to Landlord	$27.00

Order

Milton Bloomfield must pay A1 Property Managers Limited and Kura Ratana $27.00 immediately, calculated as shown in table below.
The Bond Centre is to pay the remaining bond of $500.00 (6430024-001) to A1 Property Managers Limited as agent for Kura Ratana immediately.
The tenant’s application is dismissed.

Reasons

Both parties attended the hearing. Mr Wilson and Ms McLauchlan represented the landlord.
Mr Bloomfield had a tenancy of the premises commencing on 19 November 2021. The tenancy ended on 15 April 2025 and the landlord applied for the costs (limited to the insurance excess) to replace the hob at the premises, reimbursement of the filing fee, and payment of the remaining bond.
Mr Bloomfield cross applied for payment of the bond and for exemplary damages for issuing a retaliatory notice, harassment, and unlawful entry.

Is Mr Bloomfield liable for the damage to the hob?

To be successful in a claim for damage to the premises, the landlord must prove that damage occurred during the tenancy and is more than fair wear and tear. If this is established, to avoid liability, the tenant must prove they, or others at the premises with their permission, did not carelessly or intentionally cause or permit the damage: sections 40(2)(a), 41 and 49B of the Residential Tenancies Act 1986 (the Act).
Where the damage is caused carelessly, and is covered by the landlord's insurance, the tenant's liability is limited to the lesser of the insurance excess or four weeks' rent: section 49B(3)(a) of the Act.
Carelessness is not defined in the Act, but it has its normal meaning of lack of care, negligence or lack of forethought. The standard of care required is similar to the standard of care required by the general law of tort in negligence cases. Thus, the question can be expressed as whether the tenant, or some other person at the premises with the tenant’s permission, was exercising the degree of care and attention that a reasonable and prudent tenant would exercise in the circumstances.
There was no dispute that the ceramic hob was damaged during the tenancy. The damage was a chip on the edge of the hob. I am satisfied that this damage is beyond what can reasonably be considered to be fair wear and tear.
Mr Bloomfield said that he did not know how the damage occurred but he assumes it was caused pot or pan hitting the edge of hob. He said the chip grew larger over time with use and cleaning. He claims that the damage was caused accidentally rather than carelessly.
As mentioned, Mr Bloomfield was unable to say how the damage occurred. He has therefore not discharged his onus to prove that it was not caused carelessly or intentionally. However, even if I accept that the damage was occurred in the manner Mr Bloomfield assumes (by a pot or pan hitting the edge of the hob) I would still have found him liable because in my view this is damage caused carelessly. I consider that a reasonable prudent tenant would take care when moving pots around a ceramic hob to ensure that it did not cause the damage that it did.
I therefore find Mr Bloomfield liable for the amount claimed to replace the hob (the insurance excess payable by the landlord under its insurance policy). Mr Bloomfield’s claim for exemplary damages
Mr Bloomfield’s clam for exemplary damages arises out of the circumstances surrounding the sale of the property by the landlord and the ending of the tenancy.
On 5 November 2024 the landlord gave Mr Bloomfield written notice of the property going on the market for sale. The notice included an explanation of Mr Bloomfield’s right to receive reasonable notice if the landlord wished to show prospective purchasers through the property and Mr Bloomfield’s obligation to not unreasonably withhold consent to access.
An appraisal was done by the real estate agent engaged by the landlord to sell the property and photographs were taken for marketing. Mr Bloomfield said that the real estate agent told him at the time that some of his possessions would be seen in the photographs., It appears that Mr Bloomfield did not express any concerns about this at the time.
Then, on 13 January 2025, Mr Bloomfield said that he had a phone conversation with the real estate agent who told him that the owner wanted to hold open homes. He said that he told the real estate agent that he was not comfortable with this. He said that he then spoke to Ms McLauchlan on 14 January and she told him that he could not refuse access for open homes. He said that based on what she told him, he reluctantly agreed to open homes on certain conditions including: that they would only be held on a particular day and time; there would be no access to the garage; and rent would be reduced by $30.00 per week from 14 January. The landlord agreed to the conditions.
The notice to end the tenancy was issued the following day, 15 January, and Mr Bloomfield claims that it was issued in retaliation for him expressing his right to not agree to open homes.
Ms McLauchlan’s disputes that she told Mr Bloomfield that he could not refuse the landlord’s request for open homes. She said she only told him that he must not unreasonably withhold consent to viewings by prospective purchasers.
I prefer Ms McLauchlan’s recall of the conversation on 14 January over that of Mr Bloomfield’s. There is nothing in the email correspondence between the parties before 14 January that refers to the requirement on Mr Bloomfield to agree to open homes. Moreover, the open homes were held on the conditions agreed to between the parties, and there is no evidence that Mr Bloomfield made any complaint about them until 21 March when he withdrew his consent to further open homes and the use of photographs showing his possessions for the purpose of selling the property. There were no further open homes held after this and the photographs were edited to remove any that showed his possessions.

Is the notice to end the tenancy retaliatory?

The Tribunal has the power to declare a notice of termination of no effect if the motivation for giving the notice was wholly or partly because the tenant has enforced his rights under the tenancy agreement or the Act: section 54 of the Act. The giving of a retaliatory notice is declared to be an unlawful act for which exemplary damages up to a maximum of $6,500.00 may be payable: section 109 and schedule 1AA of the Act.
I dismiss the claim for exemplary damages for issuing a retaliatory notice. I do not consider that the landlord had any retaliatory motivation when issuing the notice. Ms McLauchlan said that the sole reason for issuing the notice was because selling the property to an investor who would take on the existing tenancy (as they had originally hoped) was not successful, and the owner wanted to make the property more attractive to prospective owner occupiers as well. Moreover, while Mr Bloomfield may have expressed his reluctance to have open homes, he did agree to them on the conditions he proposed. Therefore, any right that he may have been exercising (to refuse consent to open homes) had been resolved before the notice was issued. As mentioned above, I do not agree that the evidence establishes that he was misled by Ms McLachlan regarding his right to refuse to consent to open homes.

Is the landlord in beach of any obligation regarding entry to the premises?

Section 48 of the Act sets out the landlord’s right to enter the premises. Section 48(4) provides that the landlord may, with the prior consent of the tenant, enter the premises at any reasonable time for the purposes of showing the premises to a prospective purchaser. Entering the premises in breach of section 48 is an unlawful act for which exemplary damages up to a maximum of $1,500.00 may be payable.
Mr Bloomfield claims that the landlord breached section 48(4) when, on 1 April 2025, Ms McLauchlan emailed him stating: “The real estate agent has requested access to your home on Thursday 3 rd April at 3pm. This visit is to show the property to a returning viewer who is interested in purchasing the property. You do not need to be home if you do not wish as the agent can be issued a key for access. please confirm receipt of this information.”
Mr Bloomfield asked for clarification of whether the email was an “instruction” or a “request” and Ms McLachlan responded stating that “we are requesting access” and if the date/time was not suitable to provide an alternative. Mr Bloomfield subsequently made arrangements with the real estate agent and allowed the access as requested.
Mr Bloomfield claims that the landlord was in breach of the Act because the email did not ask for his consent to the entry as required by section 48(4). I do not agree that there is a breach of section 48(4). I find that the request on 1 April for entry was just that - a “request”. While it may not have explicitly asked Mr Bloomfield to provide his consent, the follow up email from Ms McLachlan that same day made it clear that he could refuse when she asked him to provide an alternative if the date and time requested was not suitable. Moreover, it is clear that Mr Bloomfield did consent to the entry when he allowed the real estate agent to conduct the viewing.
This claim is therefore also dismissed.

Did the landlord or their agents harass Mr Bloomfield?

Section 38(2) of the Act provides that a landlord must not cause or permit any interference with the reasonable peace, comfort and privacy of the tenant in the use of the premises.
Where the breach of the tenants’ right in section 38(2) is sufficiently severe that it amounts to harassment it is deemed to be an unlawful act for which exemplary damages of up to $3,000 can be awarded. Harassment means "to trouble, worry or distress" or "to wear out, tire, or exhaust" and "indicates a particular pattern of behaviour directed towards another person": MacDonald v Dodds, CIV-2009-019-001524, DC Hamilton, 26 February 2010.
Mr Bloomfield claims that the communications between him and Ms McLachlan regarding the sale and the ending of the tenancy, including the damage to the hob, were unprofessional and showed an inability to resolve issues. He claims that this caused unnecessary stress and amounted to harassment.
I dismiss this claim. There is nothing in the written communications that support Mr Bloomfield’s claims. While Mr Bloomfield may have wanted the issues with the hob resolved sooner, there was no obligation on the landlord to do so. I accept that the process of selling the property did inevitably cause some disruption and inconvenience for Mr Bloomfield, but I consider that the landlord and Ms McLachlan did what they could to try to accommodate Mr Bloomfield’s needs and minimise any inconvenience.

Should a suppression order be made?

Mr Bloomfield applied, in his application, for a suppression order. Section 95A of the Act provides that the Tribunal must, on the application of a party who has been wholly or substantially successful in the proceedings, order that the party’s name or identifying particulars not be published (unless the limited circumstances set out in the section apply).
Mr Bloomfield has been wholly unsuccessful in his claims. His application for suppression is therefore not granted. Tribunal application fee
The landlord has been fully successful in their claim and are therefore entitled to payment of the Tribunal application fee.

Claims and awards in Tenancy Tribunal application 5238031 — net $27.00 NZD. Amounts reconciled from the published order (claims sum and net total). Verify on MoJ.
Claim	Landlord	Reason
Damaged Hob (insurance excess	$500.00	Damaged Hob (insurance excess
Filing fee reimbursement	$27.00	Filing fee reimbursement
Net award	$27.00
Total payable by Tenant to Landlord	$27.00

Order

Milton Bloomfield must pay A1 Property Managers Limited and Kura Ratana $27.00 immediately, calculated as shown in table below.
The Bond Centre is to pay the remaining bond of $500.00 (6430024-001) to A1 Property Managers Limited as agent for Kura Ratana immediately.
The tenant’s application is dismissed.

Reasons

Both parties attended the hearing. Mr Wilson and Ms McLauchlan represented the landlord.
Mr Bloomfield had a tenancy of the premises commencing on 19 November 2021. The tenancy ended on 15 April 2025 and the landlord applied for the costs (limited to the insurance excess) to replace the hob at the premises, reimbursement of the filing fee, and payment of the remaining bond.
Mr Bloomfield cross applied for payment of the bond and for exemplary damages for issuing a retaliatory notice, harassment, and unlawful entry.

Is Mr Bloomfield liable for the damage to the hob?

To be successful in a claim for damage to the premises, the landlord must prove that damage occurred during the tenancy and is more than fair wear and tear. If this is established, to avoid liability, the tenant must prove they, or others at the premises with their permission, did not carelessly or intentionally cause or permit the damage: sections 40(2)(a), 41 and 49B of the Residential Tenancies Act 1986 (the Act).
Where the damage is caused carelessly, and is covered by the landlord's insurance, the tenant's liability is limited to the lesser of the insurance excess or four weeks' rent: section 49B(3)(a) of the Act.
Carelessness is not defined in the Act, but it has its normal meaning of lack of care, negligence or lack of forethought. The standard of care required is similar to the standard of care required by the general law of tort in negligence cases. Thus, the question can be expressed as whether the tenant, or some other person at the premises with the tenant’s permission, was exercising the degree of care and attention that a reasonable and prudent tenant would exercise in the circumstances.
There was no dispute that the ceramic hob was damaged during the tenancy. The damage was a chip on the edge of the hob. I am satisfied that this damage is beyond what can reasonably be considered to be fair wear and tear.
Mr Bloomfield said that he did not know how the damage occurred but he assumes it was caused pot or pan hitting the edge of hob. He said the chip grew larger over time with use and cleaning. He claims that the damage was caused accidentally rather than carelessly.
As mentioned, Mr Bloomfield was unable to say how the damage occurred. He has therefore not discharged his onus to prove that it was not caused carelessly or intentionally. However, even if I accept that the damage was occurred in the manner Mr Bloomfield assumes (by a pot or pan hitting the edge of the hob) I would still have found him liable because in my view this is damage caused carelessly. I consider that a reasonable prudent tenant would take care when moving pots around a ceramic hob to ensure that it did not cause the damage that it did.
I therefore find Mr Bloomfield liable for the amount claimed to replace the hob (the insurance excess payable by the landlord under its insurance policy). Mr Bloomfield’s claim for exemplary damages
Mr Bloomfield’s clam for exemplary damages arises out of the circumstances surrounding the sale of the property by the landlord and the ending of the tenancy.
On 5 November 2024 the landlord gave Mr Bloomfield written notice of the property going on the market for sale. The notice included an explanation of Mr Bloomfield’s right to receive reasonable notice if the landlord wished to show prospective purchasers through the property and Mr Bloomfield’s obligation to not unreasonably withhold consent to access.
An appraisal was done by the real estate agent engaged by the landlord to sell the property and photographs were taken for marketing. Mr Bloomfield said that the real estate agent told him at the time that some of his possessions would be seen in the photographs., It appears that Mr Bloomfield did not express any concerns about this at the time.
Then, on 13 January 2025, Mr Bloomfield said that he had a phone conversation with the real estate agent who told him that the owner wanted to hold open homes. He said that he told the real estate agent that he was not comfortable with this. He said that he then spoke to Ms McLauchlan on 14 January and she told him that he could not refuse access for open homes. He said that based on what she told him, he reluctantly agreed to open homes on certain conditions including: that they would only be held on a particular day and time; there would be no access to the garage; and rent would be reduced by $30.00 per week from 14 January. The landlord agreed to the conditions.
The notice to end the tenancy was issued the following day, 15 January, and Mr Bloomfield claims that it was issued in retaliation for him expressing his right to not agree to open homes.
Ms McLauchlan’s disputes that she told Mr Bloomfield that he could not refuse the landlord’s request for open homes. She said she only told him that he must not unreasonably withhold consent to viewings by prospective purchasers.
I prefer Ms McLauchlan’s recall of the conversation on 14 January over that of Mr Bloomfield’s. There is nothing in the email correspondence between the parties before 14 January that refers to the requirement on Mr Bloomfield to agree to open homes. Moreover, the open homes were held on the conditions agreed to between the parties, and there is no evidence that Mr Bloomfield made any complaint about them until 21 March when he withdrew his consent to further open homes and the use of photographs showing his possessions for the purpose of selling the property. There were no further open homes held after this and the photographs were edited to remove any that showed his possessions.

Is the notice to end the tenancy retaliatory?

The Tribunal has the power to declare a notice of termination of no effect if the motivation for giving the notice was wholly or partly because the tenant has enforced his rights under the tenancy agreement or the Act: section 54 of the Act. The giving of a retaliatory notice is declared to be an unlawful act for which exemplary damages up to a maximum of $6,500.00 may be payable: section 109 and schedule 1AA of the Act.
I dismiss the claim for exemplary damages for issuing a retaliatory notice. I do not consider that the landlord had any retaliatory motivation when issuing the notice. Ms McLauchlan said that the sole reason for issuing the notice was because selling the property to an investor who would take on the existing tenancy (as they had originally hoped) was not successful, and the owner wanted to make the property more attractive to prospective owner occupiers as well. Moreover, while Mr Bloomfield may have expressed his reluctance to have open homes, he did agree to them on the conditions he proposed. Therefore, any right that he may have been exercising (to refuse consent to open homes) had been resolved before the notice was issued. As mentioned above, I do not agree that the evidence establishes that he was misled by Ms McLachlan regarding his right to refuse to consent to open homes.

Is the landlord in beach of any obligation regarding entry to the premises?

Section 48 of the Act sets out the landlord’s right to enter the premises. Section 48(4) provides that the landlord may, with the prior consent of the tenant, enter the premises at any reasonable time for the purposes of showing the premises to a prospective purchaser. Entering the premises in breach of section 48 is an unlawful act for which exemplary damages up to a maximum of $1,500.00 may be payable.
Mr Bloomfield claims that the landlord breached section 48(4) when, on 1 April 2025, Ms McLauchlan emailed him stating: “The real estate agent has requested access to your home on Thursday 3 rd April at 3pm. This visit is to show the property to a returning viewer who is interested in purchasing the property. You do not need to be home if you do not wish as the agent can be issued a key for access. please confirm receipt of this information.”
Mr Bloomfield asked for clarification of whether the email was an “instruction” or a “request” and Ms McLachlan responded stating that “we are requesting access” and if the date/time was not suitable to provide an alternative. Mr Bloomfield subsequently made arrangements with the real estate agent and allowed the access as requested.
Mr Bloomfield claims that the landlord was in breach of the Act because the email did not ask for his consent to the entry as required by section 48(4). I do not agree that there is a breach of section 48(4). I find that the request on 1 April for entry was just that - a “request”. While it may not have explicitly asked Mr Bloomfield to provide his consent, the follow up email from Ms McLachlan that same day made it clear that he could refuse when she asked him to provide an alternative if the date and time requested was not suitable. Moreover, it is clear that Mr Bloomfield did consent to the entry when he allowed the real estate agent to conduct the viewing.
This claim is therefore also dismissed.

Did the landlord or their agents harass Mr Bloomfield?

Section 38(2) of the Act provides that a landlord must not cause or permit any interference with the reasonable peace, comfort and privacy of the tenant in the use of the premises.
Where the breach of the tenants’ right in section 38(2) is sufficiently severe that it amounts to harassment it is deemed to be an unlawful act for which exemplary damages of up to $3,000 can be awarded. Harassment means "to trouble, worry or distress" or "to wear out, tire, or exhaust" and "indicates a particular pattern of behaviour directed towards another person": MacDonald v Dodds, CIV-2009-019-001524, DC Hamilton, 26 February 2010.
Mr Bloomfield claims that the communications between him and Ms McLachlan regarding the sale and the ending of the tenancy, including the damage to the hob, were unprofessional and showed an inability to resolve issues. He claims that this caused unnecessary stress and amounted to harassment.
I dismiss this claim. There is nothing in the written communications that support Mr Bloomfield’s claims. While Mr Bloomfield may have wanted the issues with the hob resolved sooner, there was no obligation on the landlord to do so. I accept that the process of selling the property did inevitably cause some disruption and inconvenience for Mr Bloomfield, but I consider that the landlord and Ms McLachlan did what they could to try to accommodate Mr Bloomfield’s needs and minimise any inconvenience.

Should a suppression order be made?

Mr Bloomfield applied, in his application, for a suppression order. Section 95A of the Act provides that the Tribunal must, on the application of a party who has been wholly or substantially successful in the proceedings, order that the party’s name or identifying particulars not be published (unless the limited circumstances set out in the section apply).
Mr Bloomfield has been wholly unsuccessful in his claims. His application for suppression is therefore not granted. Tribunal application fee
The landlord has been fully successful in their claim and are therefore entitled to payment of the Tribunal application fee.

Tenancy Tribunal case 5238031 — Property damage at 16 Wheatsheaf Lane, Heathcote Valley, Christchurch 8022

At a glance

Tenancy Tribunal case 5238031 — Property damage at 16 Wheatsheaf Lane, Heathcote Valley, Christchurch 8022

At a glance

Award balance

Claims & awards

Order

Reasons

Is Mr Bloomfield liable for the damage to the hob?

Is the notice to end the tenancy retaliatory?

Is the landlord in beach of any obligation regarding entry to the premises?

Did the landlord or their agents harass Mr Bloomfield?

Should a suppression order be made?

Topics & place

Residential Tenancies Act sections

Key findings

Property management

Frequently asked questions

Award balance

Claims & awards

Order

Reasons

Is Mr Bloomfield liable for the damage to the hob?

Is the notice to end the tenancy retaliatory?

Is the landlord in beach of any obligation regarding entry to the premises?

Did the landlord or their agents harass Mr Bloomfield?

Should a suppression order be made?

Topics & place

Residential Tenancies Act sections

Key findings

Property management

Frequently asked questions